



**POLAND AND UKRAINE.
PARTNERSHIP AND REGIONAL
CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION**

Wojciech Gizicki . Tomasz Peciakowski

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Introduction

This monograph was written as part of the project entitled *Cooperation of Universities Supporting the Development of Security and Crisis Management of the Lublin and Lutsk Transborder Regions*. It was financed under the Cross-border Cooperation Programme PL-BY-UA 2014–2020. The project was implemented in 2018–2020 in international cooperation between two universities: the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin in Poland and the Lutsk National Technical University in Ukraine.

The monograph presents an analysis of selected issues that influence the partnership and cross-border cooperation between Poland and Ukraine. The main analysis focuses on exploring the empirical material collected in a survey conducted on a group of 404 respondents on both sides of the border. The time frame of this publication mostly covers the last months of 2019, meaning the period when the survey was carried out. In the case of exceptionally important events, the analysis extends into 2020. In principle, the book does not take into account the consequences of COVID-19 since it is difficult to formulate any specific suggestions or forecasts, and only in some cases attempts have been made to touch upon selected problems related to the developments in this area.

The book also contains a review of selected literature, particularly in its theoretical part. The literature review has been limited to selected, most important publications which, in the authors'¹ view, contribute the most to the topics addressed in the monograph. The analysis, both in the theoretical and empirical parts, is principally based on the authors' analytical and research perspective. The authors selected issues that characterise the key phenomena in their spheres of interest.

The publication consists of an extensive methodological introduction with a review of the literature, four chapters, and a final part in the form of conclusions and recommendations. This structure was designed to help readers absorb the knowledge in the most accessible way possible. The data are presented in both graphic and descriptive formats.

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The *Introduction to the Research Methodology* offers a literature review and discusses the special characteristics of the positions of Poland and Ukraine and their mutual relations. This part also presents the characteristics of respondents and the background of the authors' research.

The first chapter outlines the geopolitical situation of Poland and Ukraine. In this respect, several selected challenges and opportunities were indicated as crucial. These concern relations at both bilateral and international levels. Some of the identified factors are independent, and both countries must respond to and deal with them as they occur, adequately to the intensity of the activities undertaken by other actors. In several other cases, the need to undertake specific actions is faced either by both countries jointly or by one of the countries separately.

The second chapter characterises the Bug Euroregion and provides the fullest picture of two regions selected for analysis: the Lublin Voivodship and the Volyn Oblast. The chapter contains essential information needed to present the specificity, similarities and diversity of the two cross-border regions. The data provided cast light on the geographical and social context.

The third chapter analyses the specific aspects of border crossing between Poland and Ukraine. The essential part is an assessment of the accessibility, functionality and time needed to carry out border checks and clearance. In fact, the state border is not only a technical barrier: it also serves an important social role. The aforementioned background conditions may create a specific situational and personal image in the minds of people who use the border crossing point and members of services who handle the cross-border traffic.

The fourth chapter discusses issues related to the assessment of the validity and effectiveness of cross-border cooperation between Poland and Ukraine. Cross-border cooperation can be a domain of formal activities at various levels. However, it plays a key role when its effects are positively viewed and perceived by the residents of the border regions. Such cooperation has a real impact on many aspects of daily life in the region, its attractiveness and accessibility.

The authors of this monograph would like to extend their thanks for the cooperation and support received from the Centre for European Projects, Warsaw, Department for International Projects at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, partners from the Lutsk National Technical University, the Nadbużański Border Guard Department in Chełm, and the National Revenue Administration in Lublin. Our thanks also go to the reviewers of this publication.

Introduction to the Research Methodology

Poland and Ukraine are often seen as strategic partners. Geographical proximity, a shared history and, in some periods and parts, shared statehood, including cultural affinity as the factors that induce such a perception. In the 20th century, both countries were severely affected by tragic events, especially World War II and the division of Europe as a result of the Yalta conference. Another issue that plays an important role is that of the politics of history (also known as the „politics of memory”), related to the events in Volyn in 1943–44. While these events played their role from 1945–1989, they also have consequences in the present².

The process of political and systemic transformation initiated in 1989 in Poland and in 1991 in Ukraine took a somewhat different course in each case. On the one hand, this was due to the point of departure for each country. Poland, despite its systemic subordination to the USSR, formally had the status of an independent country after World War II. In contrast, Ukraine was part of the USSR as one of the 16 Soviet republics and did not gain independence until 1991 due to the slow yet systematic collapse of the USSR.

