

Security in Transborder Regional Cooperation:
Ukraine vs Poland

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Security in Transborder Regional Cooperation: Ukraine vs Poland

edited by
Olena Kovalchuk

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Stowarzyszenie Absolwentów i Przyjaciół
Wydziału Prawa Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego
Al. Raławickie 14, c-742, 20-950 Lublin
tel./fax 81 445-37-42
e-mail: kkpp@kul.pl, <http://sawp.org.pl>

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Introduction

The development of international cooperation of the regions is one of the driving forces of European integration processes. As one of the features of modern Europe, international cooperation has proved to be an important contribution to strengthening democratic and political stability, economic, ecological, social and cultural development. The result of such cooperation are measured by the advantages the regions have in various spheres of life: science, culture, environmental protection, in the creation of regional development projects, etc.

With the aim “to integrate into the EU” Ukraine has intensified the cross-border cooperation with Poland in order to create promising conditions for the transformation and development of transport, tourism and recreation, finance, logistics infrastructure, which will increase the attractiveness of national territories. However, the developing cross-border cooperation between Poland and Ukraine requires cooperation with regard to improvement of the border protection organisation and border traffic control. Border plenipotentiaries, heads of border and customs units, border crossing administrators should play a significant role in this respect.

Due to the existing challenge and problematic issues, arising on both sides of the Polish-Ukrainian border two educational institutions: John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Poland and the Lutsk National Technical University, Lutsk, Ukraine, launched the project under the title "**Cooperation of Universities supporting the development of security and crisis management of the Lublin and Lutsk transborder regions**". The project is co-financed by the European Union under the Cross-Border Cooperation Program EIS Poland-Belarus-Ukraine 2014-2020 and is aimed at diagnosing problems related to the work of border institutions in the field of security and crisis situations.

In this context the publication is view as indispensable contribution to the development of knowledge in this area. The book describes the current state of cooperation between Poland and Ukraine within the transborder regions in fields of: labor market influence for migration policy in both countries; cyber security instruments and shadow economy measurement to provide economic security of Ukraine; energy security in the context of geopolitical change.

*Dr. Olena Kovalchuk,
Professor, Vice-Rector,
Lutsk National Technical University (Lutsk, Ukraine)*

Olena Baula

Olena Kovalchuk

Olena Liutak

The Concept of Regional Policy on Cross-Border Cooperation in the Context of Implementing Economic Security Strategy

An essential characteristic of the new regionalism approach is its extroversion, which means searching for optimal ways to adapt the participants involved in regional agreements to global processes. However, this approach considers both the leading economic factors (highly qualified human resources; a flexible structure of enterprises based on large enterprises operating in world markets, small and medium-sized enterprises supplying components and providing services; the advantages of scientific and technological work) and “weak location factors”, such as culture, environment and security.

The early 21st century brings new approaches to explaining factors and patterns of the spatial development of systems, including economic areas, which, unlike the neoclassical theory, do not form a single model. They reconsider the values for territorial development of crucial factors (Romanenko, 2018)¹.

The analysis of concepts and theories of spatial development factors allows one to recognize the fact of co-evolution (simultaneous development) and the stimulating effect of factors related to different processes of spatial development and various spheres of life. The difficulty of understanding and studying spatial development lies in the fact that such a space of co-evolution implicitly generates unpredictable connections of heterogeneous motivating forces and crystallizes new points of attraction and new meaningful targets. It is important

¹ Romanenko, Ye.(2018). *Synerhiiprogramtranskordonnohospivrobitystva ta stratehiirehionalnohorozvytku v Ukraini* [The synergy of cross-border cooperation programmes and regional development strategies in Ukraine]. Chernihiv: Polissya Foundation for International and Regional Studies.

to note that putting the focus on them will be necessary to formulate achievable tasks of projects on socio-economic development of regions (Liutak, 2010)².

Programmes of regional international activities should comply with the main provisions of the state regional policy; the state foreign and foreign economic strategies; the state regional policy on cross-border cooperation; EU regional policy; the competitive advantage theory; the strategic management theory and assurance of economic security of all actors.

The programme of international activities in the region should include the following modules: interregional and cross-border cooperation; foreign trade in goods and services; the attraction of investment in the region and investment abroad.

Given the objectives of this research, one should consider only the first module, namely, cross-border cooperation of regions taking into account the basic positions of economic security, which is impossible without good innovation and investment into the development of the region.

The prerequisite for developing the strategy of international activity in the region is a reasonable identification of the main problems of its development with their further segmentation. Thus, which problems can be solved independently; which ones need to be addressed with the help of the state; which ones should be addressed in the framework of cross-border and interregional agreements. In the latter case, with the right organization, one can count on the help of European international structures in methodological, informational and financial terms.

²Liutak, O. M. (2010). Rehionalizatsiia v umovakh formuvanniayevrorehionalnoipolityky Ukrainy [Regionalization under the conditions of developing Ukraine's Euroregional policy]. *Economic Sciences. Series "Economic Theory and Economic History"*, 7 (28), 2, 58–68.

Deliberately emphasizing the reasonable identification of the region's problems, the authors of the article claim that this process should be preceded by thorough research to analyze the state and forecast development prospects of the territory (in case the region is borderline, it also concerns all components of a potential cross-border cluster).

The processes of integration and enlargement of the European Union to the borders of Ukraine have provided the necessary conditions for Ukraine's cooperation with the EU countries and various European institutions, as well as Ukraine's participation in the European Union's Neighbourhood Policy. The country has been granted the opportunity to make the most of its advantageous geographical location and take essential steps towards integration into the European community. One of the ways of achieving the European integration vector of Ukraine is to develop and improve the mechanism of cross-border cooperation, and to determine its priority directions in the general system of developing border regions in the state. This is because presently, there are significant disparities both in the development levels of Ukraine's border regions and in the relevant border regions of the EU countries bordering Ukraine (Horokhovska, 2017)³.

Cross-border cooperation is not an innovation in the Ukrainian state-building process since there was only a certain transformation of concepts and processes preceding the emergence of cross-border cooperation. Previously, Ukraine's cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries (Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and Romania) was mainly a matter of bilateral or multilateral relations between Central and Eastern Europe. However, it has reached a new

³Horokhovska, K. V. (2017). Transkordonne spivrobotnytstvo v Ukraini: zachennia ta priorytetni napriamy rozvytku [Cross-border cooperation in Ukraine: the importance and priority areas of development]. *Effective Economy*, 8. Retrieved from <http://www.economy.nayka.com.ua/?op=1&z=5736>.

regional level now and has become a form of relations between Ukraine and individual EU member states, as well as the European Union as a whole (Proskura, & Fozekosh, 2018)⁴.

An example of such cooperation is the PL-BY-UA programme (Poland-Belarus-Ukraine). With the help of co-financing, it allows all the participants to promote recreational tourism, develop alternative energy sources, preserve architectural monuments, improve roads and infrastructure and, therefore, ensure the overall development of border areas of all participating regions (*Cross-Border Cooperation Programme, 2007*)⁵.

One such project is the 16-month project on the development of renewable energy sources (RES) (IPBU.02.01.00-18-156/10) as one of the methods for improving the environment in Lubaczów County (Poland) and Yavoriv District (Lviv Region, Ukraine). The total budget is 453.7 thousand Euros and co-financing 408.3 thousand Euros. The representatives of the project believe that the main problem in the region is the excessive emission of dust and gases associated with fuel combustion. This poses a significant risk to public health in the area and reduces investor interest, which, in turn, delays the development of the region. The main goal of the project is to improve the environment, especially air quality, in the project area, which can be achieved by reducing emissions. Also, the implementation of the project will allow the installation of solar systems in the Novoiavorivsk District Hospital and the purchase of special vehicles for collecting garbage on the roads in the municipality of Lubaczów. Thus, the consumption of gas and coal is expected to decrease and

⁴Proskura, V. F., & Fozekosh, M. L. (2018). Problemy ta perspektyvy realizatsii transkordonnoho spivrobitnytstva na mistsevomu rivni [Problems and prospects of cross-border cooperation at the local level]. *Economy and Society*, 14, 139–146. Retrieved from http://economyandsociety.in.ua/journal/14_ukr/17.pdf.

⁵*Cross-Border Cooperation Programme “Poland – Belarus – Ukraine 2007-2013”*. (2007). Retrieved from <http://www.pl-by-ua.eu/contract.php?id=4> (дата звернення: 19.02.2020р.).

the level of heat production from RES to increase in Poland and Ukraine (*Cross-Border Cooperation Programme, 2007*)⁶.

Ukraine's status as a neighbour of the EU brings new opportunities for the western border regions to participate in relevant cross-border cooperation programmes. In the case of proper organization, the country can expect financial assistance from the EU. Still, Ukraine needs to provide 25-30% of finance. Therefore, it is vital to have a legislative possibility of co-financing by budgetary funds at the state and local levels. Only in this case, can Ukraine gain the trust of foreign investors and receive the appropriate funds.

The practice of cross-border cooperation seeks to solve the following two main problems: to establish friendly relations between neighbouring states and to create conditions for effective mutual development of border regions. In this context, the Volyn Region, as an example of a cross-border region, faces both internal and external obstacles, including the infrastructural underdevelopment of the region (*Stratehiia transkordonnoho spivrobotnytstva, 2014*)⁷ and the socio-cultural complexity of neighbourly relations with the Republic of Poland. The region has been at the stage of co-existence between the parties for more than a decade of cross-border cooperation. Thus, it is vital to reconsider traditional methods and approaches to achieving the ultimate goal of the project, that is an open, inconspicuous border between neighbouring countries. The SWOT analysis presented in the Cross-Border Cooperation Strategy for the Lublin, Lviv, Volyn and Brest Regions for 2014–2020 proves that cultural, tourism and economic cooperation (creating conditions for investments) is indeed strategic.

⁶Ibid.

⁷*Stratehiia transkordonnoho spivrobotnytstva Liublinskoho voievodstva, Lvivskoi oblasti, Volynskoi oblasti ta Brestskoi oblasti na 2014-2020 roky* [The Strategy of cross-border cooperation of Lublin, Lviv, Volyn and Brest regions for 2014-2020]. (2014). Retrieved from http://volynrada.gov.ua/sites/default/files/strateg_ya_transkordonnogo_sp_vrob_tnictva_lyubl_nskogo_voievodstva_0.doc (дата звернення: 14.05.2019).

Therefore, it is expedient to develop these regions in the context of alternative energy and active tourism.

Given favourable natural conditions, traditional agricultural specialization and available land resources, the strategic sector for the region is the production of biofuels and their processing, which correlates with the EU energy policy (Yevrointehratsiinyi portal, n.a.)⁸).

The optimal production concept is the synthesis of the Belgian programme, titled GROENE STROOM LIEVENS (GSL), and the Dutch technology, called BIELEVELD BIO-ENERGIE BV IN HEETEN. The first one produces 7.1 million kWh of energy per year (on average, 591.666, (6) kWh per month) from corn silage, humus, industrial waste crops (cereals, potatoes, starch, sugar, vegetables), waste from the production of beverages and bioethanol, and the food industry. The second one operates on manure produced by pigs, cows and poultry and uses corn silage. The annual demand for raw material is 27.000 tons (3.000 manure, 11.500 energy crops and 12.500 organic waste) and 55.500 m³ of manure and 22.500 tons of corn silage. The main reason for combining is the large resource consumption of corn silage, whose efficient production requires soil fertilization which is possible due to by-products obtained from the Dutch technology (Vlasova, n.a.)⁹ (meeting these needs is quite real based on the region's domestic product and its potential). Thus, the production process focuses on the full sale of energy produced and the clear use of proceeds to develop infrastructure in the region, which is stated in the statutory documents.

⁸Yevrointehratsiinyi portal [European integration portal].(n.a.). *Enerhetyka* [Energy industry]. Retrieved from <https://eu-ua.org/yevrointehratsiia/enerhetyka>.

⁹Vlasova, O. (n.a.). *Kukurudza na sylos* [Silage corn]. Retrieved from <http://agro-business.com.ua/agro/ahronomiia-sohodni/item/13132-kukurudza-na-sylos.html>.

The cost of the projects' implementation was estimated at 4 and 6 million Euros, respectively (Intelligent Energy Europe, 2011)¹⁰.

Given the establishment of the International Medieval Combat Federation (IMCF)¹¹ in 2013, the functioning of the Volyn branch "AynaBera" (*AinaBera*, 2020)¹²(Lutsk) and the Polish League of Medieval Combat (RKP.Rycerska Kadra Polski, 2020)¹³, which are active in sports and participated in the 2019 IMCF World Medieval Combat Championship in Kyiv, it is expedient to use the available tourist potential (the peculiarity of the Federation lies in the fact that all sports events are held in real castles or places of their reconstruction). Following the example of the Peresopnytsia Cultural and Archaeological Center (*Kulturno-arkheolohichnyi tsentr Peresopnytsia*, n.a.)¹⁴, it would be expedient to build a thematic location where sports teams from Volyn and Poland could stay and train on the condition of holding regular tourist events and initiating the creation of a single tourist route "Places of Knightly Valour". It would help to unite castles in the region, demonstrate battles and provide opportunities to communicate with modern representatives of the knightly class from the above associations (on conditional terms). The positive impact of this activity on socio-historical relations within the region is expected since mutual recognition of knightly achievements should lead to the reconciliation of their historical past through the sporting spirit.

¹⁰Intelligent Energy Europe.(2011). *Implementation plan for BioEnergy Farm.Description of best examples*. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/energy/intelligent/projects/sites/iee-projects/files/projects/documents/bioenergy_farm_description_of_best_case_examples_en.pdf.

¹¹ *International Medieval Combat Federation*. (n.a.). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Medieval_Combat_Federation.

¹²*AinaBera.Serednovichnybii v Ukraini* [AinaBera.The medieval battle in Ukraine].(2020). Retrieved from <https://bera.com.ua/>.

¹³*RKP. Rycerska Kadra Polski*[RKP. Knight's Team of Poland]. (2020). Retrieved from <http://rycerskakadra.pl/>.

¹⁴*Kulturno-arkheolohichnyi tsentr Peresopnytsia* [Peresopnytsia Cultural and Archaeological Center].(n.a.). Retrieved from <http://peresopnytsya.rv.ua/archives/168>.

Thus, one can conclude that the realization of the cross-border potential of the Volyn region, as well as the promotion of its sustainable development, is impossible without the implementation of economic security strategy, both at national and regional levels.

The problems of assuring economic security in the country are quite intricate since it is the fundamental basis of a cost-effective state as a whole. Without assuring economic security, it is almost impossible to solve any problem at national and international levels. The conditions of Ukraine's economic security are closely related to promoting sustainable development in all its regions.

Economic security is a component of national security while remaining its basis. Indeed, without implementing economic security strategy, one cannot have military power, prevent or eliminate the consequences of environmental disasters, realize the scientific and technological potential and, finally, ensure social stability and high welfare. Economic security of the state is characterized by integrability. Indeed, it is the result of joint efforts of all forces and means available in the state and its regions to protect citizens, including the government at all levels (from the centre to the regions). The effectiveness of public administration depends on the combination of interests of the state and the region since it is a holistic socio-economic entity and, at the same time, an element of the socio-economic system of the state (Kovalska, & Savosh, 2014)¹⁵.

An essential factor in economic security in the region encompasses those indicators characterizing its innovation and investment activity.

¹⁵Kovalska, L. L., & Savosh, L. V. (2014). Ekonomichna bezpeka rehionu: otsinka ta mekhanizmy zabezpechennia [Economic security of the region: assessment and support mechanisms]. *Economic Forum*, 4, 89–95.

Mobility is virtually the only stable characteristic of economic development in the modern era of globalization. Such aspects as the speed of reaction to changing conditions of internal and external markets, the creation of a formal and informal institutional environment, the asymmetry of information and the development of global and national economic systems are only some examples indicating mobility in modern life. Under such dynamic conditions, innovation and investment is the most successful model for developing a country or region.

According to Amosha (2009), today's policy on innovation and investment should be aimed at the gradual creation of a viable innovation-and-investment potential for sustainable development of Ukraine¹⁶. Litsur&Lymych (2013) claim that the state policy on innovation and investment should be developed based on regional investment programmes. After all, the investments included in the state programme will be realized, and certain objects will be built in specific regions in certain territories. Importantly, their economic interests should be fully taken into account¹⁷.

Ukraine managed to approach the EU through the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement signed in 2014. Currently, Ukraine needs to gradually adjust the national practice of business, effective management and strategic planning for the development of the country and individual regions to European equivalents. The authors of the article believe that the implementation of the innovation and investment development model of the country as a whole and its regions largely depends on successful strategic planning. Table 1 presents a comparison of

¹⁶Amosha, O. I. (2009). *Sotsialno-ekonomichni stan Ukrainy: naslidkydlianarodu ta derzhavy* [The socio-economic state of Ukraine: the consequences for the people and the state]. Kyiv: NVTs NBUV.

¹⁷Lytsur, I. M., &Lymych, Yu.V. (2013).Chynnyky formuvannia innovatsiino-investytsiinoi polityky staloho rozvytku [The factors in the development of innovation and investment policy on sustainable development].*Effective Economy*, 9.Retrieved fromhttp://nbuv.gov.ua/UJRN/efek_2013_9_6.

individual components of strategic planning in the EU and Ukraine.

The Volyn region has a positive experience of collaboration with EU countries in terms of cross-border cooperation. Since 1995, the trans-border cooperation “Euroregion “Bug” has been operating at the borders of Poland, Belarus and Ukraine. Over the twenty years of its existence, it has made some progress in establishing interregional cooperation, in particular in economic, infrastructural, cultural, tourism, environmental, scientific, educational and other spheres, as well as in exchanging experiences of cross-border communities and modernizing local government.

Between 2012 and 2014, the Strategy for Cross-Border Cooperation of the Lublin, Lviv, Volyn and Brest Regions for 2014-2020 was developed and brought into performance (Volynska oblasna rada, 2004)¹⁸.

Table 1. A comparison of the main components of strategic planning in the EU and Ukraine

PARAMETERS	EU	UKRAINE
Management and planning system	decentralized: the initiative is taken by local communities, regions, states, united Europe	centralized: from central to local government
Structural components	a clearly defined mission, negotiated goals (within 3-5)	an unclear mission or its complete absence, inconsistent and vague goals (more than 6-10)
Ways and principles of funding	a combination of local, regional, national and European funding (structural funds); principles of subsidiarity and complementarity	the main focus is on budget financing (state, regional, district, local); a lack of coherence and clear funding principles
Planning period	seven years (currently, the 2014-2020 strategies are in force)	there are no negotiated time parameters for developing strategies, neither at state nor regional levels

¹⁸ Volynska oblasna rada [Volyn regional council]. (2004). *Stratehiia ekonomichnoho sotsialnoho rozvytku Volynskoi oblastina 2004-2015 roky* [The strategy for economic and social development of Volyn region for 2004-2015]. Retrieved from <http://voladm.gov.ua/>.

Thus, this strategy characterizes the potential of the participating regions rather sufficiently. It presents a comprehensive SWOT-analysis of the development levels of the trans-border cooperation “Euroregion “Bug”. Also, it indicates the sources of funding for project activities and identifies a clearly defined mission and the main goals of further cooperation (see Fig. 1).



Fig. 1. Mission and priority goals of the trans-border cooperation “Euroregion “Bug” (2014-2020)

Between 2008 and 2009, the project, titled “The development of Cooperation between the Volyn and Lublin Regions in the Field of Business Support” was implemented on the territory of the Euroregion “Bug”. It involved supporting and developing Ukrainian-Polish cooperation in providing consulting and educational services for small and medium enterprises, as well as presenting the examples of implementation of programmes and projects aimed at business development. Also, the “umbrella” project “Strengthening Cross-Border Cooperation in the Field of Providing Business Services and Facilitating Access for Entrepreneurs” was implemented. Other micro-projects, such as “Creating a Ukrainian-Polish Virtual Exchange of Innovative Projects and Proposals” and “Improving the Investment Climate in Border Regions” were

realized within its framework (Natsionalnyi instytut stratehichnykh doslidzhen, n.a.)¹⁹.

In the Volyn region in 2015, they completed the implementation of “The Strategy of Economic and Social Development of the Volyn Region for 2004-2015”. It aimed to increase innovative susceptibility of production since it allows one to introduce new technologies and systems of production organization, such as:

- enhancing the innovation and investment attractiveness of enterprises by increasing the number of commercial productions with the latest technologies; increasing the number of innovation-active enterprises, as well as the share of shipped innovative products, goods and services in total;

- creating an innovation infrastructure as an association of institutions enabling the implementation of effective government innovation policy and the integration of education, science, technology and production;

- introducing the mechanism for commercializing scientific developments to increase the production of innovative products by industrial enterprises;

- increasing the number of enterprises implementing and certifying the quality management system; implementing international systems of food safety management and environmental management at enterprises;

- expanding intersectoral intra-industrial cooperation and a cluster model of development, in particular in the automotive, light and woodworking industries (Volynskaoblasnarada, 2004)²⁰.

¹⁹ Natsionalnyi instytut stratehichnykh doslidzhen [National Institute for Strategical Studies]. (n.a.). *Instytutsiine zabezpechennia derzhavnoi rehionalnoi polityky* [Institutional support of the state regional policy]. Retrieved from <http://www.niss.gov.ua/>.

The implementation of this regional strategy also involved the active introduction of innovation in production. It concerns such enterprises as “Modern-Expo”, “Viki”, “Novovolynsk Fat and Oil Integrated Plant”, “SKF Ukraine”, “TeremnoHlib”, SE “Car Assembly Plant No. 1”, “Edelvika” and others.

The Volyn Region Development Strategy for the period up to 2020 began to be implemented in 2015. Currently, there are 13 main areas of the region’s development, and 5 of them are defined as priority ones (Volynska oblasna derzhavna administratsiia, 2015)²¹. The mission and priorities of the strategy are given in Fig. 2.