Despite the existing differences and problems, Poland and Ukraine are close to each other. They need each other to reinforce their own national and international interests. Cooperation at the regional and local levels provides important support for the bilateral policies. The cross-border nature of such cooperation is a matter of course. This entails both challenges and opportunities.

² See. e.g.: J. Rysicz-Szafraniec, *Ukrainian ‘Working through the Past’ in the Context of the Polish-Ukrainian Dialogue on Volhynia-43. Asymmetry of Memory*, *European Review*, no. 5/2020, (online); L. Strilchuk, *The Volyn Tragedy in Modern Ukrainian-Polish Relations*, *Skhid*, no. 2/2019, pp. 38-44; O. Kalishchuk, *The Volyn Tragedy in Ukraine and Poland’s Public Discourse*, *East Europe Historical Bulletin*, no. 12/2019, pp. 221-227; G. Motyka, *Nieustający polsko-ukraiński spór o historię*, *Sprawy Międzynarodowe*, no. 1/2018, pp. 31-40; P. Bajor, *A strategic challenge: the influence of historical policy on the current shape of the Polish-Ukrainian relations*, *Jagielloński Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa*, no. 1/2016, pp. 64-74.

In 1991, Poland was the first country in the world to officially acknowledge the sovereignty of Ukraine. This is significant not only in the symbolic dimension but also in real and practical terms. The existence of an independent Ukraine as a buffer separating Poland from Russia is a beneficial geopolitical fact for Poland. Poland has endeavoured to support Ukraine at various levels. Bilateral relations, although varying in effects and intensity over the last 30 years, are crucial for both countries. Support at the international level is also being extended. Examples include the activity in the EU (Eastern Partnership project) and NATO (the establishment of the Lithuanian–Polish–Ukrainian Brigade, LITPOLUKRBRIG).

For Ukraine, Poland appears to be a country with a generally successful record regarding the transformation of its political and economic system. Poland's swift accession to NATO and the EU, as well as the country's dynamic economic development at steadily high growth rates, serve as an example for Ukraine, showing that geopolitical goals are realistic and achievable. Poland's path and its efforts to strengthen its statehood and move towards European and Atlantic structures has two meanings for Ukraine: learning from best practices and avoiding mistakes.

This monograph aims to analyse the cross-border partnership and cooperation between Poland and Ukraine. This study focuses on two regions: the Lublin Voivodship in Poland and the Volyn Oblast in Ukraine. The main objective of the empirical research was to explore how people who cross the Polish-Ukrainian border perceive the cross-border cooperation between the two countries, how they assess its forms, and what they identify as the opportunities and barriers for further development of the cooperation. One of the central topics in the survey was the border crossing point, and the assessment of its accessibility, infrastructure and services. The study also sought to confront different perspectives: that of the people crossing the border and that of the members of border services.

The monograph attempts to answer several research questions. They arise from the adopted assumptions, the theoretical context outlined and the analysis of the authors' own empirical research.

The research questions were developed to focus on the key issues which are multidimensional: they concern the geopolitical context, the formal and practical foundations of regional cooperation as well as public awareness. In the empirical research, key importance is attached to issues related to the respondents' awareness and perceptions regarding the ontological (what it looks like, what it is like, how it proceeds), teleological (whether it is needed or

not, what purpose it serves, its significance and who should be responsible for it) and pragmatic nature (the effects it brings, its benefits, and who benefits most) of the Polish-Ukrainian cross-border cooperation. It is also important to assess the operation of border crossing points, including the competences of relevant services. Therefore, the following issues will be covered by the key research questions:

1. What are the main geopolitical challenges and opportunities faced by Poland and Ukraine?
2. What are the special characteristics of the regions under analysis: the Lublin Voivodship and Volyn Oblast?
3. What are the awareness and the current knowledge of Poles and Ukrainians crossing the border regarding the cross-border cooperation of the two countries?
4. What is the status of cross-border cooperation between Poland and Ukraine, as seen by Poles and Ukrainians crossing the border?
5. What do the respondents see as the difficulties and obstacles in the cross-border cooperation between Poland and Ukraine?
6. Do the border and border traffic represent an important barrier and, if so, how important is it?
7. How are the border services of Poland and Ukraine assessed by people who cross the border?
8. How divergent are the perceptions of the border crossing point and cross-border cooperation reported by Poles and Ukrainians, especially as reported by civilians who cross the border and officers who handle the cross-border traffic?

The study aimed to target people who cross the Polish-Ukrainian and Ukrainian-Polish border and use the border crossing point at least once a year. The goal was to obtain a survey sample consisting of respondents of both nationalities (50% Poles and 50% Ukrainians). This was complemented by a parallel survey based on a nearly identical tool (questionnaire) among members of border services of both countries (50% Polish and 50% Ukrainian officers). Since there is no sampling frame and given that the survey was conducted on an ad hoc population, the sampling was purposive, based on the aforementioned criterion of citizenship and, additionally, for individuals crossing the border, the criterion of age (10–20%: 18–25 y.o.; 30–40%: 26–40 y.o.; 30–40%: 41–60 y.o.; and 10–20%: 61+ y.o.) and the criterion of gender (60% males and 40% females). This was intended to ensure that the survey capture opinions of people representing different social categories in terms of gender and age.

The survey was conducted from December 16 to 20, 2019 at the Doro-husk-Yahodyn border crossing point, mainly among people who were waiting for border checks/clearance on both sides of the border. In the presence of the interviewer, the respondents filled in the questionnaire consisting of 26 closed-end substantive questions and 6 demographic questions. The questionnaires were collected from a total of 305 civilians crossing the Polish-Ukrainian and Ukrainian-Polish border (151 Poles and 154 Ukrainians). In the second half of December 2019, questionnaires were also collected from 99 officers of the Polish (n=51) and Ukrainian border services (n=48).

In terms of socio-demographic characteristics (Table A), the sample structure of border crossers is similar for the subgroups surveyed on both sides of the border. There is a slight prevalence of men (approx. 58% versus 42%), with an average age of approx. 41–42, close to the median in both subgroups. There is also a clear predominance of people with tertiary education, especially on the Ukrainian side (53%, versus 41.7% on the Polish side), and with secondary education (slightly above 37% on both sides). As regards respondents' place of residence, the proportions of rural vs. urban residents are slightly different on each side of the border: there is a prevalence of rural residents among Poles (58% versus 42%), whereas the reverse is true for Ukrainians, with urban residents representing 56% (versus 44%). There are also differences in terms of economic status: among Poles, there is a prevalence of public sector employees (37.2%) and people working in the private sector (24.3%), whereas in the Ukrainian subsample, the largest group was unemployed people (40.4%) and those working in the private sector (33.1%).

Among the surveyed group of border guard officers of both countries, there is a slight predominance of men (55–56%) versus women (44–45%), with an average age of 41. Quite understandably, this group included no respondents aged over 60 and very few young people up to 25 years of age (1–2 persons). The Ukrainian subsample, with the median age of 39 years, is structurally slightly younger (the median for the Polish subsample was 41 years), with a prevalence (63%) of people aged 26–40, whereas in the Polish subsample the next age bracket, meaning 41–60 y.o., prevailed (51.2%). This is also related to the positions in uniformed services held by the individuals who took part in the study. The vast majority of the Ukrainian subsample worked in lower-level jobs (87% of the Ukrainian border guards in the survey directly handled the border traffic, versus only 30.6% in the Polish subsample). On the Polish side, 1/3 of the border guard officers declared higher-level jobs, i.e. working as border traffic management staff (34.7%).

The scholarly literature on the subject of the partnership and cross-border cooperation between Poland and Ukraine is fairly extensive. Multiple studies on the subject undertake multidimensional and interdisciplinary analyses, and it is not possible to mention all of them³. Thus, this monograph focuses only on selected issues, as clearly outlined in the title and content of each chapter. The problems in focus relate to fundamental issues that are close to both Poland and Ukraine. The authors of the analyses and studies draw attention to difficult topics in the mutual relations between both countries. The dominant issue is the politics of history, including the tragic events in Volyn. Political and socio-economic relations are also an important issue, both at the governmental and regional levels. Several studies are directly devoted to cooperation at the level of the area covered by the Bug Euroregion, with a number of them providing statistical data.