In the second half of 2019, they began to develop the Volyn Regional Development Strategy for 2020-2027 (Volynska oblasna derzhavna administratsiia, 2019)²². The results of the previous meetings of the Department of Economy and European Integration of the Regional State Administration include the proposals of the working group members on strategic goals of the region’s development, strategic vision of the future, the strengths and weaknesses of the region, as well the findings of the SWOT analysis. The latter has made it possible to connect internal (strengths and weaknesses) and external (opportunities and threats) factors, as well as to formulate comparative advantages, challenges and risks of the region.

²⁰Volynska oblasna rada [Volyn regional council]. (2004). *Stratehiia ekonomichnoho i sotsialnoho rozvytku Volynskoi oblasti na 2004-2015 roky* [The strategy for economic and social development of Volyn region for 2004-2015]. Retrieved from <http://voladm.gov.ua/>.

²¹Volynska oblasna derzhavna administratsiia [Volyn regional state administration].(2015). *Stratehiia rozvytku Volynskoi oblasti na period do 2020 roku* [The strategy for Volyn region development until 2020]. Retrieved from https://voladm.gov.ua/admin-assets/files/file/VIP/strategiya_do_2020_iz%20zminamu.pdf.

²²Volynska oblasna derzhavna administratsiia [Volyn regional state administration]. (2019). *Tryvaie rozrobka Stratehii rehionalnoho rozvytku Volyni 2020-2027* [The Volyn regional development strategy 2020-2027 is underway]. Retrieved from <https://voladm.gov.ua/new/trivaye-rozrobka-strategiyi-regionalnogo-rozvitku-volini-2020-2027/>.




Fig. 2. Mission and priority goals of The Volyn Regional Development Strategy for the period up to 2020

The authors of the article believe that it is essential to apply three-stage measures to effectively realize the cross-border potential of the region, its innovation and investment model of development and ensure its economic security for the period up to 2027 (see Fig).

Still, the main problem of implementing strategic measures both at the regional and national levels is the lack of sufficient sources of funding. The

system of financing innovation and investment development in the Volyn region deals with the following fundamental problems:




Fig. 3. Means of implementing the Strategy of the innovation and investment model of development in the context of implementing the strategy of the region's economic security

- in sufficient incentives for investment (the low income of the general population and, as a result, low savings);
- a complex way of creating the institutional environment (the formal institutional environment or regulatory framework can be gradually adjusted to the European market equivalence, whereas the informal institutional environment or the reaction of the population to significant changes in the economic system takes more time; however, this process can be accelerated by a broad educational campaign aimed at developing small and medium business);
- an insufficiently developed mechanism of domestic investment (in Ukraine, national and especially regional stock markets, as well as the general population, do not have sufficient experience in using securities; commercial

banks and investment funds do not have sufficient long-term investment funds (Bozhydarnik, & Kryvoviazziuk, 2014)²³).

Insufficient national sources of funding for innovation and investment development has led Ukraine and its regions to seek foreign alternatives.

One can describe the region's investment development between 2017 and 2018 as quite dynamic (see Table 2).

Indeed, Table 2 shows some negative dynamics of foreign direct investment during 2015-2017. A significant increase (by 20% compared to 2017) occurred in 2018, although the volume of foreign direct investment attracted in 2018 did not reach the level of 2014.

In the structure of foreign direct investment as of 2018, the largest share of investment in the economy of the Volyn region belonged to Cyprus (61.4%) and Poland (15.9%) (see Table 3). The volume of investments from Cyprus in 2017 compared to 2016 decreased by 600 thousand dollars, whereas it increased in 2018 and amounted to 139.1 US million dollars. The volume of investment from Poland between 2016 and 2018 remained unchanged and amounted to 36 US million dollars. In 2018, investment inflows from the UK decreased and those from Slovakia increased. Volyn's largest partner countries are Poland, Cyprus, Slovakia, Germany, the British Virgin Islands, the UK, Lithuania and Sweden. Moreover, investment income from Cyprus is more than 50%. The largest share of investments goes to the financial sector and industry, in particular wood processing and wood production (except furniture), food production, beverage production, tobacco production and machine building.

²³Bozhydarnik, T. V., & Kryvoviazziuk, I. V. (2014).

Obgruntuvannia hospodarskykh rishen i diahnostyka promyslovoho pidpriemstva: suchasnyi format
[Justifying business decisions and evaluating an industrial enterprise: a modern format]. Lutsk: RVV Lutskoho NTU.

Table 2. The dynamics of foreign direct investment in the Volyn region between 2014 and 2018 (Holovne upravlinnia statystyky u Volynskii oblasti, 2019)²⁴

Year	Foreign direct investment into the Volyn region (at the beginning of the year; US million dollars)
2014	341.3
2015	271.2
2016	247.1
2017	249.4
2018	300.9
Absolute deviation of foreign direct investment, US million dollars	
2015-2014	-70.1
2016-2015	-24.1
2017-2016	2.3
2018-2017	51.5
Relative deviation of foreign direct investment, %	
2015/2014	-20.5
2016/2015	-8.9
2017/2016	0.9
2018/2017	20.6

A significant share of investments goes to Lutsk and the Lutsk district, Kovel district, Novovolynsk.

²⁴Holovne upravlinnia statystyky u Volynskii oblasti [The Main Department of Statistics in Volyn region].(2019). *Investytsii zovnishnoekonomichnoi diialnosti Volyni u 2010–2018 rokakh* [Investments of foreign economic activity in Volyn between 2010 and 2018].Retrieved from http://www.lutsk.ukrstat.gov.ua/Z_2.htm.

Poland (15.9%) (see Table 3). The volume of investments from Cyprus in 2017 compared to 2016 decreased by 600 thousand dollars, whereas it increased in 2018 and amounted to 139.1 US million dollars. The volume of investment from Poland between 2016 and 2018 remained unchanged and amounted to 36 US million dollars. In 2018, investment inflows from the UK decreased and those from Slovakia increased. Volyn's largest partner countries are Poland, Cyprus, Slovakia, Germany, the British Virgin Islands, the UK, Lithuania and Sweden. Moreover, investment income from Cyprus is more than 50%. The largest share of investments goes to the financial sector and industry, in particular wood processing and wood production (except furniture), food production, beverage production, tobacco production and machine building. A significant share of investments goes to Lutsk and the Lutsk district, Kovel and the Kovel district, Novovolynsk.

Several events were held in the region. The main aim was to create an attractive investment image of the region and increase the volume of foreign investment.

Also, it became possible to continue cooperation with trade and economic missions within the embassies of Ukraine abroad and diplomatic missions accredited in Ukraine (Poland, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Montenegro) in terms of exchange and dissemination of information about economic opportunities of the region, as well as business proposals and investment projects of local foreign business entities. Materials on the investment attractiveness of the Volyn region were published in "The Ukraine-Azerbaijan Friendship Bridge" distributed

Table 3. Geographical structure of foreign direct investment in the economy of the Volyn region, US million dollars (Holovne upravlinnia statystyky u Volynskii oblasti, 2019)²⁵

Country	2016 Share in total investment, %	2017 Share in total investment, %	2018 Share in total investment, %
Cyprus	41.7	55.4	61.4
Poland	14.5	19.3	15.9
Slovakia	6.5	8.4	7.5
Sweden	12.3	-	-
Germany	3.5	4.0	3.8
The British Virgin Islands	5.7	2.9	2.0
The UK	2.1	2.3	1.9
Lithuania	1.6	-	1.8
Other countries	12.1	7.7	5.7
Total	100	100	100

Between January and September 2019, foreign investors invested almost 66 US million dollars of direct investment (equity) in the region's economy.

²⁵Holovne upravlinnia statystyky u Volynskii oblasti [The Main Department of Statistics in Volyn region].(2019). *Investytsii zovnishnoekonomichnoi diialnosti Volyni u 2010–2018 rokakh* [Investments of foreign economic activity in Volyn between 2010 and 2018]. Retrieved from http://www.lutsk.ukrstat.gov.ua/Z_2.htm.

The total investment since the very beginning amounted to 355.6 US million dollars or an average of 344US dollars per capita. Foreign investments were made by partners from 36 countries. The main investor countries are Cyprus, the British Virgin Islands, Poland, Slovakia and Germany, which account for more than 72% of the total. The largest investments were received by business entities in Lutsk, Novovolynsk and the Kovel and Lutsk districts (93% of all investments). Foreign direct investment went to 266 enterprises in the region. More than 57% of foreign capital invested since the very beginning is concentrated in industrial enterprises (machine building, wood processing, wood production, food production, beverage production, furniture production, chemical production, rubber and plastic production) (Volynska oblasna rada, n.a.)²⁶.

Given the above mentioned facts, one can point out the qualitative changes in the investment sphere of Volyn, although the investment climate of the region cannot be considered sufficiently favourable and the amount of foreign direct investment is not sufficient to accelerate the region's innovative development to assure its economic security. In this regard, the authorities, proactive entrepreneurs and local communities of the Volyn region have high expectations for the inflow of significant investment resources through cross-border cooperation and European structural funds.

The Volyn region possesses sufficient economic resources which can be used to accelerate the innovation and investment development. This requires a balanced policy of combining national and cross-border development using both internal and external sources of funding.

²⁶Volynska oblasna rada [Volyn regional council]. (n.a.).*Inozemni investytsii v ekonomiku oblasti* [Foreign investments in the economy of the region]. Retrieved from <http://volynrada.gov.ua/news/inozemni-investitsiyi-v-ekonomiku-oblasti>.

It is also necessary to envisage any other options for the region's economic development depending on the opportunity to increase all types of resources, the political and socio-economic situation in society and the level of effectiveness of the national, social and economic policy.

One should also consider the option of inertial development, which means maintaining trends and areas in the development of the economy as a whole and its indicators without any impact on them due to changes in structural and investment policies. However, such a development option should be taken into account only theoretically, although it is not considered real given the economic opportunities of most regions in Ukraine and the willingness of local authorities to enhance the regional economy.

The most probable option seems to be the implementation of a scenario of the region's sustainable development. It lies in ensuring the balanced development of all spheres of its economy based on a reasonable distribution of resources to solve economic, social and environmental problems comprehensively.

At the same time, one must consider that limited resources are distributed between all sectors of the economy, which will restrain the overall pace of development and, yet, will provide complex solutions to development problems. The scenario of the region's sustainable, balanced economic growth involves certain options for its implementation. They include minimum, maximum and average-progressive ones.

The average-progressive scenario is the most probable. An important prerequisite for sustainable development is the effective functioning of the construction industry, including the construction of environmental facilities.

It is essential to increase the technical base of construction organizations in the region and organize the production of the most modern types of construction materials. Environmentally unfriendly enterprises producing construction materials must be removed to a safe distance from the residential area in both urban and suburban areas. It is vital to shift the development of the region's industrial complex to an innovative resource-saving model. Preference should be given to those enterprises that focus on the production of knowledge-intensive, environmentally friendly products using modern technologies, including energy-saving ones.

One of the new priorities of regional economic development is tourism development. It means the need to accelerate the process of attracting tourists, including from abroad. To attract and accommodate them, the region should create a modern hotel industry based on the construction of new world-class hotels and the modernization of existing ones. An effective fiscal policy is another important component of ensuring regional sustainable development. Therefore, it is advisable to develop and implement measures aimed at increasing the revenue side of the budget and promoting more rational use of its expenditure part.

Also, one should include measures for ensuring the region's sustainable development in regional programmes of socio-economic development, sectoral and targeted development programmes, as well as state and local budgets.

Investments in the development of the real sector of the region's economy thereupon should be attracted, and investment projects (of state and regional importance) should be implemented. Besides, one should develop and take measures to finance sustainable development through long-term loans from commercial banks, intensify investment funds and use the potential of financial

instruments of the securities market to mobilize additional sources of local budgets.

Therefore, foreign economic activity should be improved in the main areas, namely, by developing export potential and import substitution. It is important to conduct a full inventory of export opportunities, determine the types of products imported into the region and assess the possibilities of producing similar products by their enterprises. One of the priority nomenclature groups of foreign exchange products should be resource-saving and environmentally friendly products, as well as green equipment and processes.

Also, one should apply methods of the economic impact on the improvement of the environment to increase the effectiveness of environmental policy in the region. Such tools can include the environmental tax on harmful emissions of substances applied in many industrialized countries. Using it, one can tax all harmful emissions into the environment and transform negative external environmental effects into environmental costs. All world experience shows that this tool of environmental policy can be used to effectively tax only large pollutants. Its positive stimulating effect can be significantly strengthened through the integration with other tools of environmental policy.

However, one should not assume that an environmental tax on harmful emissions leads to a distortion of product markets. On the contrary, distortions in product markets occur as a result of ineffective environmental policies in the past, when part of the environmental costs used to be transferred to society as a whole. One should pay specific attention to the weaknesses of this environmental tax. Indeed, its use is associated with significant investments and running costs. It is difficult to control the number of harmful emissions into the environment by individual pollutants. Unfortunately, this tool only stimulates

the reduction of harmful emissions and does not take into account the impact of individual pollutants on the environment and production efficiency (Herasymchuk, & Liutak, 2010)²⁷.

In Western Europe, the paradigm of regional policy has changed over the last two decades. The change lies in the transition of traditional regional policy, based on theories of industrial location and justified by the factors of regions' "equality", to a new policy of regional development, which follows theories of polycentric functional development and the efficiency principle. The following factors have made it possible to stimulate such a transformation of regional policy in Europe: ensuring national stability, ensuring a more even distribution of national wealth and welfare standards of the population in different regions. Regional policy has begun to play a real compensatory role in the activities of central governments in the EU. Thus, central governments have practically lost their monopoly on regional policy. It was possible due to an active position of regional authorities which insisted on involving them in the elaboration of development strategies at the national level. It is important to note that the transition to a new paradigm of regional policy in Europe was mainly focused on the creation of a new institutional environment for its implementation and, especially, on decentralization, coordination and interaction of regional governments. The socio-economic core of such a new approach lies in establishing the knowledge economy knowledge in regions. In the EU, regional authorities make considerable efforts to encourage the general population to think about regional development in a new way. Indeed, it is the person who is the main factor in any development, including a regional one.

²⁷Herasymchuk, Z. V., & Liutak, O. M. (2010). *Rehionalna polityka TKS: mekhanizm formuvannia i realizatsii* [The trans-border cooperation regional policy: the mechanism of creation and implementation]. Lutsk: Nadstyria.

A very important issue is the introduction of a new socio-economic regionalization in Ukraine, which would become the framework for implementing a new regional policy. The main emphasis should be on the innovative development of regions, especially taking into account the cross-border potential of regions in terms of implementing economic security strategy. The main factor in intensifying innovative development is a well-developed regional investment policy, based on its financial sources. Indeed, the practice of economic activity has proved that one should not rely on foreign investment only. Both innovative development and formation of human capital require radical changes in the state education system. It is also essential to improve the quality of education and forecast the needs of the national economy for specialists in various fields. Nowadays, there are too many economics specialists, lawyers and historians and, at the same time, a lack of technical specialists. Thus, innovative models should become the basis for regional development strategies. The region needs to prepare highly intelligent people who are ready for innovation.

Ukraine has significant opportunities for regional development, although they are not yet fully exploited. One of the main reasons for this is a low level of regional management. The country needs to adjust to European fundamentals. Ukrainian regional authorities have already begun to introduce new forms of strategic planning and programming and to develop investment projects and to involve their investors in them. The western regions of Ukraine are the main link in its European integration. Cross-border cooperation should be actively developed to increase the level of development of the country's western border regions.

Since the launch of European integration, the importance of borders as a barrier between EU member states, especially within the Schengen area, has

significantly decreased. Moreover, Euroregional and cross-border cooperation has become one of the main elements of the EU integration strategy.

Even though cross-border cooperation at the EU's external borders poses many challenges, it is one of the advantages of regions having common borders with the EU. Cross-border cooperation is also one of the main factors in the dynamic development of good neighbourly relations between European countries.

Every region of Ukraine should develop an investment development programme including cross-border investment projects. Local authorities need to be able to use the modern tools of effective investment policy.

Such aspects as economic potential, qualified personnel, advantageous geographical location, a well-developed banking system, transport, telecommunications and border infrastructure provide a reasonable basis for further expansion of international contacts of the Volyn region in a long-term, stable and mutually beneficial manner.

Recently, the Volyn region has been actively involving its enterprises in the world market. In this regard, it is important to ensure the most effective foreign economic activity of the region to form the structure of exports and imports, taking into account the interests of Ukrainian producers and the need to restructure the economy, search for and place foreign investment in priority industries.

The problem of increasing the region's foreign economic potential is becoming extremely relevant today. This is due to the complex of endogenous and exogenous factors. Endogenous factors include the transformation of the Ukrainian economic system, which is characterized by objective imbalance and slow reorganization; excessive energy and resource intensity, as well as the

competitiveness of national production; a gradual decline of scientific-technological and high-tech industrial potentials. Exogenous factors involve excessive dependence of Ukraine's economy on monopoly import markets supplying strategically important commodity items; a significant number of Ukrainian enterprises involved in production cycles, whose final products are produced outside Ukraine; high dependence of structural and technological reforms in Ukraine's economy on various forms of external sources of funding; the lack of well-developed foreign trade infrastructure (information-related, legislative, marketing, organizational, trading, stock exchange, exhibitional, advertising); certain pressure of other countries on Ukraine's foreign economic activity through direct and indirect forms of various trading, investment, phytosanitary, technological and financial restrictions (Baula,& Vorobei, 2019)²⁸.

Despite all the positive changes in the Volyn region's foreign economic activity, there are still certain problems, including insufficient development of industrial cooperation between enterprises of neighbouring countries; scant financial support for joint cross-border projects from both the government and local authorities, except for border infrastructure arrangement; inadequate information support for cross-border cooperation.

The authors of the article believe that these problems can be solved by taking the following measures: studying and analyzing the export potential of the region and the dynamics of competitive advantages systematically; monitoring

²⁸Baula, O.V., & Vorobei, N.V. (2019). *Napriamy naroshchennia zovnishnoekonomichnoho potentsialu Volyni v konteksti transkordonnoho spivrobimystva* [Areas for enhancing the foreign economic potential of Volyn in the context of cross-border cooperation]. Proceedings of the 9th International Scientific-Practical Seminar on Cross-border Cooperation as a Form of International Integration. Lutsk: Information and Publishing Department of Lutsk NTU. Retrieved from <https://dspace.uzhnu.edu.ua/jspui/bitstream/lib/24660/1/Збірник%20тез%20ІХ%20Семінар%2019-перетворено.pdf>

and analyzing export activities of enterprises to identify and eliminate obstacles in a timely manner; using securities market tools to attract funds to finance cross-border projects in the region; coordinating export-boosting measures included in the regional and state economic development programmes.

The creation of an effective mechanism for developing and realizing foreign economic potential requires that areas in its development should be clearly defined. Compared to others within the country, the Volyn region can use its geographical location, namely cross-border potential, to increase its competitiveness (see Fig. 4).




Fig. 4. Areas in the development of the foreign economic potential of the Volyn region



Fig. 5. The concept of regional policy on trans-border cooperation in the context of implementing the strategy for assuring economic security

In Ukraine, the main problems in further implementation of cross-border projects seem to be the lack of funding for their development and further elaboration of specific project proposals, the inconsistency of mechanisms for simultaneous co-financing of cross-border projects through EU programmes, national and regional budget allocations and extrabudgetary sources.

Given the current transformations in management, the concept of aregional policy on cross-border cooperation in the Volyn region should be aimed at counteracting threats and assuring economic security. Its implementation can be enhanced through the following measures:

- to continue economic reforms and deepen cooperation with the European Union;
- to develop relevant mechanisms to s
- upport economic entities of the real sector of the economy;
- to strengthen the activity of IT investors and create conditions for successful implementation of investment programmes and informatization projects;
- to develop and implement long-term regional development programmes aimed at deepening transnationalization;
- to develop the social and market infrastructure of the region;
- to diversify the areas of e-government;
- to promote the establishment and create conditions for the effective functioning of cluster formations in the region.

Figure 5 shows the components of the concept of regional policy on cross-border cooperation taking into account the mechanism for assuring economic security in the region, which is associated with the intensification of internationalization and globalization in all spheres of social production on the ground of the above-mentioned facts.

The proposed concept is implemented at strategic (eliminating contradictions, or localizing and weakening them), tactical (eliminating the threats themselves or preventing their impact) and operational (eliminating the consequences of threats) levels. To achieve a sustainable level of economic security in the cross-border region, it is vital to implement a system of measures

to monitor threats at the stage of their emergence and prevent the spread of their negative impact. Therefore, methods and tools for implementing such a concept should include the components, which can prevent threats to economic security in the region, economic levers (tax benefits, transfers, direct budget investments, grants, soft loans, discount rates, currency restrictions, protection against unfair competition, the optimum combination of protectionist and free-market methods of competition control), as well as organizational (state support, consulting, human resources, development and modernization of market and social infrastructure, monitoring and control), institutional (budget funds, technology parks, information support, strengthening cooperation in education, business incubators, think tanks), administrative (registration, licensing, quotas, competitions, tenders), regulatory (decisions, orders, decrees, instructions, strategies, concepts, plans, forecasts, programmes) and social (holding business training sessions, implementing joint social projects).

The main task of regional development is to increase the competitiveness of Ukraine's regions in the European Economic Area

Regional development is seen as a strategic priority of state development. Nowadays, there are two complementary trends, such as globalization and regionalization. They are very complex and multi-vector processes, which one must take into account when developing socio-economic development strategies at both national and regional levels. In Ukraine, all conceptual documents in the field of regional policy pay considerable attention to the socio-economic development of territories on an innovative basis and the ways of overcoming the imbalances of regional development. The main task for researchers and managers is to create a new model of stimulating regional development, which should rely on the theories of innovative advanced development and aim to

increase the intellectual and resource potential of the regions. Cross-border cooperation in Ukraine's border regions has significant potential in this area.

One can accelerate regional development after establishing close cooperation between regional public authorities, business representatives and researchers. It is important to note that innovations are primarily related to the creation of research networks and the introduction of new types of management. This facilitates the creation of a permanent innovation environment in the regions and makes the innovative process more interactive.

The EU regional policy, along with the agricultural policy, is a priority area for their executive bodies. This may be demonstrated by the number of funds allocated for its implementation. After the enlargement of the EU, the regional policy has undergone significant changes, which implies the development of a new strategy for cooperation with neighbouring countries.

The EU regional policy is influenced by many socio-economic, political-legal and organizational factors. In Ukraine, regional authorities should take into account the shadow economy, too. Indeed, appropriate stereotypes of the behaviour of the general population in the region play the main role in this situation, which facilitates the creation of an illegal economy.

Regional development programmes funded through grants for relevant projects serve as an important financial instrument for the EU's regional development and the synchronization of regional policies of new and "old" members of the European Union, as well as EU neighbours.

Also, one should take into account the principle of national security when implementing regional policy measures and elaborating regional development strategies. Today, one can see some changes in conceptual ideas on both the world and the European security system. After the end of the Cold War, the

world did not become safer than expected. Ukraine has consistently pursued a course of Euro-Atlantic integration, which involves political and socio-economic changes in the country, including the democratization of the political system, economic transformation and reforms in the armed forces. Security issues are also very important for regional development of the western border of Ukraine. They involve overcoming the consequences of illegal migration, controlling arms and drug smuggling and ensuring the functioning of transport corridors. Cooperation should be developed in such a way that the people of the region feel safer. Such problems should be addressed at all levels of government.

After the EU enlargement, cooperation between border regions, including neighbouring countries, will develop on the principles of positive interdependence. An equal partnership based on mutual recognition will seek to prevent regional disparities. The EU has developed new tools of good neighbourliness, which is an integral part of the pan-European geopolitical strategy. This toolkit suggests more effective use of software tools aimed at developing cross-border cooperation and weakening protectionist measures. EU funds will no longer be allocated for non-finalized projects. Cross-border cooperation will be particularly focused on the development of socio-cultural partnership and the elimination of cognitive barriers to cooperation.

Conclusion

The successful implementation of regional development strategies mainly depends on the environment. The population of the region, namely their initiative and entrepreneurship skills, affect the decision-making process.

Consequently, any strategy can remain on paper without a full-fledged civil society. The success of socio-economic development depends not only on advances in technology but also on changes in people's attitudes towards economic activity. This is especially noticeable at the regional level. After all, this is where civil society undergoes the main processes of structurization.

Informal organizations of civil society most often cooperate with representatives of public authorities at the regional level. The forms of organization of such cooperation are of paramount importance. Equal partnership is the most effective form since it reflects the main principle of civil society that is the balance of interests and the creation of counterbalance to the activities of public authorities.

The borders of the Volyn region contribute to the realization of its potential socio-economic opportunities. Regional features of Volyn the region, along with rich natural resources and historical-and-architectural potential, create all the prerequisites for organizing effective foreign economic cooperation. By accelerating the development of foreign economic cooperation, one can attract investment and new technologies, create new jobs and increase the competitiveness of national producers to enter the EU market. The use of cross-border cooperation potential, taking into account economic security, will contribute not only to creating the proper market and social infrastructure of the Volyn region and building an economic system accorded with world standards but also enhancing the foreign economic potential of the region.

Oleksandr Dluhopolskyi

Tetiana Dluhopolska

Poland–Ukraine Migration Policy in a Context of Transborder Cooperation: Challenges and Opportunities

Introduction

As mentioned in the research of K. Gracz, A. Piłat, F.J. Segeš, D. Michalska, A. Łada²⁹, in recent years, Poland has suffered a serious demographic crisis that is due both to the demographic decline and to the emigration trends amongst the local labor force. The consequences of these demographic tendencies are felt mostly in the labor market and in the education sector. Labor migration that, creates a redistribution of the labor force between the countries with a significant effect on the situation in their labor markets, is increasingly expanding. In the history of mankind, migration has always played a vital role in the progress of society³⁰.

The annual increase in the number of labor force expulsion from Ukraine to Poland leads to economic, social and demographic losses, and as a result, requires a reaction from public authorities of both countries and also international organizations that cover integration, inclusiveness and informational and educational work with migrants. With respect to Ukraine, nowadays, labor migration not only reduces the supply of labor in the domestic labor market but also reduces its quality, since most motivated and creative

²⁹ K. Gracz, A. Piłat, F.J. Segeš, D. Michalska, A. Łada, Ukrainian students in Poland: policies of engagement, integration, students' motivation and plans, 2018. URL: <https://cedos.org.ua/en>.

³⁰ O. Dluhopolskyi, T. Zatonatska, I. Lvova, Y. Klapkiv, Regulations for returning labour migrants to Ukraine: international background and national limitations, *Comparative Economic Research. Central and Eastern Europe*, 2019, Vol. 22(3), p. 45-64; O. Dluhopolskyi, T. Dluhopolska, Migration as a global challenge: case of Ukraine, *Стратегические направления социально-экономического и финансового обеспечения развития национальной экономики: материалы II-й Международной научно-практической конференции (27-28.09.2018)*, Минск: Право и экономика, 2018, с. 146-148.

workers have been changing their place of working and living. Along with the social and economic factors that provoke the departure of workers (especially from Western parts of Ukraine) to Poland, features of Ukrainians deserve special attention because work in foreign countries is often perceived as real «earnings» that bring real incomes in freely convertible currency.

Results

When it comes to the European refugee crisis, Poland's ruling Law and Justice party (PiS) has distinguished itself with arguent anti-migrant eloquence³¹. But when it comes to finding low-paying workers for jobs the Poles don't want to take, the government has been quite happy to let in a historic influx of desperately needed foreigners. As we see, during the past years Poland has been shifting from an emigration to an immigration country. Despite a dynamic inflow of migrants from Ukraine and other parts of the world (post-soviet and Asia regions), the country lacks a concrete migration policy. The last framework policy document in this category, produced before the current government led by PiS came to power, was suspended in 2016³².

The absence of an effective national migration strategy in Poland can be explained by such facts. The present government first suspended, and in March 2017 subsequently abolished the "Polish Migration Policy" document written by the previous government³³. Also, there is no effective migrant integration program at the national, regional or local levels. Only those who have

³¹ M. Eyre, M. Goillandau, Poland's two-faced immigration strategy, 2019. URL: <https://www.politico.eu>.

³² K. Pedziwiatr, The new Polish migration policy – false start, 2019. URL: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en>.

³³ A. Grimmel, S. Giang, Solidarity in the European Union: a fundamental value in crisis, Springer 2017, 175 p.

been granted refugee status or subsidiary protection qualify for participation in the annual Individual Integration Program (IPI)³⁴, while other groups of migrants (including students) are not entitled to state-funded support and rely on NGO assistance.

According to the Eurostat³⁵, in 2017 Poland recorded the highest number of employment-related residence permits (680,000) for third-country nationals among the EU Member States (85% of them – for Ukrainians). They came also from such countries as Belorussia, Russia, Vietnam, India, and China³⁶. 90% of them received work visas.

In accordance with Selectivv, the organization calculated how many smartphone owners with Polish SIM cards use the interface in Ukrainian or Russian and cross the Polish-Ukrainian border at least once a year. The analysis of mobile phone usage data pointed out that there were 1.27 million Ukrainians residing in Poland at the beginning of 2019³⁷.

In this research, “a person from Ukraine living in Poland” is assumed to be one who has a SIM card from a Polish operator but has the Russian or Ukrainian language set on the phone and has been in Ukraine at least once during 2018, and/or switched to a Ukrainian SIM card during this. On this basis, over 600,000 users were selected for the study from among 1.27 million Ukrainian citizens living in Poland that are profiled in the Selectivv DMP database. Based on data from the mobile channel, it is also known that PKO BP, Bank Pekao S.A and mBank applications are the most frequently used mobile banking applications. In addition, it is assumed that about 95% of Ukrainians

³⁴ J.S. Frelak, Migration climate, discourse and policies in Poland, 2017. URL: <https://www.globsec.org>.

³⁵ Migration and migrant population statistics, 2017. URL: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat>.

³⁶ K. Pedziwiatr, The new Polish migration policy – false start, 2019. URL: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en>.

³⁷ Selectivv study: do Ukrainians build their future with Poland? 2019. URL: <https://selectivv.com/en>.

working legally in Poland have a Polish Bank account³⁸. This is more convenient for people from Ukraine because– Ukrainian banks do not accept the IBAN system, so the transfer of money takes a long time and is relatively expensive.

In the work³⁹ the extent of labor migration was investigated based on the analysis of the number of phone calls from Ukraine to other countries of the world on the night of December 31, 2017, to January 1st, 2018, when there were preferential tariffs for calls abroad on the Vodafone Ukraine network. On New Year's Eve, 68% of Ukrainians made calls to the Russian Federation, almost 10% to Poland, and almost 6% to Italy.

Thus, during the last 10 years, the Ukrainian diaspora in Poland has increased to 2-2,5 million people (fig. 1). In 2019 about 800,000 to 900,000 - Ukrainians were simultaneously working on the Polish labor market, of which 30% are on a permanent basis, while the rest were temporary workers. Poland has been clearly transforming from a net-emigration towards a net-immigration country.

Many of these newcomers do unskilled work as replacements for Polish nationals, who are either rejecting lower-paid jobs or have migrated elsewhere in Europe, seeking higher salaries. A growing number also come to attend Polish universities. Polish universities also do not stay away: they hire Ukrainian-speaking staff, open information points in Ukrainian cities. Against the backdrop of shrinking students in Poland, it is often foreigners who help the university maintain EU subsidies – in some schools, Ukrainians make up more 50% of students. The increase of Ukrainians in Polish universities during 2014-

³⁸ Smartphones reveal number of Ukrainians in Poland, 2019. URL: <https://polandin..>

³⁹ O. Dluhopolskyi, T. Zatonatska, I. Lvova, Y. Klapkiv, Regulations for returning labour migrants to Ukraine: international background and national limitations, *Comparative Economic Research. CentralandEasternEurope*, 2019, Vol. 22(3), p. 45-64.




Fig. 1. Ukrainian citizens with a residence permit in Poland⁴⁰




Fig. 2. Foreign students in Poland (green – the number of Ukrainians, blue – the number of total foreign students)⁴¹

⁴⁰ О. Бабакова, Польща наша: як масовий приїзд українців змінив сусідню країну, Європейська правда, 2019. URL: <https://www.euointegration.com.ua>.

⁴¹ Built by authors based on: Number of foreigners studying in Poland from 2014 to 2019. URL: <https://www.statista.com/statistics>.

2019 is around 1,7 (fig. 2). In comparison with previous years, the interest in Polish education has increased among young Ukrainians. Every year more and more Ukrainians come to Poland to get a higher education, usually choosing an education in the Polish language.

In the year of 2017-2018, there were over 70,000 international students planning to study in Poland for at least one academic year, including 37,200 female students. As mentioned, over half of the students came from Ukraine (52%), while the second-largest group came from Belarus (8,3%). Indian students made it to the top three of foreigners at Polish universities, although they constitute only slightly over 4% of students⁴².

What factors attract Ukrainians to Poland both for studies and for jobs? First, it is the significantly higher wages and good opportunities that Poland offers to Ukrainians (fig. 3). Second, a Polish education is European, and it gives Ukrainians a chance to become legally employed in the EU. Today, even in Ukraine graduates of European universities are valued more by some employers than domestic ones. This situation can be explained by the lack of confidence in and the decline in prestige of a Ukrainian education.

As CEDOS mentioned, “Poland does not have a comprehensive, up-to-date migration strategy, combined with a policy of internationalizing the higher education, but the number of Ukrainian students is constantly growing. Young people from Ukraine are coming to Poland because of the lower costs of living and studying and better prospects for finding a job in this country. In Poland we hear more and more about the shortage of qualified workers. A way to increase their number is to encourage young people from other countries to come to Poland. Those who are particularly valuable are the ones who know the

⁴² Polish education 2030 – the future of academia, 2018. URL: <https://www.careersinpoland.com>.

language and culture, - as well as the procedures and requirements for a given profession – that is, those who have completed their education in Poland. A group which in recent years has been particularly willing to come to Poland to work and study are the Ukrainians. However, Poland has not yet developed a uniform, concrete policy strategy addressed to this group”⁴³.




Fig. 3. The level of salaries of Ukrainians in Poland⁴⁴

work and study are the Ukrainians. However, Poland has not yet developed a uniform, concrete policy strategy addressed to this group”⁴⁵.

Today it is crucial to pay attention to the context of Polish-Ukrainian cooperation. For Poland recruiting high qualified workers from Ukraine means their lack in the donor country, at the same time the development of Ukraine is in Poland’s interest.

⁴³ K. Gracz, A. Piłat, F.J. Segeš, D. Michalska, A. Łada, Ukrainian students in Poland: policies of engagement, integration, students’ motivation and plans, 2018. URL: <https://cedos.org.ua/en>.

⁴⁴ Built by authors based on: О. Бабакова, Польща наша: як масовий приїзд українців змінив сусідню країну, Європейська правда, 2019. URL: <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua>.

⁴⁵ K. Gracz, A. Piłat, F.J. Segeš, D. Michalska, A. Łada, Ukrainian students in Poland: policies of engagement, integration, students’ motivation and plans, 2018. URL: <https://cedos.org.ua/en>.

Conclusions

We are certain that while minimizing the negative consequences of labor migration, it is necessary to eliminate the reasons that force people to emigrate. After all, if a country does not create good jobs at home, people will inevitably leave their country in search of decent work, wages, and a higher level and quality of life elsewhere⁴⁶. Today relatively well-paid work abroad is perceived as an ambitious model of existence by Ukrainians. From an economic point of view, a person who has some human and social capital will try to obtain the greatest possible profit from it. In such a case, the only things that will stop someone from emigrating are patriotic feelings and a sense of personal responsibility for the future of his country. With Poland's new initiatives in the field of migration policy, it will be even more difficult to "bring home" Ukrainians. Not long ago the PiS government has the following priorities in the field of migration policy⁴⁷: internal security, facilitation of channels for economic migration, and further easing of the inflow of people of Polish origin. By the middle of 2020, the Polish government will announce new rules for migration policy. They'll be more flexible for Ukrainian workers, because other EU countries (for example, Czech Republic), have made migration rules for foreign workers simpler.

⁴⁶ O. Dluhopolskyi, T. Zatonatska, I. Lvova, Y. Klapkiv, Regulations for returning labour migrants to Ukraine: international background and national limitations, *Comparative Economic Research. Central and Eastern Europe*, 2019, Vol. 22(3), p. 45-64.

⁴⁷ J.S. Frelak, Migration climate, discourse and policies in Poland, 2017. URL: <https://www.globsec.org>; B. Łaciak, J.S. Frelak, Attitudes towards refugees and migrants in Poland. Instytut Spraw Publicznych, Warszawa, 2018.

The Influence of Ukrainian Citizens on the Labour Market in the Lublin Voivodeship

Poland, like other European Union countries, is facing serious demographic problems. The society is aging and the number of people of working age is constantly decreasing⁴⁸. Due to the opening of EU borders, many Poles have gone abroad. Migration of citizens, both within and outside the European Union, is inevitable. Migration has many advantages, but it also has drawbacks. Thanks to the influx of foreigners, demographic problems can be partly solved. Economic migration has a positive impact on the labor market, largely eliminating emerging staff shortages. However, there are voices in the public saying that "foreigners are taking local jobs". The above issues also apply to the Lubelskie Voivodeship. The prepared material - at least in part - answers the question of how migrants from Ukraine influence the labor market in the Lublin province.

1. Lublin Voivodeship - demographic situation and unemployment issues

The area of the Lubelskie Voivodeship is 25,100 square kilometers, which is 8 % - of Poland (third place in the country). In terms of administrative division, the voivodship consists of 20 land poviats, 4 cities with poviat rights (so-called urban poviats - Lublin, Biała Podlaska, Chełm, Zamość), 48 cities and 213 municipalities. The Lubelskie Voivodeship borders four other

⁴⁸ Working-age population means the population of working age. In Poland, for men age is 18-65, for women 18-60 years. Among the working-age population, the mobile age population is distinguished, i.e. aged 18-44 and immobile, i.e. men - 45-65 years, women - 45-60 years. Non-working age population is understood as the population of pre-working age, i.e. 0-17 years old, and the population of post-working age, i.e. men over 65 years and women over 60 years.

provinces: Podlasie, Mazowieckie, Świętokrzyskie, and Podkarpackie. It is the easternmost voivodship in Poland - the eastern border of the voivodship is the state border with Ukraine and Belarus⁴⁹.

According to publicly available analytical data⁵⁰, at the end of December 2018, 2,117,619 people resided in this area. The inhabitants of the voivodship constituted 5.5% of the total population of Poland (9th place in the country). The average population density was 86 people per square kilometer. A statistical inhabitant of the voivodship was 38 years old. The population under 18 was 18% of the population, and over 65 was 21%. 1,002,642 people lived in cities (including 348,450 in Lublin; 65,120 in Chełm), which constituted 46.6% of the total population. Taking into account the gender structure, women constituted 51.6% of the population - there were 106 women per 100 men. A characteristic feature of the region is the relatively low level of urbanization. The Lublin subregion has the highest urbanization, while the weakest is in Biała Podlaska. Among the poviats, the most urbanized were the poviats: Świdnicki (population of cities constituted 58.1%), Puławy (47.6%) and Rycki (46.0%). The smallest share of urban residents was recorded in the Chełm (10.1%) and Lublin (7.4%) poviats.

One of the most important sectors of the economy of the Lubelskie Voivodeship is agriculture. This is evidenced by large land resources, a high share of agricultural population and significant agricultural production on a national scale. Organic farming is a new and very developmental direction of the region's agricultural economy. A significant place in the Lublin region is occupied by the

49 In the analyzed context, a comprehensive analysis of the Polish-Ukrainian state border and the possibilities of crossing it in passenger traffic, see publication S.Dubaj, R.Suduł, P. Witkowski, *Cross-border cooperation in the realities of the Schengen Agreement. Practical aspect of the Polish-Ukrainian borderland*, Chełm 2014, Chapter 2, pp. 56-98.

50 See: *Demographic Yearbook 2019*, Central Statistical Office of Warsaw, Warsaw 2019, passim. The publication is available on the website: stat.gov.pl [on-line access: 04.01.2020].

food industry, including fruit and vegetable, sugar, dairy, milling, brewing and tobacco industries. The Lublin region also has beekeeping and herbal facilities. Mining occupies an important place outside the agri-food sector. Bogdanka Coal Mine operates in the eastern part of the Lublin Upland. There are also a large number of cement plants and building materials factories producing traditional and clinker brick, cellular concrete and precast concrete. The mineral waters for which the Nałęczów spa is famous are natural resources. The region's economy is also supported by the chemical, wood and furniture, metal and machinery industries, including the aviation industry in Świdnik.

The largest employers of the Lubelskie Voivodeship include: EMPERIA HOLDING - a network of food wholesalers, the Black Red White capital group, a furniture manufacturer, Polimex Mostostal S.A. –a producer of metal constructions, Genpact Poland Spółka z o.o., Lubelski Węgiel Bogdanka S.A. – a hard coal producer for energy needs, one of the largest national leaders in the production of flour, pasta and sticks - Lubella S.A. ; Sipma - a manufacturer of agricultural and gardening machines, Zakłady Azotowe Puławy S.A - the leader in the Polish fertilizer and chemical industry in the production of nitrogen fertilizers for agriculture, Zakłady Mięsne ŁMEAT - Łuków S.A., Zakład Mięsny "Wierzejki", Herbapol Lublin S.A. - a producer of herbal products, food syrups and teas, POL-SKONE Sp. z o.o. - one of the largest and most dynamically developing companies in the construction joinery industry, a producer of wooden doors and windows, WSK PZL Świdnik, Perła Browary Lubelskie, Okręgowa Spółdzielnia Mleczarska w Krasnymstawie, Spółdzielnia Mleczarska w Ryki, Fabryka Bearings Tocznych in Kraśnik and the producer of mineral water Nałęczowianka sp. z o.o. and a cardboard manufacturing plant - Model Opakowania Sp. z o.o. from Biłgoraj.

Turning to the analysis of the demographic situation in the region, it should be noted at the outset that for many years, from year to year, the population of the Lubelskie Voivodeship has been steadily decreasing. In 2010 this area was inhabited by 2, 181, 608 people, and in 2015 –by 2, 143, 221. In 2018, compared to 2017, the population decreased by 5,804 people, including 2,584 men and 3,220 women⁵¹. Further forecasts for the coming years are also not optimistic. It is expected that in 2035, only 1,871,000 people will live in the Lubelskie Voivodeship, and in 2050 – 1, 710,000 people (i.e. nearly 24% less than in 1995)⁵².

The structure of the population by age is also constantly unfavorable. The number of children and adolescents is systematically decreasing with the simultaneous increase in the population of older people. The main reason for these changes is the shifting of baby booms and demographics, as well as the decline in women's fertility observed since the beginning of the 90's and the increase in life expectancy. The Lubelskie Voivodeship does not differ from general trends observed throughout the European Union, which is facing structural problems in the field of demographic development⁵³.