This work draws on several research methods, with comparative analysis and analysis of own empirical research playing the major role. The theoretical part focuses on the similarities and differences of state-level institutions. Several background conditions that are either identical or different between Poland and Ukraine were identified. The empirical part provides an analysis of responses obtained from individual respondents, meaning those who in practice use and benefit from the effects of cross-border cooperation between Poland and Ukraine within the Lublin Voivodship and the Volyn Oblast (both of which are part of the Bug Euroregion).

³ In the context of the issues contained in the monograph, a special role should be given to several studies devoted to Poland and Ukraine. They concern both geopolitical and cross-border issues, including the specificity and cooperation of the analyzed regions of the Lublin Voivodship and the Volyn Oblast. More information about them you can see in footnotes.

CHAPTER I. GEOPOLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF POLAND AND UKRAINE

The mutual contacts between Poland and Ukraine are determined by their geographical location. While the geographic proximity enforces cooperation, it is also a source of many problems. Both countries have experienced many challenges in their history, including mutual ones. Poles and the Ukrainians had separate states and were dependent on their big neighbours, especially Russia and Germany. There was also a time when both nations lived within the same state.


1.1. Geopolitical Changes after 1989

One cannot analyse the contemporary situation of Poland and Ukraine without the context of geopolitical changes occurring towards the end of the 20th century. The collapse of the bipolar world, dominated by the rivalry between the USA and the USSR, triggered a geopolitical revolution in Europe. Its consequences are also experienced by Poland and Ukraine.


The differences in the development trajectories of the two countries, as well as their existing opportunities and challenges, are a result of the slight differences in their respective backgrounds. One cannot agree with the statement that the geopolitical situation of Poland and Ukraine after World War II was the same. Although there were some similarities, the situation of the two countries was particularly determined by their actual dependence on the USSR, total or partial.

After World War II, Poland was pushed into the Soviet sphere of influence. However, it remained an independent country under international law. In contrast, Ukraine became one of the 16 republics of the USSR. Already in 1989, Poland undertook reforms and embarked on the restoration of its full sovereignty as a consequence of profound geopolitical changes that swept across the whole of Central Europe. Ukraine declared its independence more than two years later, on August 24, 1991, and this fact should be clearly

Map 1. Map of Europe, 1989.



Map 2. Map of Europe, 2020.



highlighted⁴. Therefore, the starting point for reforms and the pace of transformations are closely linked with these circumstances.

Poland's immediate neighbourhood is another consequence of geopolitical changes in Europe. From 1990–1993, Poland lost all three of its existing neighbours and gained seven new ones. This kind of situation was unprecedented for any country in the modern world. Until 1990, Poland shared its western border with the German Democratic Republic (GDR). After the GDR was incorporated into the Federal Republic of Germany, this border is now shared with reunited Germany. In 1991, Poland saw Czechoslovakia divide at its southern border. As a result, two independent countries, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, were created. In Eastern Europe, the collapse of the USSR ended in 1991. As a result, instead of sharing a single border with the USSR, Poland is now a neighbour of Russia, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine.

The group of Poland's immediate neighbours is also very diverse. This is related to the type and nature of the political systems prevailing in the neighbouring countries. Four countries, i.e. Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Lithuania, are members of NATO and the EU. Relations with these countries are based on bilateral and multilateral contacts within the aforementioned international organisations. The borders are open and regulated by the rules of the Schengen area. In the case of Russia and Belarus, their proximity can be seen as highly challenging. Both countries show features of authoritarian regimes. Ukraine is considered a neighbour of strategic importance.

Ukraine was a Soviet republic until 1991. After declaring independence and being recognised as an independent state in the international arena, Ukraine had to undertake political and diplomatic efforts related to its immediate neighbourhood, involving seven countries: Poland, Belarus, Russia, Moldova, Romania, Hungary and Slovakia. Four of Ukraine's neighbours are EU and NATO members. As in the case of Poland, being a neighbour of Belarus and Russia represents a particular challenge. In the case of Belarus, it is clear that the changes in the political and social situation there are progressing. The recent presidential elections of August 2020 showed that Belarusian society demands concrete changes. This will certainly have an impact on internal affairs in Belarus, as well as on Europe as a whole. As the closest neighbour of Belarus, Ukraine will be particularly involved in these processes. There

⁴ Poles born from 1945 to 1989 had Poland as their birthplace recorded in personal documents. The situation with citizenship was similar: it was always described as Polish. As regards Ukrainians, all those born before 1991 had the USSR as their birthplace and were regarded as citizens of that country. The significance of this fact seems to go beyond being purely symbolic.

can be no doubt that Russia will remain interested in the developments, as it is in Russia's interest to maintain an influence on Belarus as well as increase instability in the eastern part of Ukraine. There are also several important challenges concerning Moldova. The most important ones are, of course, related to Transnistria and the role of Russia in the region.