Statistical data shows that in the Lubelskie Voivodeship at the end of December 2017, amongst the working age there were 1, 299, 079 people (which constituted 61.1% of the total population), and in the pre-working age there

51 The area of several voivodships compared to today's Lubelskie voivodship in 1995. inhabited 2244 thousand people, so in 25 years an alarming number of nearly 130 thousand. people.

52 Population 2010 in Lubelskie voivodship, Everyone counts, Statistical Office in Lublin, Materials from the press conference on June 9, 2011, p. 4. Currently, all Member States of the European Union are facing structural problems in the field of demographic development. The slogans of "aging Europe" are loud, e.g. in 2010. for every 3.5 people of working age there was one person aged 65 or older, in 2050 this ratio is to be 1.7 to 1 and the lack of hands to work, especially qualified specialists. Hence the more and more frequent analyzes about immigrants as a panacea for these ills.

53 For comprehensive analyzes of Poland's demographic situation, see among others *Poland 2030. Development challenges*, Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Warsaw 2009, pp. 46-89; Disturbing demographic trends in the Chełm region see *Development Strategy of the City of Chełm. Update for 2015-2020 with a perspective up to 2030*, Lublin-Chełm 2015, pp. 27-32.

were 376, 198 people (17.69%), while in the post-working age there were 451, 040 people (21.21%). Statistically, there are 67 people of non-working age (including 51 men and 86 women) per 100 working age population in 2020, and the forecasts leave no illusions and predict that in 2050 100 professionally active people will be charged in the same area 108 persons in non-working age (including 82 men and 141 women).

When analyzing issues related to unemployment, it should be noted that the concept of unemployment means: an unemployed person, not engaged in paid work, not conducting economic activity, while at the same time able and ready to take up employment. An unemployed person is a person who is at least 18 years of age, has not acquired the right to an old-age or disability pension, is not the owner of agricultural property, does not receive pay, pre-retirement, maternity, training benefit, teacher compensation benefit, does not run a business, is not a person in police custody, does not receive permanent benefits, or a special allowance for guardian or nursing benefits from a social assistance center⁵⁴. We can divide unemployment by its duration. Short-term unemployment lasts up to 3 months. Medium-term unemployment covers the unemployed person for a period of 3 to 6 months. We talk about long-term (chronic) unemployment when the unemployed person is unemployed for more than 12 months. We can also divide unemployment into explicit and hidden ones. Open unemployment means the unemployed person has registered with the poviats labor office in their the place of residence. The opposite of explicit unemployment is hidden unemployment. Structural unemployment is the result of the evolution of the production structure. Some professions are "dying out" and people skilled in that field are out of work. Unemployment resulting from technical progress - technological unemployment.

⁵⁴ Act of 20 April 2004 on employment promotion and labor market institutions (Journal of Laws of 2018 Pos. 1265).

Workplaces are modernized and the demand for employees is reduced. Business unemployment is associated with cyclical changes in productivity. In the recession phase, the demand for goods offered by enterprises decreases, which reduces their production, which leads to a reduction in the demand for employees. In the boom phase, the process is analogously the reverse. Seasonal unemployment is closely related to the season, weather and vegetation of plants. Classical and neoclassical unemployment results from insufficiently flexible labor market and wages. Frictional unemployment is a break in employment resulting from a change of job or place of residence. There is also voluntary unemployment - a person consciously gives up the opportunity to take up a job, often such unemployed work is in the black zone of the labor market. The unemployment rate is measured as the percentage of unemployed people registered in labor offices in relation to the total civilian working population⁵⁵.

In the last decade, a steady decline in the unemployment rate has been observed in Poland. At the end of 2009, there were 1,892,700 people registered in unemployment offices and the unemployment rate was 11.9%. Statistics from subsequent years (Study of the Economic Activity of the Population - LFS) show the dynamic growth of professionally active people. At the end of 2018, 627,000 people remained unemployed in Poland, and the unemployment rate was 3.7%. The latest available data at the end of the third quarter of 2019 shows that there were 542,000 people unemployed in Poland and the unemployment rate was only 3.2%.

In turn, in the Lubelskie Voivodeship, according to BAEL data, in the fourth quarter of 2018 there were 625,000 people, i.e. 72.1% of the total working population. The employment level by sex was as follows: public sector women

⁵⁵ For definition issues of unemployment, see e.g. <https://rynekpracy.pl/slownik> [access: 28.12.2019].

(60.1%), men (39.9%), private sector: women (38.9%), men (61.1%). In 2018 hired employees constituted 632,000 people, i.e. 72.9% of all employed persons. The group of self-employed people had 217,000 people, which constituted 25% of the total.

In the 4th quarter of 2018 in the analyzed area there were 74,449 unemployed people, and the unemployment rate was 8%⁵⁶. The largest group among the unemployed were people aged 25-34 (27.5% of the total number of the unemployed). The next largest group was the population aged 15-24 and it constituted 25.5%, followed by 45-54 years (17.6%), then the population aged 35-44 (15.7%). The smallest number of unemployed was the population aged 55 and older (11.8%). Among the unemployed from the Lubelskie Voivodeship in the analyzed period, largest group of unemployed were aged 25-34, the smallest group were people aged 55 and older.

Most of the unemployed people in the voivodeship in 2018 had the following professions: salesmen (46,65), cooks (21,14), auxiliary construction workers (15,26), locksmiths (12,94), farm workers (11,80). The occupation with the most shortages, i.e. those in which employers have the hardest time to find candidates for work, in the Lubelskie Voivodeship include: truck and tractor truck drivers, bus drivers, bakers, independent accountants and accounting staff, physiotherapists, masseurs and welders. On the other hand, the professions that were considered surplus (in which it is the most difficult for job seekers to find employment) are: economists, food and nutrition technology specialists, educators, public administration specialists, philosophers, historians, political scientists and culture experts, travel agency employees and tour operators ,

⁵⁶ The highest unemployment rate was in the following poviats: Włodawa - 15.2%, Chełm land - 13.4% and Hrubieszów - 12.8%, while the lowest was for Łukowski - 4.6%, Biłgoraj - 5.2% and Łęczyński - 5.4%

agriculture and forestry specialists and IT technicians⁵⁷.

At the same time, labor offices at the end of 2018 had 27,732 vacancies. In mid-2019, statistical data in the Lubelskie Voivodeship was as follows: 68,057 people were registered as unemployed; job offers, i.e. casting positions 26,370, of which the most covered industrial processing 4,531 offers, wholesale and retail trade, vehicle repairs 4,408, construction 2,837, public administration and national defense 2,653, office work 2,551, scientific activity and educational 2,385, health care and social assistance 1,500, hotel and catering services 1,239, agriculture 72,0⁵⁸.

2. Citizens of Ukraine in the Lubelskie Voivodeship And Their Employment Issues

As indicated in the previous section, migration of population is a particularly important factor influencing the creation of demographic phenomena in the voivodship (as well as in the whole country, and in other EU Member States). Population migrations are movements of people related to the change of permanent or temporary residence, combined with crossing the border of the administrative unit of the territorial division of the country, e.g. in the case analyzed in this article - voivodships (internal migrations) or state

⁵⁷ The situation in Chełm and Chełm powiat directly bordering Ukraine looks alarming. The unemployment rate in Chełm is 11.2 percent and in Chełm powiat as much as 13.4 percent. At the end of December 2018, 6684 unemployed people were registered at the Powiat Labor Office in Chełm, of which 2613 were Chełm residents and 4 071 were residents of the Chełm powiat. The demand of employers does not always go hand in hand with the qualifications of the unemployed. According to data from PUP Chełm, most job offers are for salesmen, chefs, beauticians, warehousemen, hairdressers, truck drivers, vehicle mechanics, and construction workers. At that time, as many as 899 people with higher education remained unemployed in Chełm.

⁵⁸ See detailed specification: https://wuplublin.praca.gov.pl/bezrobotni-wg-sekcji-pkd/?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_T0JaRiaPKwdR&p_p_lifecycle=0=normal&p_p_state&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_idcolumn=1&p_colposp_=2&p_p_col_count=3&p_r_p_564233524_resetCur=true&_101_INSTANCE_T0JaRiaPKwdR_navCate goryId=8326940 [access: 28.12.2019].

border (foreign migrations). Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 in force in the European Union⁵⁹, contains a definition of migration, taking into account as an important criterion the intended duration of residence in another country of at least 12 months. Within the meaning of this definition, "immigration" means the arrival in the country (e.g. to Poland) of a person who has previously been a resident of another EU Member State or a third country with the intended intention of residence for at least 12 months, while "emigration" means a person who previously resided in the territory of an EU Member State ceases to have his usual place of residence in that Member State for a period of at least twelve months or which is expected to last for as long⁶⁰. As a result of migration, the population of the Lubelskie Voivodship in 2010 only decreased by 4,905 people, while in 2009 by 4,153 people, and in 2000 - by 3,082 people. Because of the permanent departure abroad, in 2010 459 inhabitants left the voivodship, while 421 people came from abroad permanently. Most people emigrated to Great Britain (27.5%), USA (12.6%) and Germany (11.8%). In turn, among the immigrants, the largest group were people who came (returned) from Great Britain (38%), USA (10.2%), Ireland (8.3%) and from Germany (8.1%). On the other hand, the data from 2016 is interesting, where the population of the voivodship as a result of migration decreased by another 4,067 people, but the balance of foreign migration was positive by 385 people (264 went abroad and 649 permanent residents). It was similar in 2017, where 4,731 people left the

59 Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on Community statistics on migration and international protection and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 311/76 on the compilation of statistics on foreign workers (EU DU L 199 of 31.07.2007), <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:199:0023:01:PL:HTML> [read: 28.12.2019].

60 These types of migrations (associated with a change of country of residence for a period of at least 12 months) are often referred to as long-term foreign migrations. In contrast, "place of residence" means a place where a person usually spends his or her free time away from work, irrespective of temporary absences related to leisure, vacation, visiting friends and relatives, interests, medical treatment or religious pilgrimages or, if such data is not available, place of formal residence or place of residence. Ibid.

voivodship, but again the balance of foreign migration was positive, because 341 inhabitants came from abroad (279 people left, 620 came).

Turning to the analysis of the issue of professional activity of foreigners in Poland, it should be borne in mind that every foreigner who is not exempted from the obligation to have a work permit in our country under the provisions of law, and who wants to take up employment in Poland, must have an appropriate permit. A work permit is a document that entitles a foreigner to take up legal work provided that they have a visa or a temporary residence permit allowing them to work in Poland. Each time the applicant and party to the proceedings regarding the issue of a work permit for a foreigner is an entity entrusting the performance of work to a foreigner. Permits are issued by the competent voivode. This property is mainly determined due to the seat or place of residence of the entity entrusting the performance of work and does not have to be the same as the place of work by a foreigner.

Official data on the number of Ukrainians residing in Poland differ depending on the sources indicated. It is believed that for many labor migrants (including Ukrainians) work is still a more important element than the status and procedures associated with it, which is why they prefer to stay in the country illegally and thus be seen as attractive employees in the labor market. The mentality of employees from Ukraine keeps them convinced that it pays to cross the border illegally, i.e. without the knowledge of the relevant services, and also because many of them work illegally, without having an appropriate contract, the working conditions are determined only in oral form with future employer. Citizens of Ukraine work many hours longer than 40 hours per week, which constitutes the average weekly work standard in Poland. Many employers also provide accommodation for their employees, so there is no official data on how

many people rent apartments in Poland, and how many families they live with.

All these circumstances make it difficult to determine the exact number of Ukrainians currently residing in Poland. According to estimates of the Ministry of Labor, by the end of 2017, almost 2 million working Ukrainians were registered in Poland. If the pace of migration and the increase in the number of Ukrainian population on the territory of the Commonwealth persist, it can be estimated that by the end of 2018 it may reach a number exceeding even 3 million people. If the population of Ukraine is about 44 million, then 3 million of its citizens working in Poland constitute almost 7% of the total population of this country. This does not seem to be a large number, however, in the context of Poland, in which more than 38 million citizens lived in 2017, this ratio is already rising to 8%, and in the following years it may increase further. The majority of immigrants are men (about 58%), mostly young people (average age is about 32 years). Therefore, soon it may happen that every tenth person in Poland may have Ukrainian nationality⁶¹.

From June 11, 2017, Ukrainian citizens no longer need visas to enter the European Union⁶². However, this stay cannot exceed 90 days and must be related to business, tourist or family purposes. The abolition of the visa requirement does not mean, however, that Ukrainians have been released from the necessity to meet the other conditions set out in the Schengen Borders Code. When undertaking employment in Poland, they still have to apply for a work permit or submit a declaration of intention to work in Poland. In 2017, 192,500

61 P.Gajewski, A.Szydlik, T.Buchwald, *Undertaking work for Ukrainian citizens in Poland with particular emphasis on the Tri-City* [in:] *Immigrants from Ukraine in Poland. Needs and expectations, social responses, security challenges*, M. Lubicz Miszewski (ed.), Wrocław 2018 p.177.

62 Regulation (EU) 2017/850 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 amending Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders, and those whose nationals are exempt requirement (Ukraine) - Journal of Laws EU L 133 of 22.05.2017.

Ukrainian citizens obtained a work permit and 1.7 million made a declaration of intention to work in our country. However, it is estimated that from this second group, between 1.2 and 1.5 million Ukrainians took up employment. It should be remembered, however, that these data do not take into account the number of newcomers from beyond the Bug who are working in Poland in the so-called gray area. The lack of detailed data on the actual number of Ukrainian citizens also results from the rotational nature of their migration to Poland⁶³.

According to official information included in the "Demographic Yearbook 2019" at the beginning of January 2019, 17,9154 Ukrainian citizens had the right of residence in Poland, including 35,169 for permanent residence, 4,172 for long-term resident's EU residence, 138,657 for temporary residence and 1,156 broken down by the type of permit in the "other" category, included: right of residence of an EU citizen's family member, permanent right of residence of a family member of an EU citizen, asylum, refugee status, subsidiary protection, humanitarian stay and tolerated stay. In addition, in 2019 another 39,203 people were students from Ukraine in Poland. In connection with the entry into force in June 2017 of the visa-free regime for Ukrainian citizens with biometric passports in 2018, a decrease in Schengen visas issued is visible. The number of national visas issued in 2018 fell to the level of 2015.

It should be emphasized that the number of work permits issued to foreigners in Poland is steadily increasing. In 2018, 328,768 were issued. It was almost 40% more than in 2017 and almost 5 times more than in 2015. The

⁶³ In 2017, the State Statistical Office of Ukraine published the results of the study 'International labor migration of society', this study confirms trends regarding the migration of Ukrainian citizens to Poland. According to the report, Poland is the most important destination for the migration of Ukrainians, nearly 40% of all emigration came to Poland. According to the report, in 2015-2017 507 thousand came to Poland people from Ukraine in connection with work.

period of validity of the permit received in 2018: up to 3 months - 560 people, from 3 months to 1 year 114,027 from 1 to 2 years 52,231 people, over 2 years - 71,516 people. In 2018, work permits were issued to citizens of 125 countries and two stateless persons. Most often they were granted to Ukrainian citizens (70%). The largest number, 85% of permits for citizens of this country, were issued in the Lubuskie Voivodship, although every fifth Ukrainian resides in the Mazowieckie Voivodship. In the Lubelskie voivodship their situation has been evolving over the past years as follows: 2015 1,615 work permits; 2016 2,782; 2017 5,254; 2018 8,043. Although the number of foreigners insured in Lublin ZUS seems to be slowly stabilizing, their structure has changed. From October 2018 until May 2019 the number of Ukrainian citizens has decreased (from almost 12,800 to less than 11,700). The gap was partially filled by citizens of other countries, mainly Belarusians. The largest percentage of Belarusians insured in Poland work in Masovia, the second largest percentage in the province Podlasie, and in the third largest percentage - just in the province Lublin. The number of Belarusian citizens insured in Lublin increased from 3,400 thousand up to over 4,000 people. There were also legally working Moldovans (from 57 to 162 people) and Georgians (from 99 to 145 people).

Available analyses of the labor market⁶⁴ confirm that migrants from Ukraine in the Lubelskie Voivodship usually carry out occasional work - 60.5%, 33.7% of employees have permanent work, and only 0.3% declare their own business activity; 5.5% of Ukrainians were temporarily out of work (ready to work). Considering the diverse employment sectors, it should be emphasized that hotel and gastronomy - 24.2%, wholesale and retail trade - 21.2%, and other services - 13.8% enjoyed the greatest popularity among Ukrainians.

⁶⁴ Citizens of Ukraine working in Poland - survey report. Study conducted in 2017, Department of Statistics, National Bank of Poland, Warsaw 2018.

Transport - 11.4%, agriculture - 9.8% and industry - 9.2% were also relatively important. The next sectors remain: services for households - 8.4%, construction and renovation services - 6.8%, education - 3.2%, health care - 2.8%. A new phenomenon is that more and more Ukrainians are employed in new sectors, so far relatively fewer "staffed" by immigrants - the "other" and "other services" categories were declared by as many as 11.4% of them. The results of the research also provided data enabling an analysis of the situation of Ukrainians on the labor market in the context of professional position. The vast majority of Ukrainian immigrants in Poland perform simple, low-skilled jobs - almost 66% in Lublin and around 73% in Warsaw. In the Mazowieckie voivodship, every fifth migrant from Ukraine was employed as a qualified craftsman / worker (21.8%). The other professions were not significant in the overall schedule. The situation is slightly different in Lublin, where in addition to skilled workers and craftsmen (12.1%), specialists, doctors, lawyers, translators, IT specialists, etc. (12.1%) are also of considerable importance. Over half of the students from Lublin declared to work as a specialist.

Ukrainians employed in the Lubelskie Voivodship achieved average net earnings of 1730PLN per month. From the money earned, an average of 34.2% in Lublin is spent "on living, or expenses such as flat fees, fixed fees, e.g. for energy and utilities, food, shopping, transport, etc. The possibility of relatively low living expenses in Poland is largely associated with the widespread phenomenon of immigrants receiving additional benefits, e.g. in the form of accommodation, meals, or transport to / from work, which facilitates saving a significant part of income - savings were declared by 60% of employees. Migrants from Ukraine who live in the Lubelskie voivodship are characterized by a tendency to use their savings in their country of origin, as well as transfer

their money abroad. The majority of migrants transferring funds to Ukraine were people who transferred small amounts below 1000 PLN on average every 2-3 months. An analysis of how funds are transferred indicates that Ukrainians usually take them to their family personally, which can be proof of a circular migration model in which contact with family plays a significant role.

To sum up this thematic block, it should be emphasized that Ukrainian citizens coming to Poland most often choose cities where a large number of their countrymen already work. Family-friendly networks are created in this way, and enables novices who come to not feel alienated, and the assimilation process is milder. The attitude of Ukrainians towards working in Poland is changing. Younger people are more willing to earn a living. Employees from Ukraine want to make better and better earnings, and they are convinced that the level of salary is influenced by knowledge of Polish, as well as the fact that experience in the industry is increasingly important. Generally, the Lubelskie Voivodeship is an attractive area for foreigners. It is determined by both geographical proximity and the demand off work for foreigners, connections developed over the years - migrant networks and the fact that, above all, Lublin, but also larger cities (Biała Podlaska, Chełm, Zamość, Puławy) are becoming attractive academic cities. Due to the proximity of the border as the first Member State of the European Union (and thus a safe country) and communication routes, asylum issues for immigrants are an important issue. Non-governmental organizations play an important role in the provision of assistance to foreigners. In the Lubelskie Voivodeship, the Institute for the Rule of Law in Lublin has significant achievements in this respect⁶⁵.

⁶⁵ The nearly 20-year involvement of this non-governmental organization in helping foreigners is presented in an article by S. Dubaj, A. Kosinska, *Support for foreigners in the Lublin Province in the programs of the Institute for the State of Law* [in:] *Non-governmental organizations in the Lublin Province - theory and practice*, P. Olszewski, A. Stachula (ed.), Chełm 2013 pp. 105-118.

At the beginning of 2019, Germany opened its borders to immigrants from outside the European Union, including from Ukraine. Germany is somehow a competition for Poland in the fight for immigrants - workers from Ukraine. Until now, Ukrainians came to Poland for a profit. After opening the borders, the situation may change, and Poland will be only a stop on their way to Germany, where they can expect even three times better remuneration than with us.

Is a similar culture, similar language and close proximity to the home country sufficient to keep workers from Ukraine in Poland? This remains a great unknown. One thing is certain, many job openings remain vacant, because the offered jobs and pay are not attractive to Poles. Until now, our eastern neighbors filled the vacancies. The preparation of the Polish community for working with foreigners should be accompanied by state support. If Polish law does not change in a specific way and become more favorable to immigrants from across our eastern border, we may lose many workers.

3. Survey - "Environmental assessment - the impact of Ukrainian citizens on the Chelm labour market"

On 11 June 2017 The European Union, including Poland, lifted the visa requirement for Ukrainian citizens. Ukrainians who have biometric passports can enter member countries (except Great Britain and Ireland) without a visa for 90 days within half a year for business, tourist or family purposes. This does not apply to people coming to work or to run a business.

The aim of the short survey was to find out how the inhabitants of Chelm relate to the possibility of an increased influx of Ukrainians and their impact on the local labor market, where the highest unemployment rate has been

maintained for a long time. The survey was carried out on January 2-4, 2020. in the city of Chełm. Incidental population was examined. The respondents were asked to complete a short paper questionnaire containing short questions such as disjunctive (closed) cafeteria, where the respondent could indicate only one possible answer (yes, maybe yes, no, maybe no)⁶⁶. The respondents were of different ages and practiced various professions. 30 surveys were collected in a short time. The author is aware that the conducted research is not exhaustive (full), however, it gives a certain overview of the subject matter and may constitute the starting material for more in-depth inquiries in the future.

Research results and conclusions drawn

Of the 30 respondents, 18 are men (60%) and 12 are women (40%). The study involved 57% of middle-aged people, i.e. 31-55 years old, 36% of those surveyed were 18-30 years old, and the smallest group - 7% were, 56 years old and older. Over half, as many as 53% of respondents declared the type of work they performed as a white-collar worker. In turn, 27% of those surveyed perform physical work, 13% of people participating in the survey have their own business. 10% of respondents were unemployed. One person did not answer the question. The analysis of the conducted research shows that 53% of respondents noticed an increased influx of citizens from Ukraine, of which 40% answered yes and 13% answered yes. 20% of respondents did not observe an increased influx of Ukrainian citizens, while 27% did not notice the difference.

⁶⁶ The survey questionnaire contained seven questions and a record (gender, age and type of work performed by the respondent - a manual worker, white-collar worker, own business activity, unemployed; age). Respondents were asked to answer the following questions: 1. Have you observed an increased influx of Ukrainian citizens to Chełm in the last two years? 2. For how long did the citizens of Ukraine come with whom you met? 3. How do you assess the visa waiver for Ukrainian citizens? 4. Do you feel endangered at your workplace? 5. Do you think that Ukrainian citizens are competitors on the Chełm labor market? 6. Would you mind if a Ukrainian citizen was your boss? 7. Would you mind that a Ukrainian citizen would be your colleague?

The largest number of respondents, as much as 46%, met with Ukrainian citizens who have stayed in Chełm for more than a month. In turn, 20% of respondents marked the answer "Week". 17% of respondents met with Ukrainian citizens staying in the city for up to one month. 10% of respondents did not meet with Ukrainian citizens in the city.

37% of respondents believe that it is good that visas for Ukrainians have been abolished (in interviews the respondents raised the topic that Poles still go to Ukraine without visas all the time). On the other hand, 63% of the respondents are strongly opposed to the abolition of visas for Ukrainian citizens coming to Poland (in interviews the respondents explained that this is for security reasons and for protection of jobs for Poles).

The vast majority of respondents, as much as 86% do not feel threatened at their workplace, 63% answered no, while 23% answered maybe not. 14% of respondents said they were worried about their place of work, of which 7% answered yes, and another 7% answered yes.

When asked about concerns as to about whether Ukrainians are competitors in the labor market, 30% of respondents answered yes, while 30% of respondents answered maybe not. 27% respondents replied that the citizens of Ukraine are competitors in the Chelm labour market. The opposite opinion is expressed by 13% of respondents, they believe that the inhabitants of Ukraine are not competitors in the Chelm labour market.

Most, as many as 60% of those polled, do not mind if Ukrainian citizen were to be their boss. 30% of those polled answered no, and another 30% selected maybe not. 23% of respondents are against having a Ukrainian citizen as boss. The remaining 17% of respondents would rather not have a Ukrainian citizen as their boss.

Half of the respondents would not mind cooperating with Ukrainian citizens in the workplace. Polish-Ukrainian cooperation would not bother 33%. In turn, 7% of respondents would not like to cooperate with Ukrainian citizens. 10% of respondents would prefer to work in a workplace with uniform nationality.

Surveys show that the inhabitants of Chełm have noticed an increased influx of Ukrainian citizens to the powiat in the last two years. According to the respondents' knowledge, most stay of people with a Ukrainian passport in the powiat was short-term. Most respondents do not feel the threat of losing their jobs. At the same time, more than half of the respondents said that Ukrainian citizens could be competitors on the labor market for Poles. Citizens of Chełm have nothing against the citizens of Ukraine being their associates or superiors. Most women do not mind that a Ukrainian citizen should be their boss. Whereas for men the situation is quite the opposite, most of them would not like to have a boss other than a Polish citizen.

City residents assess the impact of foreigners being employed in the local labor market as neutral. The vast majority of respondents do not feel threatened at their workplace.

However, the vast majority of respondents believe that Ukrainian citizens should still be required to have visas in order to come to Poland.

Conclusion

Lubelskie Voivodeship, as well as the entire country, is threatened by progressive depopulation. The population is declining at an alarming rate, as

many Poles have traveled abroad, the population is aging and the number of people of working age is constantly decreasing. Due to the influx of foreigners - especially from nearby Ukraine, the increasing demographic problems can at least partly be solved. Economic migration has a positive impact on the labor market, largely eliminating emerging staff shortages. Available analyses of the labor market confirm that the Lubelskie Voivodeship is an attractive area for migrants from Ukraine. It is determined by both geographical proximity and the demand for work by foreigners, and the links developed over the years - migrant networks. Young Ukrainian citizens also willingly come not only to Lublin, but also to other cities in the province to study. In turn, many years of practice confirm that many of them, who are already graduates of higher education, willingly take up work in the Lubelskie Voivodship, bonding with this region for longer or even permanently.

European Union Cyber Security Instruments and their Impact on Ukraine

Introduction

While Ukrainian academic circles extensively use the term “information security”, the EU gives preference to the term “cyber security” (coined by the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA)) which is defined as “... the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and organization and user’s assets. Organization and user’s assets include connected computing devices, personnel, infrastructure, applications, services, telecommunications systems, and the totality of transmitted and/or stored information in the cyber environment”⁶⁷.

Ukraine has defined one of its priority goals as “to integrate into the EU”. Hence, on the one hand, it needs to adapt its legal base in conformity with the EU requirements and standards, and, on the other hand, facing increasing challenges in the cyber security sphere, Ukraine need to take into account the experience and positive practices of better developed partners (for instance, like the EU).

So, it is of utmost importance to study the EU achievements in the domain of security of cyber space.

⁶⁷ Definition of Cybersecurity – Gaps and overlaps in standardization, December 2015, <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/definition-of-cybersecurity>

European Union Cyber Security Legislation Initiatives and Bodies

2001 was the year when basic legislative requirements were made, namely:

- “Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data by the Community Institutions and Bodies and on the Free Movement of Such Data”⁶⁸ imposes a set of obligations on data controllers within the EU institutions and agencies with regard to handling personal data of employees and other affected data subjects in order to protect the privacy of these data subjects;
- “Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents”⁶⁹ stipulates that EU documents are to be made accessible to the public in electronic form or through a register;
- “Framework Decision on combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment” (2001)⁷⁰, which defines the fraudulent behaviours that the EU States need to consider as punishable criminal offences. The Commission is assessing the need to revise this Framework Decision to cover new forms of money transmissions like virtual currencies and other aspects.

⁶⁸ Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data by the Community Institutions and Bodies and on the Free Movement of Such Data, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32001R0045&from=EN>

⁶⁹ Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/PDF/r1049_en.pdf

⁷⁰ EU cybersecurity initiatives: working towards a more secure online environment, January 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/2017-

Further Decisions and Directives⁷¹ lay the basis for the “General Data Protection Regulation” (GDPR, 2016) which represents a profound reform of data protection law in Europe, shifting the balance of power towards the citizen to whom the personal data belongs, and away from organisations that collect, analyse and use such data⁷². The GDPR is complemented by the “Network and Information Security Directive” (NISD, 2016) designed to create a focus on the protection of IT systems in European critical national infrastructure (CNI)⁷³.

In 2013 the European Commission and the European External Action Service developed the “EU Cybersecurity Strategy” and defined such priorities: 1) to increase cyber resilience; 2) to drastically reduce cybercrime; 3) to develop an EU cyber defence policy and capabilities related to the Common Security and Defence Policy; 4) to develop the industrial and technological resources for cybersecurity; 5) to establish a coherent international cyberspace policy for the EU and to promote core EU values⁷⁴.

Fighting cybercrime more effectively is one of the three priorities under the new “European Agenda on Security 2015 – 2020”⁷⁵. Underlining the fact that cybercrime requires a coordinated response at the European level, the Agenda sets out the following actions: giving renewed emphasis to implementation of existing policies on cybersecurity, attacks against information systems, and combating child sexual exploitation; reviewing and

⁷¹N. Karpchuk, European Union Information Security Practice: a Ukrainian Prospect, UR Journal of humanities and social sciences, № 1 (6), 2018. P. 90-103.

⁷²New European cyber laws GDPR and NISD, <https://www.cgi-group.co.uk/systems-integration-services/cyber-security/nisdandgdpr>

⁷³ EU cybersecurity initiatives: working towards a more secure online environment, January 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/2017-

⁷⁴ EU cybersecurity initiatives: working towards a more secure online environment, January 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/2017-

⁷⁵ European Agenda on Security 2015-2020, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-security_en.

possibly extending legislation on combatting fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payments to take account of newer forms of crime and counterfeiting in financial instruments; reviewing obstacles to criminal investigations on cybercrime, notably on issues of competent jurisdiction and rules on access to evidence and information; enhancing cyber capacity building action under external assistance instruments.

The efficiency of the digital economy is highly dependent on trust and security. So, on 5 July 2016 the Commission and the European Cyber Security Organization (ECSO consists of large companies, SMEs and start-ups, research centers, universities, end-users, operators, clusters and association as well as public authorities) created a public-private partnership (PPP) on cybersecurity which defined the “Digital Single Market Strategy”. The goal of this partnership is to stimulate European competitiveness and to help overcome cybersecurity market fragmentation through innovation, building trust between Member States and industrial actors as well as helping align the demand and supply sectors for cybersecurity products and solutions. The partnership helps to: 1) gather industrial and public resources to deliver innovation against a jointly-agreed strategic research and innovation roadmap; 2) focus on targeted technical priorities defined jointly with industry; 3) maximize the impact of available funds; 4) provide visibility to European research and innovation excellence in cybersecurity⁷⁶.

On July 2016 the Commission adopted “Communication: Strengthening Europe’s Cyber Resilience System and Fostering a Competitive and Innovative

⁷⁶ EU cybersecurity initiatives: working towards a more secure online environment, January 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/2017-

Cybersecurity Industry”⁷⁷. Its objectives are: to cooperate across Europe; to support the emerging single market for cybersecurity products and services in the EU; to establish a contractual public-private partnership with industry, to nurture cybersecurity industrial capabilities and innovation in the EU.

The mentioned legislative initiatives are developed, implemented and controlled by respective organizations, namely:

- Directorate-General for Informatics (DIGIT) has the mission to enable the European Commission to effectively and efficiently use ICTs to achieve its organisational and political objectives. First, DIGIT provides the Commission as well as other European institutions and agencies with a secure and reliable high-performance ICT infrastructure. Second, DIGIT is responsible for the acquisition of ICT tools used within the Commission, the lifecycle management of ICT components, and the provision of support and training services related to the use of ICT equipment⁷⁸;

- since 2011, DIGIT has been host to a permanent Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-EU), which is supervised by the Director-General of DIGIT and steered by a group chaired by the Council. CERT-EU’s task is to support EU institutions and agencies in their fight against cyber threats. Towards this end, CERT-EU engages in information sharing, threat assessment and awareness-raising activities⁷⁹;

⁷⁷Communication: Strengthening Europe’s Cyber Resilience System and Fostering a Competitive and Innovative Cybersecurity Industry, <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/communication-strengthening-europes-cyber-resilience-system-and-fostering-competitive-and>

⁷⁸ N. Robinson, J. Gaspers, 2014, Information Security and Data Protection Legal and Policy Frameworks Applicable to European Union Institutions and Agencies, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR557.html

⁷⁹CERT – EU, <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/csirts-in-europe/capacity-building/european-initiatives/cert-eu>

- the DIGIT Security Operations Centre (SOC) is managed by a Local Information Security Officer (LISO) who also acts as an advisor to the Information Security Steering Committee. The LISO analyzes the security requirements of DIGIT's ICT systems and proposes policies that govern the ICT systems in line with the latter's needs⁸⁰;
- in 2010, the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU launched the Network Defence Centre (NDC)⁸¹. Its objective is to strengthen the protection of the EU sensitive and classified Communication and Information Systems against all forms of technical attacks, including Advanced Persistent Threats, through the development of the capability to detect and respond to security incidents;
- the European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems became fully functional on 1 December 2012 and has since been responsible for the operational management of IT systems in the area of home affairs. The Agency's core task is to ensure the uninterrupted exchange of data between national authorities. The Agency is to ensure that no system-related operational information circulates in the communication infrastructure without encryption⁸²;
- European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) as well as an Assistant Supervisor and an institutionally independent supporting structure

⁸⁰ N. Robinson, J. Gaspers, 2014, Information Security and Data Protection Legal and Policy Frameworks Applicable to European Union Institutions and Agencies, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR557.html

⁸¹ Network Defence Operational Centre of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, <https://www.trusted-introducer.org/directory/teams/gsc-ndc-oc.html>

⁸² N. Robinson, J. Gaspers, 2014, Information Security and Data Protection Legal and Policy Frameworks Applicable to European Union Institutions and Agencies, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR557.html

were established in January 2004. The EDPS's mission is to ensure that EU institutions and agencies respect individuals' fundamental rights and freedoms, specifically their right to privacy, when processing personal data or developing new policies⁸³.

The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) was set up in 2004 to contribute to the overall goal of ensuring a high level of network and cyber security within the EU. ENISA helps the Commission, the Member States and the business community to address, respond and especially to prevent NIS problems. ENISA's main activities are the following: to collect and analyse data on security incidents in Europe and emerging risks; to promote risk assessment and risk management methods to enhance the capability to deal with information security threats; to run of European cyber exercises; to support Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) cooperation in the Member States; to raise awareness and cooperation between different actors in the information security field⁸⁴.

In 2013 the Europol's Cybercrime Centre (EC3) was set up as an integral part of Europol and has become a focal point in combatting and preventing cross-border cybercrime by: serving as the central hub for criminal information and intelligence; supporting Member States' operations and investigations by means of operational analysis, coordination and expertise; providing strategic analysis products; reaching out to cybercrime related law enforcement services, private sector, academia and other non-law enforcement partners (such as internet security companies, the financial sector, computer emergency response teams) to enhance cooperation amongst them; supporting training and capacity

⁸³ Ibidem

⁸⁴ European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies/enisa_en

building in the Member States; providing highly specialised technical and digital forensic support capabilities to investigations and operations; representing the EU law enforcement community in areas of common interest (R&D requirements, Internet governance, policy development).

It should be mentioned that having faced a number of recent serious cyber security threats, Ukraine has made some amendments in this sphere by taking into account the EU positive practice.

Cyberpolice as a structural unit of the National Police was created on October 5, 2015 with the purpose to reform and develop the units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, to ensure the training and functioning of highly qualified specialists in the expert, operational and investigative units of the police engaged in the fight against cybercrime and capable of applying the latest technology in operational and service activities at the highest professional level. The main tasks of Cyber police are to implement state policy in the field of combating cybercrime; to immediately inform the population about the emergence of the latest cybercrime; to use software tools for the systematization and analysis of information on cyber incidents, cyber threats and cybercrime; to respond to inquiries from foreign partners received by channels of the National round-the-clock network of contact points; to participate in the training of police officers concerning the use of computer technologies in counteracting crime; to take part in international operations and co-operation in real time; to counteract cybercrime, specifically in the area of using payment systems etc. The Development Strategy claims the application of methodology elaborated by Europol⁸⁵.

⁸⁵Cyberpolice, <https://cyberpolice.gov.ua/>

In 2016 “the Cyber security Strategy of Ukraine”⁸⁶ was approved. In the draft discussions the experts and authors claimed to have taken into account the EU strategies on cyber security issues. The Strategy includes a set of measures, priorities and directions for the provision of cybersecurity in Ukraine, in particular, the creation and operational adaptation of the state policy aimed at developing cyberspace and achieving compatibility with relevant EU and NATO standards, forming a competitive environment in the field of electronic communications, providing information security and cybernetic services protection. In addition, the Strategy provides for 1) the involvement of expert potential of scientific institutions, professional and public associations in preparation to draft conceptual documents in this area; 2) the increase of digital literacy of citizens and the culture of behavior safety in cyberspace; 3) the development of international cooperation and the support of international initiatives in the field of cyber security, including the deepening of Ukraine’s cooperation with the EU and NATO.

In June 2016 the National Coordination Center for Cyber Security was created (its functions remind the respective functions of the EU DIGIT). The main tasks of the Center include the analysis of the condition of cybersecurity; the monitoring of the national cybersecurity system; the control of the readiness of the subjects providing cybersecurity and counteracting cyber threats; the analysis of national legislation fulfillment in the sphere of cyber defense for state electronic information resources and information; the collection of data on cyber incidents in relation to state information, etc.⁸⁷.

⁸⁶Президент затвердив Стратегію кібербезпеки України, 2016, <https://dt.ua/POLITICS/prezident-zatverdiv-strategiyu-kiberbezpeki-ukrayini-202619.html>

⁸⁷Президент затвердив Положення про Національний координаційний центр кібербезпеки, 2016, <http://www.president.gov.ua/news/prezident-zatverdiv-polozhennya-pro-nacionalnij-koordinacijn-37329>

On October 5, 2017 the law on “Basic principles of providing cybersecurity of Ukraine” was adopted based on national legislation and the Convention on cybersecurity. The coordination of activities in the sphere of cybersecurity as a component of national security of Ukraine is carried out by the President of Ukraine through the Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine headed by him. The National Cybersecurity Coordination Center, as the working body of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, coordinates and monitors the activity of the security and defense sector, which provides cybersecurity, makes proposals to the President of Ukraine on the formation and refinement of the Cybersecurity Strategy of Ukraine. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine shall ensure the formation and implementation of state policy in the field of cybersecurity, protection of human and civil rights and freedoms, national interests of Ukraine in cyberspace, and the fight against cybercrime. It organizes and provides the necessary forces, instruments and resources for the functioning of the national cybersecurity system, establishes requirements and ensures the functioning of the information security audit system at the objects of critical infrastructure⁸⁸.

Governmental Response Team for Computer Emergencies of Ukraine CERT-UA, established under the support of ENISA, is responsible for the accumulation and analysis of data on cyber incidents, keeping the state register of cyber incidents; providing owners of cyber defense objects with practical help in preventing, detecting and eliminating the effects of cyber incidents on these objects; organizing and conducting practical seminars on cyber defense issues for subjects of the national system of cybersecurity and owners of objects of cyber defense; preparing and publishing on its official website

⁸⁸Закон України «Про основні засади забезпечення кібербезпеки України», 2017, <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2163-19>

recommendations on the counteraction to modern types of cyber attacks and cyber threats; interaction with law enforcement agencies, ensuring their timely information on cyber attacks etc.⁸⁹.

Conclusions

The European Union has developed a powerful base for counteracting the threats and challenges that have been provoked by the widespread use of ICTs in all areas of society. ICTs are improving, making the negative influences more “sophisticated”, but the EU is constantly improving its regulatory framework as well, creating new structures for counteracting cyber threats, laying the basis for the prevention rather than the elimination only. Having suffered from cyber attacks, and being under the influence of hybrid warfare, Ukraine developed some cybersecurity and related legislation, and established some cybersecurity structures following the EU experience.

⁸⁹CERT – EU, <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/csirts-in-europe/capacity-building/european-initiatives/cert-eu>

Economic Security as a Basis for Cross-Border Cooperation of Poland and Ukraine

Introduction

In today's environment, security is a key component of any country's economic policy. It is especially relevant for countries in the process of economic transformation.

In the 21st century, researchers of economic security issues insist on the inadmissibility of understanding the essence of this concept as a state of immunity. Some of them, from a theoretical and philosophical point of view, propose to consider the concept of "security" as a set of conditions of subject's existence controlled by this subject⁹⁰. Others, on the basis of an institutional approach, emphasize the essence of security in the conditions of activity of the subject, characterized by a set of conditions under which the state and society's capacity for self-preservation and development is ensured⁹¹.

Despite the existence of two conceptual approaches to the interpretation of the content of the concept of "security", the methodology of the study remains the same. Security is a synergistic concept that comprehensively reflects the overall status of its components and needs to be explored through a system of indicators, national interests, factors and threats.

⁹⁰ Ivashchenko G.V. About the Concept of "Safety" [Electronic resource] / GV Ivashchenko // CREDO Theoretical Journal. - 2000. - № (6) 24. - Retrieved from: <http://www.orenburg.ru/culture/credo/24/5.html>.

⁹¹ Kolisnyk O.Ya. Fiscal Security in Providing a Strategy for Socio-Economic Development of the State: diss. ... PhD in Economics: 08.00.08 / Kolisnyk Oleh Yaroslavovych. - Ternopil, 2009. - 237 p.

Results

Scientific studies of this issue have been conducted since the early 1990s in connection with a number of newly emerging threats to the countries following this path. Therefore, the concept of economic security of the state, its regions and individual economic entities is currently at the stage of scientific justification.

The term "economic security of state" originated under the influence of globalization and internationalization of world economic relations and was first used at the level of international economic relations as a set of quantitative and qualitative characteristics of individual countries⁹². The term "economic security" gained its official status in 1985, when "International Economic Security" resolution was adopted at the 40th session of the UN General Assembly. It emphasized the need to promote international economic security for the purpose of socio-economic development and progress of each country⁹³.

Security is revealed through the detection, prevention, reduction, elimination and prevention of danger and threats, capable of causing significant losses, and closing the way for progressive development⁹⁴.

The security function is implemented at two levels:

- 1) macro-levels - through the use of mechanisms of specific functions: state regulation of economic relations, operational-search activities, certification, standardization, quotas, judicial protection;
- 2) micro-levels - through the performance of specific functions: detective activity, analytical and search activities, technical protection of information,

⁹². Fiscal Security in Providing a Strategy for Socio-Economic Development of the State: diss. ... PhD in Economics: 08.00.08 / Kolisnyk O.Ya Kolisnyk Oleh Yaroslavovych. - Ternopil, 2009. - 237 p.

⁹³ Kozachenko H.V. Economic Safety of the Enterprise: Essence and Mechanism of Providing: [monograph] / H.V. Kozachenko, V.P. Ponomariov, O.M. Lyashenko. - Kyiv: Libra, 2003. - 280 p.