Ukraine's relations with its neighbouring countries represent a major challenge. Although the majority of its neighbours are NATO and EU members, the border with non-members of these organisations is almost 3,000 km longer.

Table 1. Borders of Poland and Ukraine

State	Neighbouring States	Length of Borders
Poland	I. NATO and EU countries: Germany, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania II. non NATO and EU countries: Ukraine, Belarus, Russia	I. EU countries – 1930 km II. non EU countries – 1185 km
Ukraine	I. NATO and EU countries: Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania II. non NATO and EU countries Belarus, Russia, Moldova	I. EU countries – 1391 km II. non EU countries – 4260 km

Source: Own work.

1.2. The Contemporary Geopolitical Reality of Poland and Ukraine

Poland and Ukraine must take account of the contemporary geopolitical context in undertaking actions. This is not just a matter of accepting the external constructs as an absolute and finite fact. A modern state must be able to participate in shaping the international order. An active policy in this area is part of a country's *raison d'état*. At the same time, this allows countries to attain their strategic objectives. Of course, not everything is fully achievable given objective circumstances, existing independently of specific states. However, every country has to maximise actions that are possible to undertake. A country that entrusts decisions and key undertakings to other entities puts

itself in a situation of dependence, which deprives it of the ability to present an effective response.

Within these contexts, what is of crucial importance for Poland and Ukraine in the geopolitical sphere are mutual relations, effectively dealing with challenges and maximizing opportunities⁵. Some of the existing determinants seem particularly important in this regard. Nearly thirty years of mutual relations, dating back to 1991 –when Ukraine regained independence – have been highly dynamic and diverse. Periods of very good cooperation have alternated with periods of stagnation. The catalogue of matters undertaken during this period, with varying effects, is very extensive. For the sake of clarity, one can subdivide it into the spheres of politics, economy and social affairs.

1.2.1. Relations between Poland and Ukraine after 1991

During the last 100 years, the geopolitics of Poland and Ukraine directly influenced the positions of both countries and their mutual relations. The Treaty of Versailles in 1919, which ended World War I, brought independence to both Poland and Ukraine. This did not mean, however, that the independent statehood of the two countries was a foregone conclusion. The Bolshevik War of 1920, World War II (1939–1945) and the Yalta Conference (which, in fact, determined the history of the years 1945–1991) set the direction for the free development of Poland and Ukraine and, at the same time, their subordination to foreign countries. This was coupled with nationality problems, particularly in the territories inhabited jointly by both ethnic communities.

The history of mutual rivalry, often very bloody, also has a clear impact on contemporary relations between Poland and Ukraine. Many differences, unresolved issues and deep grievances are deeply imprinted in people's minds and constitute an obstacle on the path to a real strategic partnership. The difficult historical experience represents a serious hurdle in this process. However, they can be overcome. It seems that it will be crucial to admit responsibility

⁵ See e.g.: C. S. Christensen, (ed.), *Analyzing Political Tensions Between Ukraine, Russia, and the EU*, Pennsylvania 2020; A. Lanoszka, *Poland in a time of geopolitical flux*, *Contemporary Politics*, no. 4/2020, pp. 458-474; K. Martsikhiv, L. Shepelyak, *Geopolitical Goals and Geostrategy of Ukraine*, *The Journal of V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University. Issues of Political Science*, no. 37/2020, pp. 116-124; A. Szeptycki, *Poland versus Russia: Competition in Ukraine*, *East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures*, no. 9/2020, (online); W. Moźgin, *Ukraine in a Geopolitical Game between the West and the Russian Federation*, *Ukrainian Policymaker*, no. 3/2018, pp. 36-42; T. Grosse, *Poland's geopolitical strategy (2004–2015)*, *Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. International Relations*, vol. 11/2018, issue 2, pp. 171–183; J. Delwaide, *Identity and Geopolitics: Ukraine's Grappling With Imperial Legacies*, *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* no.32-33/2014, pp. 179-207.

for the wrongs of the past and to offer forgiveness. The memory of the past as well as the politics of history based on the truth will provide an opportunity for effective and lasting cooperation, beneficial for both countries. Today, more things should unite Poland and Ukraine than those that set them apart. After all, the strategic challenges and opportunities are numerous.