⁹⁴ Franchuk V.I. Theoretical and Methodological Foundations of the Organization of the System of Economic Security of Joint Stock Companies: abstract for the degree of Doctor of Economics. Kyiv, 2012.40 p.

security activities, legal protection, insurance, labor protection, etc.

Specific functions of economic security include any activities that contain security mechanisms to counteract the internal and external threats to the social system⁹⁵.

In this study, we believe that economic security of the state is a complex multifactorial phenomenon that includes a set of economic, geopolitical, environmental, legal and other measures that provide:

- state of protection of vital economic interests of the individual, society and the state from internal and external threats;
- creation of internal immunity and external protection against the effects of imbalances;
- adequate resource provision for balance and development dynamics;
- competitiveness of the country in the world markets and stability of its financial position;
- decent living conditions, employment and sustainability of personality development;
- ability of institutions of power to create mechanisms for realization and protection of national interests of development of domestic economy, and support of socio-political stability.

In addition, the concept of “security” is a synergistic concept that comprehensively reflects the generalized state of its components and is required to be investigated through a system of indicators, national economic interests, factors and threats. Economic security is one of the components of national security. This multifaceted concept also includes geopolitical, military,

⁹⁵Franchuk V.I. Theoretical and Methodological Foundations of the Organization of the System of Economic Security of Joint Stock Companies: abstract for the degree of Doctor of Economics. Kyiv, 2012.40 p.

information, environmental and demographic security. In turn, economic security has its own structure and reflects the cause-and-effect relationship between a country's economic power, its military-economic potential and national security (Fig. 1).




Fig. 1. Structure of economic security of the state

As the figure shows, economic security has its corresponding structure, and the links between its elements are united by a common purpose in the form of an integral formation or a system. Economic security includes industrial, energy, food, social, transport and innovation security.

An analysis of research showed a lack of unified approach to the definition of "economic security system". The economic security system is characterized by a number of properties such as resilience, adaptability, inertia, cumulateness, independence, self-development ability, purposefulness, contradiction, controllability, stochasticity. As a result, we can conclude that this category is polystructural and multidimensional.

The research paper considers the system of ensuring the state economic security as a state-organized body of economic security entities, legislation, forces and means, as well as coordinated and concerted actions and measures to

protect the vital interests of the individual, company, region, society and state from internal and external threats.

The purpose of the economic security system is to maintain the normal functioning of the economy, identify threats and take adequate measures to prevent and neutralize them, protect the economic interests of the individual, society, family, state, and implement socially oriented economic policy⁹⁶.

The economic security system should consist of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government, enterprises, organizations, citizens and citizens' associations. Given the geopolitical and internal situation in Ukraine, the activity of state bodies in the economic sphere should focus on forecasting, timely detection, prevention and neutralization of external and internal threats to economic security, protection of economic sovereignty, raising the economy of the country, ensuring the constitutional rights and freedoms, the eradication of economic crime, the improvement of the functioning of the state in the economic sphere, the strengthening of law and order, protection of social and economic stability of society, strengthening Ukraine's economic positions of in the world, maintaining its economic potential at the proper level, radical improvement of the environmental situation⁹⁷.

In today's globalized world, the absence of an effective system of ensuring the economic security of a country that constitutes among others a function of fiscal regulation of foreign trade activities will increase the destructive impact of various internal and external threats, which will manifest in:

- decrease in financial revenues to the budget,

⁹⁶Vorozhikhin V.V. On the Definition of Economic Security in the Conditions of Globalization. // *Business Security*. 2014. № 3. P. 3-7.

⁹⁷Vorozhikhin V.V. On the Definition of Economic Security in the Conditions of Globalization. // *Business Security*. 2014. № 3. P. 3-7.

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- increased movement across the customs border of goods causing damage to domestic producers thus contributing to the non-compliance of participants of foreign economic relations with the state interests in the foreign market;
 - uncontrolled movement of currency across the customs border of Ukraine;
 - violation of the interests of consumers of goods through the import of goods that cause damage to the physical and moral health of the population;
 - increased smuggling and breach of customs rules.

Such threats can be counteracted by using security mechanisms of fiscal regulation of foreign trade activity. The scientific sources describe the mechanisms that different macroeconomic and micro-level economic security systems possess:

- a) information-operative - for timely documentation of illegal actions, receiving or transmitting relevant information about potential or real threats;
- b) preventive-deterrent - to create conditions that would not create a favorable environment for the emergence of threats thus acting as a kind of "filter" in their path;
- c) liquidation and restoration - for creation of appropriate conditions and opportunities for elimination (termination) of threats and compensation of the caused losses, restoration of processes, system integrity, etc.⁹⁸.

⁹⁸Behey M.V. Modeling of the System of Ensuring the Economic Security of Forestry Enterprises: dissertation for the degree of Candidate of Economics. Lviv. 2017. 237 p

Interpreting the content of these mechanisms in the context of the problem under study, we can distinguish the following security mechanisms of foreign trade fiscal regulation system as a specific function of economic security of the state:

- threat detection mechanism - system actions aimed at monitoring and controlling the objects of protection, as well as timely informing security entities about suspicious phenomena and processes;
- averting - prevention and avoidance of the occurrence of unlawful, illegal and uncontrolled phenomena and processes in the object of security;
- elimination of threats - elimination of the action or harmful influence of unlawful and illegal phenomena and processes on the object of security;
- recovery - a set of actions by security entities to return the object of protection to normal processes of its functioning and life;
- compensation for losses is a mechanism of compensation for damage caused by the effects of unlawful and illegal phenomena and processes on the object of protection (Fig. 2).

Fiscal regulation, as a type of economic security function, in terms of a systematic approach, in addition to its mechanism, whose identity is manifested through its specific elements, should include the subjects, objects and the application order of the mechanism elements.

The subjects of security are the central bodies of the legislative and executive branches of government, whose task is the implementation of effective foreign trade and fiscal policy, as well as the international institutions involved in this sphere of life. Institutional support for the implementation of fiscal regulation as a specific function of economic security of the state will be

described below.

Regarding the topic of our research, the institutional support for fiscal regulation of foreign trade operations includes:

- defining the functions, tasks and responsibilities of the bodies responsible for regulating the FTA;
- the tools used by these bodies;
- established realities and behavior of subjects;
- reasons that change the regulatory institutions or their behavior.

The objects of security and protection of fiscal regulation of foreign trade activity, as a specific function of the economic security of the state, are the conditions of moving goods, loads and vehicles across the customs border of the state, as well as creating conditions to counter the emergence of new threats.

It should also be noted that not all levers, tools and regulators that are in the arsenal of the fiscal regulation mechanism can contribute to the detection, prevention and elimination of threats in the foreign trade sphere, as well as to facilitate the restoration of normal processes and compensate for losses. According to the author, it is the fiscal levers and tools that possess the most protectionist potential aimed at preventing and eliminating threats in the fiscal sphere. Fiscal regulators, on the other hand, have good incentive properties and the ability to help restore normal processes and offset losses.

Let's take a closer look at these elements of foreign trade activity fiscal regulation system through the lens of security theory, particularly at those that have the ability to detect, prevent, eliminate threats, and possibly facilitate the restoration of normal processes or to compensate for losses.




Fig. 2. Fiscal regulation of foreign trade activity as a function of ensuring economic security of the state

Analyzing the security impact of fiscal instruments and their implementation leverage, it becomes clear that the action of these two elements of foreign trade activity fiscal regulation mechanism is closely interrelated, since the action of the tools, in practice, is realized and specified through their levers. However, the security potential and nature of the operation of individual instruments is different. Such fiscal instruments as duties, VAT and excise tax, along with their main levers (entities, objects, tax base and tax rate) are aimed at both detecting, preventing and eliminating threats in the area of foreign trade fiscal regulation. However, budget expenditures with their implementation levers (subsidies, grants and subventions) help to restore normal processes and develop foreign trade activities. Also, financial incentives are aimed at restoration and development, whereas the main purpose of financial sanctions is to compensate for the losses caused to the state budget.

On the basis of this information, it becomes clear that fiscal regulation mechanism significantly reduces the losses of the state from illegal activities, effectively generates financial resources of the state and promotes the development of international trade.

Analyzing the structure of mechanisms of security activities and their content, it is clear that fiscal regulation of foreign trade activities contains a qualitative mechanism for detecting, preventing and eliminating threats, which allows us to consider it as an important and effective specific function to ensure the economic security of the state.

The problem of ensuring the economic security of the state requires an analysis of all internal and external factors under which it is proposed to consider economic processes and phenomena that shape the level of economic security at macro, meso and micro levels, and affect the basic structural proportions of the national economic complex of the country. Exceeding the

threshold levels for the above factors transform them into factors of destabilization of the established development, thus causing the emergence and development of crisis situations and creating a threat to the economic security of the country.

Conclusions

Summarizing, it is worth mentioning that the concept of "economic security of the state" has a corresponding structure in which there are close relationships between its elements, united by a common purpose in the form of an integral formation or system. According to the results of the study, fiscal regulation has the greatest interconnection with the financial and foreign economic components of the economic security of the state and exerts influence on all its other components. It is the goals of state policy implemented through the mechanism of fiscal regulation that directly affect the following: development of the real sector of the economy, filling the state budget with financial resources, intensifying international trade, providing high-quality food for the population of the state thus entering the path of a sustainable economic growth.

Also, from the point of view of a systematic approach, fiscal regulation as a specific function of economic security of the state, besides its mechanism, the identity of which is manifested through its specific elements, contains its own subjects, objects and the application order of the mechanism elements.

Pavlova Olena,
Pavlov Kostiantyn

Energy Security in the Context of Geopolitical Change

Introduction

Probably each of us has our vision of the real state of things that are taking place today in the Ukrainian natural gas market. In this scientific work, we have attempted to reflect the current state of the gas market in the country, as well as the problems and challenges that stand in the way of its balanced formation and functioning.

Indeed, the issue of the Ukrainian, gas transportation system load is an important component of the country's energy security. Russian gas transit via the territory of Ukraine not only provides significant revenues (up to 3 billion USD annually) to Ukraine's income, but also provides for the employment of 18,000 Ukrtransgas employees and, just as importantly, is a guarantee of not initiating the large-scale military actions by Russia.

Unfortunately, according to our estimation, by-pass gas pipelines that bypass the territory of Ukraine, in particular: Turkish Stream (TS) and Northern Stream-2 (NS-2) are already under construction. The first line of TS will be ready by the end of 2018, but NS-2 is delayed and, according to our estimates, will be put into operation in 2020-2021. Moreover, the NS-2 extension to the south of Germany, Eugal gas pipeline, will be ready no later than in 2021-2022. Therefore, we still have time for finding solutions. However, the fact is that there is a high probability that NS-2 will be built anyway⁹⁹.

⁹⁹Матеріали 4-ого форуму "Gas Forum". "Газовий ринок України QUO VADIS (позиція експертів)" 2018., 2018. 48 с.

According to the calculations of Naftogasbudinformatyka Ltd. carried out in 2012, with the construction of TS (the first line) and NS-2, the minimum volume of transit through Ukrainian GTS will be about 40 billion cubic meters per year. Of course, this will not ensure a full load of our GTS. The fact is that a significant part of Ukrainian consumers is provided with natural gas from the system of “transit” gas pipelines. Therefore, even now it is necessary to develop a state program, precisely, the state Program for modernization of gas supply system, providing for the supply of certain settlements with propane-butane, some settlements with liquefied natural gas (liquefaction at gas distribution points). This is, by the way, also stated in the letter Mr. S. Konovets acting as a Chairman of the management board of Naftogas of Ukraine in the name of the Prime Minister of Ukraine Mr. V. Groisman: “To instruct the Government of Ukraine, in coordination with the international partners to develop and approve an Action Plan in the event of a complete absence of natural gas transit through Ukraine to the EU after 2019, including all the necessary military -political, logistical, economic, financial, legislative and other measures to protect the interests of Ukraine”¹⁰⁰.

We return to the assessment of the transit volumes of Ukrainian GTS. Whether a value of 40 billion cubic meters is such that “shows” the maximum possible value. Based on the estimates of the International Energy Agency, BP and Shell companies, the co-authors of the global gas report of 2018 (Snam company, the World Gas Union, Boston Consulting Group) forecast an increase in natural gas consumption in Europe for the period 2016-2040 by 39 billion cubic meters. It should also be borne in mind that due to several objective circumstances, imports will increase significantly. This is, in particular, the EU

¹⁰⁰Government Portal. Official website. URL: <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en>].

countries' refusal to use coal-fired power plants, the closure of nuclear power plants in Germany, the drop-in production at the Groningen gas field in the Netherlands, (followed by its complete closing in the 20's), and the approach to the maximum possible production volumes in marine waters ¹⁰¹. Also, one more factor should be taken into account. All bypass gas pipelines (TS, NS-1, and NS-2) are not equipped with sufficient capacity of underground natural gas storage facilities, unlike the Ukrainian route. Therefore, only the Ukrainian GTS can ensure the leveling of fluctuations in demand in different regions of Europe.

When discussing transit, especially transit after 2019, we should, in our opinion, also pay attention to the problem of finding foreign partners for the Ukrainian GTS management. What is it for? This question is answered by several means, since there is no single point of view in the society whether it is necessary for the country ¹⁰².

Indeed, the Ukrainian operator's engineering, technological and technical staff can professionally and reliably manage the process of GTS gas transportation. However, due to certain political circumstances, and more specifically, in connection with the very tense relations of the Ukrainian side with PJSC Gazprom, we need a foreign partner who, in essence, would have to: on the one hand, assume responsibility for gas customers in Europe for the reliability of transit and on the other hand, guarantee the fulfillment of Gazprom's conditions of the transit transactions to the Ukrainian side. In the long term, subject to the involvement of partners, it's possible to move the Russian gas "receiving-transmission" points to our eastern border. However, for this purpose, it is still necessary to build gas measuring stations (GMS) in our territory.

¹⁰¹ Official site "Snam". URL: <https://www.snam.it/it/index.html>

¹⁰² Матеріали 4-ого форуму "Gas Forum". "Газовий ринок України QUO VADIS (позиція експертів)" 2018., 2018. 48 с.

To date, 10 European operators and recently 1 American operator has expressed an interest in taking part in the Ukrainian GTS management. And, if Europeans are not inclined to invest real money in the purchase of a 49% stake of the Ukrainian gas transportation operator, Americans offer rather big funds.

The appearance of Americans as partners, in our opinion, will significantly change the political situation around the transit gas pipelines. First, the probability of US sanctions against NS-2 will sharply increase, and second, real funds will be invested in providing the “presence” of North American liquefied gas on the European continent. That is, an American partner figuratively speaking, who will determine the rules of the “gas game” in the territory of Ukraine (this also applies to the tariff policy. However, what will Europeans say?

And the last thesis, however, in our opinion, is one of the most important. Ultimately, economic efficiency will be the deciding factor for shippers choosing the Ukrainian gas transit route. Therefore, one of the most important directions of our activity should be our GTS modernization. So far, everything is very bad in this area. Ukrtransgas failed in 2017 and is failing now (in 2018) even the reduced investments and repair plans. So, the initial plan for repairs of the gas compressor units (GCU) for the amount of UAH 1.5 billion has been reduced to UAH 600 million. The reasons are not holding tenders.

Table 1 provides data on the development plan for the gas transportation system and underground natural gas storage of JSC Ukrtransgas. We think that this is not enough. Indeed, if we want to compete with other routes of Russian gas supply to Europe, we must ensure the economic feasibility and environmental acceptability of our GTS transportation.

According to Mott McDonald, the cost of Ukrainian GTS modernization is estimated at 5.3 billion USD (subject to the annual load of about 60 billion cubic meters). Moreover, these decisions should be made immediately.

It should be noted that the situation with European energy markets requires us taking decisive and consistent steps to ensure the legitimate interests of Ukraine, as well as all Eastern European states in the field of energy supply. Russia's aspiration to go directly to the western/central gas markets ("Northern Streams", "Turkish Stream") supplying the energy sources deepens the "energy gap" between Western European developed countries and Eastern European countries such as Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Romania, Moldova, and Ukraine, questioning the issue of their energy security¹⁰³.

However, the countries in the Eastern European region have enormous energy potential. Table 1 gives the main characteristics of these countries in the gas sector.

Table 1 – Comparable characteristics of the natural gas sectors of the countries in Eastern and Southern Europe in 2017, [1, 3]

Country	Production, bcm	Consumption, bcm	UGS capacity, bcm	Import, bcm	Export to Ukraine, bcm	LNG terminal, bcm	Gas price for households EUR / kWh
Ukraine	20.5	31.9	31	14.1	0	0	0.02
The Czech Republic	0.2	8.7	3.5	9.89	0	0	0.06
Slovakia	0.09	4.7	3.9	3.23	9.91	0	0.04
Hungary	1.7	10.5	6.9	11.8	2.83	0	0.04
Poland	40	20.4	3.4	14.07	1.31	5	0.04
Romania	10.3	12.3	3.4	2.34	0	0	0.03

¹⁰³ На модернізацію української ГТС треба \$5,3 млрд – Укртрансгаз. Zaxid.net. URL: zaxid.net/ua_modernizatsiyu_ukrayinskoyi_gts_treba_53_mird_ukrtransgaz_n1286500.

Thus, in the case of uniting the gas markets of these countries, we will have a trading zone with an annual gas consumption of more than 88 billion cubic meters that is almost equivalent to the annual consumption of a country such as Germany.

Considering the above, the key to the sustainable development of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Ukraine, and Moldova is to consolidate their efforts, first of all, to achieve the required level of their energy security.

The most effective tool for this is the creation of an Eastern European hub that would unite the energy markets (primarily the natural gas and electricity markets) of the countries in this region. Let us determine what an energy hub is.

This is a single trading area with a set of means for receiving, distribution, and storage of energy resources and trading platforms, as well as single market operators (electricity, gas) that carry out all spot trade operations (a day ahead and within a day) and daily balancing.

Let us recall only the latest global projects for energy hubs creation. These are: the regional energy hub on Geshm island (Iran); the energy hub in the North Sea; the Caspian energy hub in the territory of Kazakhstan; the efforts of Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria to create gas hubs on their territory¹⁰⁴. A prerequisite for the energy hub creation is developed infrastructure and the availability of facilities for the energy products' storage and distribution.

According to the European target model of the gas market (2015), it is required to meet five conditions for a single trading zone (hub) creation: the total demand for gas should be at least 20 billion cubic meters per year (220 TWh); the according to the Herfindahl-Hirschman index should be zone must have at least

¹⁰⁴ Saxon. URL: <https://oil-gas-energy.com.ua>.

three outside sources of gas supply; the market concentration less than 2000 points; the churn Rate on the stock exchange (no OTC transactions) must be at least 8; the Residual Supply Index (RSI) indicator should be at least 110% ¹⁰⁵.

If everything is satisfactory with the first two conditions, then for the fulfillment of the others, we still; have to work and work – just like our neighbors. Such an energy hub introduction will make it possible: to create a competitive single trading zone for Eastern European countries; due to this zone attractiveness (with large volumes of trade) to provide an inflow of significant volume for energy resources; to arrange competition of the hub, to provide quality services and affordable, economically feasible resource prices; to guarantee integration of the energy infrastructure of the countries that will enter the hub; to unify normative and regulatory documents, which is to create a unified regulatory framework for the established trading zone ¹⁰⁶.

The idea of creating an East European trade energy zone (Energy Hub) has been long-standing. However, it will be erroneous to assert that to bring it into reality, we need significant changes. First of all, this is the completion of unbundling. In general, we need the coordinated work of regulatory bodies in the Energy Hub zone to harmonize the operational procedures of the respective gas and electricity systems. Also, we need unified customs rules to ensure smooth transportation and storage of gas, as well as electricity transmission.

Ukraine is ready to contribute to the Energy Hub creation. The Ukrainian energy sector has the largest energy potential in Central and Eastern Europe – 55, 400 MW of installed power generation capacity. Currently, the pilot project “Energy Bridge Ukraine – the European Union” is being considered. Its implementation will significantly increase the export of electricity to the EU.

¹⁰⁵ Saxon. URL: <https://oil-gas-energy.com.ua>.

¹⁰⁶ Матеріали 4-ого форуму "Gas Forum". "Газовий ринок України QUO VADIS (позиція експертів)" 2018., 2018. 48 с.

Also, Ukraine has one of the largest underground gas storage systems in Europe, near the western border. Their capacity is about 28 billion cubic meters; and the extensive electrical and gas transmission systems. We should point out that there are large prospective natural gas reserves in Ukraine (more than 1 trillion cubic meers) that may provide a resource base for regional countries in the future ¹⁰⁷.

Also, at power hub could be the main supplier (distributing center) of North American liquefied natural gas for the region countries. Calling for the idea of an “Eastern European gas hub”, we must understand that its creation requires long-term and systematic actions. Indeed, as we have already mentioned, without real unbundling it is impossible. And this is a required condition, but not enough. Among conditions are: availability of diversified sources and routes of supply to and from the trading area (hub); availability of the group of independent suppliers; a single regulatory framework in the whole zone (system codes, etc.); stable and forecasted demand for energy resources; a well-established system of swap operations; a favorable business environment; a clear and stable tax system; an effective and efficient system of financial instruments (clearing, etc.); an independent and professional regulator; clear and simple reporting ¹⁰⁸.

The legal mechanism for the creation of an Eastern European energy hub may be the launch of an international trading zone in Uzhgorod with its jurisdiction and the creation of hub (market) operators in this area for both gas

¹⁰⁷ Матеріали 4-ого форуму "Gas Forum". "Газовий ринок України QUO VADIS (позиція експертів)" 2018., 2018. 48 с.

¹⁰⁸ Матеріали 4-ого форуму "Gas Forum". "Газовий ринок України QUO VADIS (позиція експертів)" 2018., 2018. 48 с.

and electricity in the form of joint-stock companies based on equal rights by participating companies ¹⁰⁹.

We would also like to emphasize that the proposed model of the future European natural gas market (Quo Vadis project) provides for refusal of the internal gas tariffs in the EU for compensation, as well as transferring the natural gas receiving and transmission points from the third parties' agents to the external borders of the EU energy legislation application area. In our case – on Ukraine's border with Russia.




Figure 1 - Split of underground gas storage capacities by countries¹¹⁰

In conclusion, we draw attention to circumstances that, in our opinion, give grounds to a reasonable hope that the idea of an Eastern European energy hub creation can be quite realistic.

¹⁰⁹ The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. URL: <https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?v=3943d8795e03>.

¹¹⁰ The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. URL: <https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?v=3943d8795e03>.

Energy storage systems are rapidly developing in the world. Not oil and oil products (EU Directive No. 68/414 as amended by EU directive 98/93) but specifically energy. Natural gas is not an exception.

Figure 1, shows the possible volumes of natural gas storage in various countries. EU-27 plus Ukraine has 32% of the world's storage capacity. Figure 2 illustrates the split of storage capacities on the European continent (EU-28 and Ukraine), where 23% is a share of Ukrainian UGS.




Figure 2 – split of EU-28 and Ukrainian underground gas storage capacities¹¹¹

The maximum volumes used in EU-28 and Ukraine are 793 TWh (74% of total capacity) and 133 TWh (41% of total capacity), respectively. In case Ukraine reaches the level of using UGS in EU-28, an additional 108 TWh of effective storage can be found solely by means of Ukraine's capacities. This is equivalent to an additional 8% of the total world storage capacity.

¹¹¹ The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. URL: <https://www.oxfordenergy.org/?v=3943d8795e03>.

Conclusions

Thus, it can be argued that an Eastern European energy hub built on the basis of Ukrainian UGS can serve not only regional countries but also, in the case of peak demand spikes or technogenic emergency situations, other European countries, where natural gas from Ukrainian gas storages can be supplied.

Security Dimensions of the Regional Cooperation in the Eastern Partnership Initiative

In 2019, when the European Union (EU) and six countries to the east of the EU (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) celebrated the 10th anniversary of the Eastern Partnership (EaP), foreign ministers underlined common work on trade, visa liberalization, economic development and human rights that had been achieved by (or through) the partnership¹¹². The occasion was an opportunity to highlight the partnership's achievements, which are often overshadowed by a tendency to focus on problems and challenges. For example, it is worth noting the tangible increases in the volume and value of trade and a growing number of people-to-people contacts (not only in the fields of education, research and youth engagement), but also through trans-border cooperation.

The EaP by promotion economic integration, political association with the EU, and strengthen cooperation of civil society has delivered important results in the development of national laws and the strengthening of institutions needed for modern and effective governance. However, there is criticism that clarity about the EaP as a political project has not sufficiently fit to the new reality and security challenges in the neighboring region¹¹³. A new understanding of the political project that unites the EaP countries needs to be created.

¹¹² Eastern Partnership celebrates its 10th anniversary in 2019, 18.01.2019, <https://www.euneighbours.eu/en/east/stay-informed/news/eastern-partnership-celebrates-its-10th-anniversary-2019>.

¹¹³ *Limits to the European Union's Normative Power in a Post-conflict Society*, ed. R. Zupančič, N. Pejič, London 2018.

Developments in the eastern and southern neighborhoods in the last few years suggest that the initial goal of the EU's European Neighborhood Policy, which was to be a community of prosperous and stable countries around the EU (ring of friends), has largely not been achieved. While the EU cannot be accused of unfavorable economic conditions or stagnation, or even a fall back in compliance with democratic standards, the deterioration of the security environment and other disasters generated by countries located on the external periphery of the EU constitute the largest geopolitical test for EU policy. Although the conflicts in the south and the east of Europe are of different nature, they emphasize the need to strengthen its foreign and security policy so that it responds better to hybrid challenges (military and non-conventional and unconventional methods and practices). Both the new ENP, including the Eastern Partnership, and the Global Strategy need a tailor-made approach that looks at the neighborhood and their goals in an individualized way, without even agreeing to share common values.

Established in 2009, the Eastern Partnership was considered a landmark in the ENP - for the first time a program focused only on post-Soviet countries was created. Recent years - especially the Ukrainian crisis and political changes in the rest countries have highlighted the disadvantages of this program and the sense of its continuation. At the same time, efforts to reform security policy within the EU have been intensified.

The main assumption of the article is the statement that during emerging problems in the neighborhood resulting from a return to the principles of realism of Russia's policy and destabilization of the EU region, it needs a strengthened approach towards the outside world, based on a more realistic and permanent

vision, even securitization of this policy and taking over the absent so far security policy in the region.

1. Evolution of the European Union's policy towards its neighborhood

In the first decade of the EaP security issues were addressed indirectly through ‘soft security’ measures. Some of the projects sketched above would inevitably expand the focus to new issue areas. For example, the digital economy must manage cybersecurity risks and develop effective tools to respond to anti-social use of digital space. However, partners will remind the EU of the need to play a direct and active role in conflict management.

Thirty years after the end of the Soviet Union, the Eastern partners cannot be placed in a unified category of ‘post-Soviet’ states as each of them has specific aspirations, objectives and personality. However, fragmenting the Eastern Partnership into a series of bilateral relationships would take away a valuable space in which the partners can discuss issues of mutual interest and concern with each other, as well as with the EU. Moving forward the EaP will probably emphasize a more differentiated approach that tailors’ projects to the needs of individual partners, but country-specific actions should still co-exist with common elements, including a security roundtable.

Taking to accounts security challenges in the region, Belarus is the only EaP partner that is not directly affected by unresolved conflicts. However, Belarus is sometimes treated in the security discourse as a geographical space, or province, of Russia - rather than as a state with agency and its own interests. If -

EaP discussions included a roundtable on European security, the results could be harvested in a systematic way and introduced into the wider inter governmental dialogue in the context of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

Moreover, it should be stressed, that the EU is not a powerful military actor - and it will not become one in the near term - but it is taking a greater interest in security and defence matters. The EU is building its own capabilities to be a more effective actor in security and defence, but a selfish and protectionist approach that forces EaP countries to seek other military partners or sell their military equipment in world markets would ultimately be counterproductive. A framework for engaging non-member states in defence industrial projects is under discussion. The framework is mainly focused on the United Kingdom and the United States, but when considering how non-EU states can participate in joint projects partners to the east should also be considered.

The ENP political and legal framework does not provide specific solutions to discourage emerging security challenges outside the EU. The response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine and Georgia is a perfect example of this. In this sense, art. 8 TEU, which provides for a peaceful and prosperous neighborhood and provides a legal basis by agreeing agreements aimed at closer association of neighbours, it has turned out that reality in partner countries sometimes goes in the opposite direction¹¹⁴.

This is characteristic of the generally reactive nature of the EU's activities in its neighborhood, operating 'too little and too late'. The EU's slow response

¹¹⁴ *Treaty on the European Union*, „Official Journal of the European Union”, C83/15, 30.03.2010, <http://eur-lex.eu>

to the dramatic events of the Arab Spring in 2011 and the annexation of Crimea reflects the limitations of neighborhood policy, particularly in the area of security. The EU has not demonstrated effectiveness in ensuring the stability of EU ENP beneficiaries - ineffectiveness in stopping Russia in destabilizing the Eastern Partnership countries.

In view of the current security situation that followed the crises in Eastern and Southern Europe, new goals, measures and a new role for the EU were identified. The focus was on several key issues: neighborhood, priority to the interests of European citizens, civil measures and security policy.

The idealistic narrative of the first strategy adopted by the European Council in 2003 stated that ‘the best protection for European security is well-managed democratic states in the European Union’s environment’ - those that are equally able to ensure universal values: security, prosperity and freedom as do EU Member States. However, most of the security problems facing the European Union are caused by neighboring countries that are neither democratic nor well managed.

The EU’s position on its neighborhood was most fully expressed in a separate document of May 2004 ‘European Neighborhood Policy. Strategy Paper’¹¹⁵. In the documents the main objectives of cooperation were enumerated: achieving political association and a greater degree of economic integration as soon as possible, supporting and strengthening by the EU stability, security and prosperity of neighboring countries. The objectives of the EU were planned to be fulfilled within the framework of the proposed instruments: contractual solutions, in the form of political Association Agreement signed with Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, and thus Deep

¹¹⁵ *European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper*, Brussels, 12.5.2004 COM(2004) 373 final
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/2004_communication_from_the_commission_-_european_neighbourhood_policy_-_strategy_paper.pdf

Comprehensive Free Trade Areas. The events of recent years have highlighted the need for a new approach, modification of priorities and introduction of new methods of action. The ENP was criticized for numerous deficiencies: inefficiency, inconsistency, or the use of double standards. The main objection is the perception of the gap between goals and results or difficult relations between interests and values in the implementation of the ENP.

The current narrative on the ENP made in previous reviews of this policy in 2011 and 2015 reflects a change in discourse on the nature and methods of achieving different political goals¹¹⁶. While in the years 2003-2010 the narrative on the ENP was dominated by a discourse on stability, good governance and prosperity, in 2011 there was a shift from deep and lasting democracy¹¹⁷. In turn, on November 18, 2015, he was replaced by a discourse on (in) stability and security, where neighborhood stability became a key priority preceding the goal of strengthening good governance, democracy, the rule of law and human rights¹¹⁸. The 2015 communication proposed cooperation priorities in a specific order: economic development for stability, security dimension, migration and movement of people, and regional cooperation.

That is why the new ENP considers stability rather than democratization as the main political priority - the focus of the new policy is the stabilization of the region in political, economic and security terms. The stability of the European

¹¹⁶ T. Schumacher, *The 2011 Revised European Neighbourhood Policy: Continuity and Change in EU Foreign Policy*, [in:] *The Revised European Neighbourhood Policy: Continuity and Change in EU Foreign Policy 1st*, ed. by D. Bouris, T. Schumacher, London 2016, p.1-33.

¹¹⁷ *A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood*, Brussels, 25.05.2011 COM(2011) 303 final, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0303>

¹¹⁸ *Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy Accompanying the document* Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions; *Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy*, Brussels, 18.11.2015 SWD(2015) 500 final http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/documents/2015/151118_staff-working-document_en.pdf

Union itself is built on democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The role of all member states belonging to this organization is to continue working to strengthen these universal values.

Thus, the EU has turned towards stabilization and securitization of an increasingly destabilized neighborhood, but seeing the roots of this fragility rather outside the domain of security, and caused by inequality, poverty, feelings of injustice, corruption, and poor economic and social development. This means a return to the original ENP approach, where economic development and good governance were seen as a driver of stability. Thus, according to the securitization of the narrative, democracy support is no longer the first but the long-term goal of the ENP.

The communication on the new European Neighborhood Policy outlines the framework for a new approach to the neighborhood - somewhat ahead of what was included in the EU Global Strategy, for which the ENP is a kind of sub-strategy and a useful precursor. The reason of enrichment the EU's approach to security issues were as follows:

Firstly, the importance of newly recognized interests vis-à-vis the international environment, such as the security of citizens and territory, prosperity, democracy, a world order based on principles was emphasized¹¹⁹.

Secondly, the European Commission states that 'the Union should also continue those that include the promotion of universal values', but it is also added that 'not all partners aspire to EU principles and standards' - the Union will continue to 'promote democracy, responsible and good governance' where there is joint involvement (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in the east, and Morocco

¹¹⁹ *Democracy Promotion and the Normative Power Europe Framework: The European Union in South Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia*, ed. Marek Neuman, London 2019.

and Tunisia in the south), however not all countries want to benefit from art. 49 TEU.

Thirdly, a change in the main interest was announced and a focus on three issues, relevant from the beginning, especially in the context of the southern neighborhood:

- paying more attention to energy and climate security;
- emphasis on security sector reform, conflict prevention, the fight against terrorism and radicalization;
- safe and lawful flow of people across borders, fight against illegal migration, smuggling of people and goods.

Fourthly, a new element compared to previous European Commission documents is the European Union's emphasis on greater importance of equality in ensuring stability, because poverty and inequality may be the basis for injustice¹²⁰.

Fifthly, the new label under which the ENP was finally presented and the way the neighborhood was introduced to the debate on Global Strategy is resilience¹²¹. This term appeared for the first-time regarding progress made in development policy, but introduced in the context of foreign and security policy has gained more importance. It is a basic innovation compared to the content of the European Security Strategy from 2003, in Global Strategy it was referred to in at least 40 cases¹²².

¹²⁰ *Theorising the European Union as an International Security Provider*, ed. by A. P. Dodt, R. Whitman, S. Wolff, Routledge 2016.

¹²¹ *Resilience and the EU's Eastern Neighbourhood Countries: From Theoretical Concepts to a Normative Agenda*, ed. by G. Rouet, G.C. Pascariu, Springer 2019.

¹²² *European Strategy in the 21st Century, New Future for Old Power*, 1st Edition, ed. by S. Biscop, London 2018; *Shaping the EU Global Strategy: Partners and Perceptions*, ed. by N. Chaban, M. Holland, London 2018.

2. Security priority and challenges the in Eastern Partnership initiative

At the very beginning, the EaP did not directly address the issue of security to a small extent - the goal was and is still political convergence and economic integration between the EU and the countries concerned, or to focus on two issues: economic transformation (DCFTA) and the other - political transformation (supporting democratic change and the rule of law). The Eastern Partnership security goals do not completely correspond with the interests of the partner states as these goals fail to provide the most important target solution: conflict resolution, and Russia is not mentioned as the main source of security threats.

The lack of clear identification of the source of threats makes it difficult to undertake effective combat measures. It is worth noting that in the EU Global Strategy of 2016, the key foreign policy and security document, the EU does not clearly identify the source of threats. However, it says that they come from the East and accuses Russia of its destabilizing policy: ‘Russia’s violation of the international law and the destabilization of Ukraine, on top of protracted conflicts in the wider Black Sea region, have challenged the European security order’¹²³.

However, the European Union has clearly defined security priorities according to which it aims to develop its cooperation with the Eastern Partnership countries. In the first decade of the EaP security issues were addressed indirectly through ‘soft security’ measures¹²⁴. Some of the projects sketched above would inevitably expand the focus to new issue areas.

¹²³ From Vision to Action: The EU Global Strategy in Practice - Three years on, looking forward, https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-global-strategy/64034/vision-action-eu-global-strategy-practice-three-years-looking-forward_en

¹²⁴ B. Piskorska, *Soft power w polityce Unii Europejskiej wobec państw Partnerstwa Wschodniego*, Lublin 2017, s. 326.

For example, the digital economy must manage cybersecurity risks and develop effective tools to respond to anti-social and malicious use of digital space. However, partners will remind the EU of the need to play a direct and active role in conflict management.

The question remains whether these priorities are also the once vital for stability and security in the region and partner states and to what extent¹²⁵. Security has been one of essential components in Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative since it was launched¹²⁶. According to the European Commission press release on Eastern Partnership of December 3, 2008, security was defined as one of the components of this EU initiative, focusing on border management and effort to combat illegal migration and organized crime. If we analyze the effective document ‘Eastern Partnership - 20 Deliverables for 2020 Focusing on key priorities and tangible results’, finally adopted in June 2017, we will see that the European Union retained these priorities for EaP security, logically adding cyber security, fighting cyber threats, arms escalation, radiation, chemical and biological threats and emergency situations¹²⁷.

The list of these security priorities is obviously important to Ukraine and other EaP countries; however, the issue remains as to whether these priorities are important for the stability and security in the region. Ukraine, which has always been a leader when it comes to developing security cooperation with the EU, and which has been combatting Russian hybrid aggression for five years, has already

¹²⁵ V. Martyniuk, *EP security: EU goals and Ukraine's promotion*, Center for Global Studies “Strategy XXI”, https://geostrategy.org.ua/images/Безопасность_Восточного_партнерства_Eng.pdf

¹²⁶ Commission of the European Communities, *Eastern Partnership*, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, COM(2008), 823/4, Brussels, 3.12.2008, <http://eapereg.org/attachments/article/198/EaP%20Brussels%202008.pdf>

¹²⁷ *Eastern Partnership - 20 Deliverables for 2020 Focusing on key priorities and tangible results*, Brussels, 9.6.2017 SWD(2017) 300 final, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/eap_20_deliverables_for_2020.pdf.

partially achieved some deliverables defined by the EU. Moreover, Ukraine is likely to be able to fulfill all of them until 2020 as stated in the EU document on the Eastern Partnership mentioned before¹²⁸.

As the EaP enters its second decade the partners have an opportunity to create a positive agenda for change that can engage citizens, particularly young people. At their 2020 Summit EaP leaders should use the political guidelines for the next European Commission 2019-2024 as a starting point for their new programme of work¹²⁹. In addition, the leaders should add a security table to the Eastern Partnership as a positive contribution to European peace and stability.

The existing framework of cooperation based on the Association Agreements (AAs) are tools of very broad engagement, but there are still issues in EU relations with EaP countries that need further or different engagement of the EU and the partners. Given the emphasis of AAs on trade, other areas where cooperation needs to grow or develop based on changing circumstances are, among others, security, including cyber security and strategic communications, civil society, energy and climate change.

The European Union has also suggested the EaP countries to hold joint training for military units, take part in the EU missions and armed units that would make them better prepared for preventing conflicts and resolving crises. Even though Moldova and Georgia used this opportunity to participate in the EU missions, and Ukraine is planning to send its unit to be a part of the EU armed task forces, these steps are of only tactical nature and relate only to separate units with these developments demonstrating mostly the activities of those three countries that signed the association agreements.

¹²⁸ *EU revises the 20 key deliverables for 2020 for the Eastern Partnership*, 13.06.2017, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/28117/eu-revises-20-key-deliverables-2020-eastern-partnership_en

¹²⁹ *Eastern Partnership leaders' video conference*, 18/06/2020, <https://eu2020.hr/Events/Event?id=489>

Till 2020 limited Eastern Partnership security deliverables can be explained by the following: the EU priority of securing its eastern frontiers; the EU wish to define tasks that would correspond to its interests and the interests of each, without exceptions, partner state; avoiding taking measures against any third country and Russia in particular; radically polar policy courses for different partner countries, when some of them are the Eurasian Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization members while others have chosen the EU and NATO membership as their priorities.

Conclusions

The change towards securitization discourse is easily explained in the light of immediate threats, i.e. territorial annexation, hybrid war, or terrorism. The turn of discourse towards promoting democracy in 2011 was more complex, but both were to enable the EU to deal with various aspects of the EU's legitimacy deficit in external relations. Reasons of these transformations were between others: the rejection of democratic discourse and the strengthening of securitization ties can be seen as an attempt to bridge the gap between narrative and real challenges in the neighborhood, such as destabilization, war in the Arab world and Ukraine, the refugee crisis and terrorist attacks. This is a step-in line with the realistic argument, the greater the perception of the level of threats, the lower the normative emphasis on the promotion of democracy, and this increases the role of securitization n discourse¹³⁰.

¹³⁰ *Towards a new European security strategy? Assessing the impact of changes in the global security environment*, June 2015 – PE 534. 989, [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/534989/EXPO_STU\(2015\)534989_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/534989/EXPO_STU(2015)534989_EN.pdf)

To initial security issues of the EaP - border management and effort to combat illegal migration and organized crime, in June 2017, the European Union added cybersecurity, fighting cyber threats, illicit firearms trafficking, radiation, chemical and biological threats and emergency situations. The list of these security priorities is obviously important to Ukraine and other EaP countries, but they don't meet all security challenges and threats in the EaP region. At least for Ukraine, which has been combatting Russian hybrid aggression for five years, these goals are not ambitious. However, they remain actual. Ukraine has already partially achieved some goals, defined by the EU, and is likely to be able to fulfil all of them until 2020¹³¹.

Additionally, the political guidelines for the next European Commission 2019-2024 published by Ursula von der Leyen in July 2019 also indicate how a joint program with partners to the East could be constructed. The guidelines place a strong emphasis on the relationship between economic and technological development and how initiatives can be harnessed in ways that deliver direct benefits to citizens and partners security. The most specific parts of the guidelines refer to issues where partners could play an important role in cooperative efforts.

In order to actually create a stable and secure zone in the EaP region it is needed to be more active when it comes to participating in processes dealing with conflict resolution and making them more efficient. Brussels does possess capacities for influencing these matters; the only question is whether there is a will to do it. This could be a test for the EU Common Security and Defence

¹³¹ V. Martyniuk, *Does the Eastern Partnership Promote Common Security for Eastern Europe? Views from Ukraine*, Ukrainian Liaison Office in Brussels, October 30, 2018, <https://ukraineoffice.blogactiv.eu/2018/10/30/does-the-eastern-partnership-promote-common-security-for-eastern-europe-views-from-ukraine/>

Policy, a demonstration of its efficiency and a contribution to the EU development as a global leader in exactly the way it is envisioned in its Global Strategy¹³².

¹³² V. Martynyuk, *EP security: EU goals and Ukraine's promotion*, "EaP Think Bridge", No 4, September 2018, p. 22.

Iryna Potapiuk

Describing the Shadow Economy in the Structure of Ukraine's Economic Security

Since the early transition period, Ukraine has been dealing with the problem of the shadow economy. The latter encompasses production, distribution, exchange and consumption of goods and services unregulated by the institution of society. In Ukraine, it has become one of the threats to national security. Its impact on Ukrainian society and state is complex and systemic.

Indeed, the intensification of shadow economic activities in the country has led to such “shadowiness” which competes with all official economic activities of the national economy on an equal footing and makes them weak. It also leads to a decrease in the effectiveness of state policy, promotes bribery and inhibits economic development of the country (Ladiuk, 2017)¹³³.

The relevance of this particular problem is related to several internal and external factors. First, it is the increasing complexity of domestic economic and socio-political problems in some countries: the state budget deficit, unemployment rates, the rampancy of the shadow economy and other negative phenomena connected with declining production, political instability and the exacerbation of social tensions in society. Second, one can observe how some states strive to be military and technologically superior to those under unstable conditions and use economic levers of pressure to achieve their political interests. Third, it becomes vital to maintain a balance between the positive and negative sides of the impact of foreign economic relations during the course and

¹³³ Ladiuk, O. D. (2017). Kharakterystyka tinovoi ekonomiky v Ukraini [The description of the shadow economy in Ukraine]. *Economy and the State*, 8, 32–34.

pace of socio-economic changes and to assure the defence capabilities of the state (Ermolenko, 2014)¹³⁴.

National economic security has always been a priority. As a rule, the economic security of the state is characterized by conditions and factors determining the conditions of the economy, its stability, resilience, the degree of legalization and a level of effectiveness of legislation. After all, the economy of any state, as in other spheres of human life, includes the shadow sector.

The impact of the shadow sector on Ukraine's economic security is one of the thorniest issues since its solution depends on the levelling of external and internal threats to parties to legal relations and the prospects for their economic growth.

All countries in the world regularly deal with the issues of the shadow economy. The main features of its classification are as follows: scope, form, aspect of implementation, and the level of social and legal control. An essential economic feature of the shadow economy is its destructiveness, i.e. a direct negative impact of a party to legal relations on the economy of a country, industry, region (Arkhypov, 2013)¹³⁵.

Varnalii (2009)¹³⁶ believes that the shadow economy is a complex socio-economic phenomenon represented by a set of uncontrolled and unregulated (illegal and legal, however immoral) economic relations between economic entities to generate excess profits by concealing income and evading taxes.

The shadow economy is a complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon,

¹³⁴ Ermolenko, E. A. (2014). Aktualnye problemy v obespechenii ekonomicheskoi bezopasnosti gosudarstva [Relevant problems in assuring the economic security of the state]. *Managing Development*, 3 (166), 48–50.

¹³⁵ Arkhypov, E. L. (2013). Model pidvyshchennia ekonomichnoi bezpeky u finansovomu sektori [A model of increasing economic security in the financial sector]. *The Internet Journal "Scientific Review"*, 12. Retrieved from http://www.sced.ru/ru/index.php? Option = com_content & view = article & id = 236: nauchnoe-obozrenie-12-2013 & catid = 39 & limitstart = 9/.

¹³⁶ Varnalii, Z. S. (2009). *Ekonomichna bezpeka* [Economic security]. Kyiv: Znannia.

which is a special economic activity. Its main feature lies in business entities' moving beyond the existing legislation. Since economic entities seek to increase their profits, one of the ways to achieve their economic interests is to increase their disposable income by refusing to transfer part of it to government officials. In this regard, the shadow economy is always in interaction with the institutions of the state and, therefore, largely determines its parameters.

The shadow economy is a somewhat ambiguous phenomenon with its pros and cons. As for its positive side, one can say that it mitigates the effects of financial crises during which laid-off workers can find temporary sources of income in the more flexible shadow sector. The negative side of the shadow economy is tax evasion, crime, and corruption.

Cassel (1986)¹³⁷ isolates the following positive functions that the shadow economy performs in a market economy:

1. The function of "an economic lubricant", which allows one to minimize the differences in economic development by redistributing resources between the official economy and its shadow component. This is because when there is an economic crisis and production volumes are forced to decline, production resources are not lost but redistributed to the shadow economy and returned to the legal one after the crisis has been overcome.

2. The function of "a social shock-absorber" makes it possible to mitigate unwanted social contradictions in society between the rich and the poor, when shadow employment alleviates the financial situation of people on lower incomes.

3. The function of "a built-in stabilizer", whose resources are gradually transferred to the observed economy. Shadow income is used to purchase goods

¹³⁷ Cassel, D. (1986). Funktionen der Schattenwirtschaft im Koordinationsmechanismus von Markt und Planwirtschaften. *ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 37, 73–101.

and services not only in the shadow sector but also in the legal sector of the economy, after which shadow capital is no different from legal capital. It is taxed and invested in the production or financial sphere of activities.

These functions can also involve other positive aspects of the impact of the shadow economy on the conditions and development of both national and regional economies:

- increasing gross domestic product (GDP);
- preventing the bankruptcy of enterprises;
- creating incentives to accelerate the implementation of R&D results in the legal sector of the economy;
- promoting amateur “business school” for the unemployed population;
- cultivating “entrepreneurial initiative” in former employees.

Given the high tax burden, one should pay particular attention to a positive effect of paying taxes in Ukraine. A high level of corruption makes it possible to significantly reduce the likelihood of timely detection of tax evasion, and poor legislation allows one to reduce tax payments to a minimum. In Ukraine, the practice of supporting loss-making and tax-evading enterprises is quite common. Therefore, it allows enterprise owners to receive significant hidden income.

It is important to note that the shadow economy includes negative and destructive activities which harm both society and its members. The socially useful nature of activities is the initial criterion for classifying its various types as the shadow or official economy.

Thus, the development of the shadow economy is determined by the following factors:

- economic factors which include high tariffs on all types of taxes, the emergence of a crisis in the financial system and the impact of its negative

effects on the economy as a whole, inadequate improvement of privatization and ineffective activities of unregistered economic structures;

- social factors which usually include the factor of low living standards contributing to the development of shadow activities; high unemployment rates which affect income in any way; uneven distribution of GDP which affects social development;

- legal factors which include certain changes in the legal framework, inadequate activities of law enforcement agencies in terms of stopping illegal and criminal economic activities and the underdeveloped mechanism for coordinating the fight against economic crime.

In turn, the defining features of the shadow economy involve evading from official registration of enterprises' agreements or distorting the conditions of their implementation intentionally.

In Ukraine, it is common to support loss-making and tax-evading enterprises and, therefore, allow enterprise owners to receive significant hidden income. It is important to note that a high level of the shadow economy in Ukraine brings certain negative effects. They are the following:

- losing tax revenues and, consequently, complicating the state's fulfilment of its financial obligations to society and increasing the uneven tax pressure;

- reducing investment resources in Ukraine;

- spreading distrust in the government;

- increasing the number of economic crimes, promoting large-scale development of organized crime and, thus, forcing the state to lose its regulatory, controlling, and other socially important functions.

Only if one identifies and systematizes the factors leading to such "shadowiness", will it be possible to implement effective policies and measures

related to reducing the shadow sector of the economy. It must be noted that many methods for overcoming such a phenomenon, developed for European countries specifically, will not be effective under the conditions of the Ukrainian economy. Only by taking into account special, “mentality” factors that form the basis of shadow relations in Ukraine, can one develop a comprehensive strategy to officialize the Ukrainian economy (Kirzhetskyi, 2013)¹³⁸.

The shadow economy consists of the following elements:

Informal economy (“grey market”) – legitimate economic transactions, whose scale is hidden or reduced by economic entities (employment without registration, unregistered repair and construction work, tutoring, real estate rental and other ways of tax evasion);

criminal economy (“black market”) – economic activities prohibited by law in any economic system and the vast majority of countries: drug trafficking, smuggling, prostitution, racketeering;

fictitious economy – bribery, individual benefits and subsidies based on organized corruption.

Savchenko and Iordanov (2012)¹³⁹ claim that the main reasons behind the existence and growth of the shadow economy in Ukraine are:

- the long-term socio-economic crisis in the country;
- the presence of organized economic crime and corruption in state authorities and the local self-government (in 2016, Ukraine ranked 131st out of 176 countries in terms of corruption);

¹³⁸ Kirzhetskyi, Yu. I. (2013). *Tinova ekonomika ta napriamy yii podolannia v Ukraini* [The shadow economy and ways of overcoming it in Ukraine]. Lviv: Liha-Pres.

¹³⁹ Savchenko, I. H., & Iordanov, A. Ye. (2012). *Tinovyi sektor ekonomiky Ukrainy: analiz stanu ta napriamy detinizatsii* [The shadow sector of Ukraine’s economy: analyzing the state and areas of formalizing]. *Foreign Trade: Law, Economics, Finance*, 3, 107–116.

- the availability of non-bank money circulation;
- the complexity and chaos of tax legislation;
- poor legislation in the field of national security;
- activities of the criminogenic banking system;
- “shadow” psychology and “shadow” morality of Ukrainian society.

An analysis of the causes and conditions of the shadow economy shows the following. Incorrect and sometimes criminal actions taken during socio-economic changes when transiting to the market have led to the replacement of a market-based management mechanism. It was believed that the transformation of property relations would create an effective mechanism for managing the economy. However, this did not happen because the bureaucracy and enterprise owners violated regulations and acquired property for almost nothing and, at the same time, failed to ensure the effect of privatized enterprises.

Experts believe that the existence of shadow activities indicates an inefficient economic policy of the state. The shadow economy penetrates all spheres of society. Shadow institutions have taken root in both political and legal systems. Thus, shadow activities can affect the state of the economy and the social climate of society, although most of the mentioned aspects point out the fact that the shadow economy leads to negative socio-economic effects. Still, the effects of shadow economic processes cannot be assessed solely negatively. Many types of shadow activities, to some extent, promote the development of the legal economy. The negative effects of shadow activities are manifested, first of all, in the fact that various social and economic institutions are changing, and the foundations of society are being deformed.

Therefore, the shadow economy mainly destabilizes the interests of economic entities of the society. In particular, it displaces official mechanisms

of taxation and, accordingly, reduces the amount of collected taxes, there by affecting the national interest. Alternative shadow mechanisms of taxation often displace official taxation. Shadow activities disrupt the production process in the official economy, worsen the conditions of existing economic organizations and prevent the creation of “healthy” enterprises, limiting collective interests. Besides, the shadow economy is associated with criminal activity and generates numerous conflicts, some of which can only be resolved through violence. Sociological polls show that 30-40% of enterprise owners have personally faced cases of racketeering, extortion and attempts to bring the enterprise under the control of criminal groups. At the same time, other far from harmless economic phenomena are institutionalized de facto (forced resolution of conflicts between entrepreneurs or illegal privatization of former state property).

In this regard, it is essential to identify certain threats of the shadow economy to the national interests of the country: increase in crime, including organizational and juvenile delinquency; the emergence of new types of economic crimes; reduction of revenue and control over the expenditure side of the budget, tax evasion, circumvention of customs rules; reduction of the level and quality of life, transition to “anti-social economy”, poverty, extinction of the population, destruction of the social security benefits for children; combination of state bureaucracy and the shadow economy; corruption, theft, fraud; poor economic management; the vacuum of social ideals, destruction of legal consciousness and morality; creation of an aggressive information environment, the cult of violence, immorality, the imposition of the Western way of life; admission of criminal structures to weapons and weapons trade; illegal employment, violation of occupational safety, unregulated working hours; other threats.

One can state that the role of the shadow economy in the constantly

changing socio-economic environment is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, tax evasion increases the competitive advantages of companies carrying out shadow actions, which allows employees of these companies to receive additional income and reduces real unemployment. However, on the other hand, shadow activities damage the state budget, reduce the efficiency of macroeconomic policy, transform the structure of the economy, worsen the investment climate and competitive environment for law-abiding entrepreneurs and, finally, cause significant damage to national interests and economic security. The development of an effective policy to tackle the shadow economy requires a full socio-economic and economic-legal approach (Demenko, & Ogorodnikova, 2017)¹⁴⁰.

Thus, the stabilization at a high level of the shadow sector reduces tax revenues, which in turn reduces not only government spending but also other components of official GDP expenditures (gross investment, consumer spending and net exports). All these factors significantly slow down economic growth and thus reduce the country's security, increasing threats in the economic sector.

Conclusions

The existence of the shadow sector in the country's economy poses serious threats not only to economic but also national security in general. However, the impact of the shadow economy on economic growth and establishment of a legal economy, as well as society, is not destructive but multi-directional. A more detailed and accurate analysis of shadow phenomena

¹⁴⁰ Demenko, I. A., & Ogorodnikova, S. I. (2017). *Vliianie tenevoi ekonomiki na razvitiye obshchestva* [The influence of the shadow economy on the development of society]. Retrieved from http://vectoreconomy.ru/images/publications/2017/10/economic_theory/Demenenko_Ogorodnikova.pdf

allows one to state that they are also characterized by some positive factors.

Consequently, the problem of the existence and development of the shadow economy has become a difficult systemic problem of national security. It can be solved only by implementing a purposeful set of measures in all spheres of life of the state and society. It is possible to overcome the shadow economy and corruption only if there is conscious mass support of society, which is achieved with a high level of public confidence in government and power.

Анотація

В умовах стрімкого розвитку глобалізації світової економіки, коли інтеграційні процеси стають домінуючими і значною мірою набувають регіонального відтінку, актуальність активізації транскордонного співробітництва прикордонних регіонів сусідніх держав зростає. Українсько-польське транскордонне співробітництво є надважливим для України як для підвищення рівня соціально-економічного розвитку регіонів-учасників, так і для держави в цілому, що проявляється у, як мінімум, двох аспектах: по-перше: такий вид міжнародної міжрегіональної співпраці вже довгий час сприяє підтриманню добросусідських відносин України та Польщі, дозволяє вирішувати локальні проблеми спільними зусиллями, поступово зменшуючи негативний вплив фактора периферійності на добробут прикордонних територій; по-друге: транскордонний регіон на кордоні з Європейським Союзом є свого роду апробаційним майданчиком для практичної реалізації інтеграційних прагнень України по відношенню до ЄС на регіональному рівні, а також служить потужним ресурсом для бенчмаркінгу та всебічного удосконалення організаційно-економічного механізму забезпечення ефективності української економіки у напрямку до рівня країн ЄС.

Проте, активізація співпраці з іноземними партнерами, нівелювання бар'єрної функції кордону, інтенсифікація транскордонних потоків товарів та робочої сили, відкриття ринку для імпортованих товарів тощо в значній мірі породжують нові загрози для економічної безпеки регіону-учасника транскордонного співробітництва та держави в цілому. Так, у випадку українсько-польського транскордонного співробітництва для України існує велика вірогідність нездатності вітчизняних виробників витримати

конкурентний тиск з боку товаровиробників ЄС через нижчу конкурентоспроможність їхньої продукції та невідповідність її якості стандартам ЄС, небезпека впливу висококваліфікованих кадрів та молодого населення у пошуку високооплачуваної роботи, загроза перетворитися на ринок збуту вживаних речей через низький рівень життя українського населення, що породжує високий попит на такі товари і т.п.

Такий стан речей спонукає наукову спільноту до пошуку дієвих превентивних механізмів для уникнення потенційних загроз та мінімізації деструктивного впливу вже існуючих на економіку регіонів-учасників транскордонного співробітництва, які здатні забезпечити при цьому сприятливі умови для розвитку та поглиблення українсько-польської транскордонної співпраці з отриманням максимальної двосторонньої вигоди.

Дана монографія становить собою ґрунтовні актуальні наукові дослідження в сфері транскордонного співробітництва, містить наукову новизну: запропоновано концепцію регіональної політики транскордонного співробітництва в контексті реалізації стратегії забезпечення економічної безпеки, набуло подальшого розвитку визначення елементів системи забезпечення економічної безпеки держави. Результати досліджень мають практичну цінність для подальшої активізації українсько-польської співпраці, для роботи державних структур регіонального рівня при розробці стратегій соціально-економічного розвитку, фахівців з міжнародних економічних відносин, може застосовуватись в навчальному процесі у закладах вищої освіти.

Леся Корольчук,

PhD, доцент кафедри міжнародних зв'язків,

Луцький НТУ, (м.Луцьк, Україна)

Streszczenie

Polska i Ukraina są często postrzegane jako strategiczni partnerzy. Sąsiedztwo geograficzne, wspólna historia i po części także państwowość, bliskość kulturowa sprzyjają takim określeniom. Mimo istniejących różnic i problemów Polska i Ukraina są sobie bliskie. Potrzebują się wzajemnie dla wzmocnienia swoich własnych, narodowych i międzynarodowych interesów. Istotnym wsparciem dla prowadzonej polityki bilateralnej ma współpraca na poziomie regionalnym i lokalnym. Jej transgraniczny charakter jest oczywisty. Pociąga to za sobą zarówno wyzwania, jak i szanse. Literatura naukowa poświęcona problematyce partnerstwa i współpracy transgranicznej Polski i Ukrainy jest obszerna. W opracowaniach poświęconych tej problematyce podejmowane są wielowymiarowe, interdyscyplinarne analizy. Nie sposób wskazać wszystkich. Istotnym elementem współpracy jest przestrzeń bezpieczeństwa. Dotyczy to zarówno obszaru militarnego, jak i polityczno-gospodarczego. Polska z racji członkostwa w NATO i UE jest dla Ukrainy udanym przykładem i wzorem do naśladowania w kontekście zacieśnienia i ewentualnej akcesji do tych struktur. Nie będzie to proces łatwy, być może niemożliwy do osiągnięcia w najbliższej przyszłości. Jakkolwiek jednak nie przekreśla to konieczności współpracy.

Przedłożony do opinii wydawniczej materiał liczy 129 stron. W skład materiału wchodzi 8 tekstów autorstwa 12 badaczy. Zestaw Autorów jest dwunarodowy, 10 osób z Ukrainy, 2 osoby z Polski. Wszystkie teksty są w języku angielskim. Całość jest jednym z naukowych efektów międzynarodowego projektu realizowanego przez KUL (Lublin, Polska) i LNUT (Łuck, Ukraina) ze środków Programu PL-UA-BL 2014-2020.

Prezentowane teksty można zasadniczo podzielić na 3 grupy. W pierwszej, najliczniejszej dominuje tematyka uwarunkowań ekonomicznych (O. Baula, O. Kovalchuk, O. Liutak; V. Martyniuk; O. Pavlova, K. Pavlov; I. Potapiuk). Druga obejmuje aspekt migracji (O. Dluhopolskiy, T. Dluhopolska; S. Dubaj) . W trzeciej grupie poruszone są szersze, europejskie kontekst współpracy z Ukrainą (N. Karpchuk; B. Piskorska).

Teksty włączone do materiału mają różny poziom strukturalny i merytoryczny. Należałoby w tym kontekście przyjąć jednolitą strukturę (np. Wstęp, części merytoryczne i Wnioski). Ponadto cały materiał powinien być jednolicie skorygowany przez jednego anglistę (proofreading). Podobnie spójne i jednolite powinny być zastosowane figury, tabele, wykresy. W materiale brakuje redakcyjnego „Wprowadzenia”.

Generalna ocena materiału jest pozytywna. Całość nadaje się do wydania w formie książki. Teksty podejmują ważną, transgraniczną tematykę. Jest ona aktualna i istotna badawczo i poznawczo. Zastosowane rozwiązania i propozycje wnoszą kilka interesujących wniosków. Mogą stanowić materiał analityczny dla kilku instytucji w Polsce i Ukrainie. Książka może też być ciekawa dla innych badaczy.

Konieczne jest jednak dopracowanie materiału na etapie wydawniczym. Zwłaszcza w wymiarze wskazanym wyżej. Do korekty są także przypisy (nie jest jasne dlaczego np. w pierwszym tekście stosuje się jednocześnie tzw. przypisy amerykańskie i klasyczne?) oraz układ tekstu (np. w spisie treści prawidłowo zapisano dane Autorów, poza pp. Pavlov, s. 91, gdzie najpierw jest nazwisko a potem imiona). Być może warto też dołączyć do tekstu krótkie streszczenie w języku polskim (skoro materiał jest wynikiem polsko-ukraińskiego projektu).

Wskazane uwagi są w większości łatwe i szybkie do korekty. Jej dokonanie z pewnością poprawi jakość tego materiału, który generalnie rekomenduję do dopracowania wydawniczego i wydania w formie monografii pod redakcją.

Wojciech Gizicki,
Dr hab. prof. KUL,
(Lublin, Poland)

Notes about the authors

Olena Baula PhD, Department of International Economic Relations, Lutsk National Technical University (Lutsk, Ukraine).

Oleksandr Dluhopolskyi Dr., Full Professor of Economics and Economic Theory Department, West Ukrainian National University (Ternopil, Ukraine).

Tetiana Dluhopolska PhD, Assistant Professor of International Economic Relations Department, West Ukrainian National University (Ternopil, Ukraine).

Stanisław Dubaj PhD, Deputy Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of International Relations and Social Communication in Chełm (Chełm, Poland).

Natalia Karpchuk Dr., Full Professor of the Department of International Communications and Political Analysis, Lesia Ukrainka East European National University (Lutsk, Ukraine).

Olena Kovalchuk Dr., Full Professor of the Department of Ukrainian and Foreign Linguistics Lutsk National Technical University (Lutsk, Ukraine)

Olena Liutak Dr., Full Professor of the Department of International Economic Relations Lutsk National Technical University (Lutsk, Ukraine).

Volodymyr Martyniuk Dr., Full Professor of Administrative and Financial Management Department, National University “Lviv

Polytechnics”, Professor of University of Economics and Innovation in Lublin (Lublin, Poland).

Kostiantyn Pavlov Dr., Full Professor of the Department of Analytical Economics and Environmental Management, Lesya Ukrainka Eastern European National University (Lutsk, Ukraine).

Olena Pavlova Dr., Full Professor, Head of the Department of Analytical Economics and Environmental Management, Lesya Ukrainka Eastern European National University (Lutsk, Ukraine).

Beata Piskorska PhD, Associate Professor of Department of International Relations and Security Institute of Political Sciences and Administration, Faculty of Social Sciences, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin (Lublin, Poland).

Iryna Potapiuk PhD, Associate Professor in Economics, Poltava State Agrarian Academy (Poltava, Ukraine).