The issue of strategic partnership has found its place in the research conducted for the purposes of this monograph. Respondents were asked: **Do you think that Poland and Ukraine are strategic partners in the area of politics and economy?** The dominant belief among the two national groups is that there is indeed a strategic partnership between Poland and Ukraine. However, a detailed analysis shows that this issue is more often perceived as important by Ukrainians (91%) rather than by Poles (61.2%). Ukrainians also hold much firmer views on the existence of this partnership and its importance. It seems that the noticeable difference in the assessment of the situation in this regard is due to the political situation of both countries. Poland has been a NATO member for over 20 years and, since 2004, it has also been a part of the EU, with an increasingly prominent voice as a member. Ukraine has been trying to win recognition for its cause in both NATO and the EU. In this context, Poland is viewed as a promoter and advocate of Ukrainian interests in both organisations.

In the 20th century, Poland recognised and acknowledged the independence of Ukraine twice. The first time was in the spring of 1920, under an alliance in the fight against Bolshevik Russia. Józef Piłsudski knew very well that an independent Ukraine was essential for Poland to become a sovereign and free country. The interwar reality proved to be very difficult for both countries. World War II determined the fate of Poland and Ukraine for 45 years.

The second time when Poland recognised the independence of Ukraine was on December 2, 1991. Poland was the first country in the world to do so⁶. This fact is remembered by Ukrainians and often invoked when building a vision of strategic partnership. Ukraine's independence, which ensued after the collapse of the USSR, is of key importance for Poland. Therefore, strengthening their regional and global cooperation is in the interest of both countries. Many politicians, experts and analysts believe that Ukraine is also a crucial country for maintaining security in Europe. The opinion reiterated

⁶ The resolution adopted by the Polish Parliament on December 6, 1991 reads, among others: *The Parliament of the Republic of Poland is glad to welcome Ukraine in the family of independent countries. The establishment of the Ukrainian state is an important event not only for Ukraine, but also for Europe and the world as a whole.*

by Zbigniew Brzeziński on various occasions⁷ represents a symbolic expression of this thinking. Ukraine is directly called a *geopolitical pivot point*. An independent Ukraine clearly undermines Russia as a superpower, thus helping to stabilise security in Central Europe. As a result, Poland has a much more favourable geopolitical position. It can pursue its strategic vision, and also strengthen and stabilise the situation across the entire region. As a security buffer, Ukraine plays an important role in global politics.

Ukraine recognises the importance of Poland for its Euro-Atlantic plans. Poland firmly supported the democratic transformations in Ukraine in 2004 (the Orange Revolution), as well as in 2013 (the Euromaidan). At the initiative of Poland and Sweden, the Eastern Partnership project was established within the EU (2009).

The political importance of relations between Poland and Ukraine has already been highlighted. This is linked to the role of both countries for each other as well as in the external context. For Ukraine, Poland is an example of a successful political transformation after 1989. Moreover, what plays an important role in Ukraine is Poland's experience during the period when it joined NATO and the EU. The determination of all political forces in Poland in this regard and the unanimity of purpose in pursuit of these political goals are particularly important here. Poland defined membership in both organisations as its strategic goal even before making the required political changes in 1989. As for Ukraine, it considerably lagged behind and failed to take specific steps. In fact, clearer signals in Ukrainian politics regarding its Euro-Atlantic objectives can only be found after 2002. The concept of multiple vectors in Ukraine's foreign policy, based on a balance between the West and the East (Russia), was put to a tragic test in 2014 after the start of the war with separatists in Donbas.

The economic importance of mutual relations is undisputed, covering the inter-governmental, regional and individual contexts. At present (2020), Poland is the largest import partner for Ukraine, with trade exchange developing dynamically in terms of both the quantity and types of goods and services. Economic operators from Poland are increasingly willing to engage in a variety of businesses in Ukraine. Cross-border trade also plays an important role. A large number of Ukrainians are taking up employment in Poland, and at present, their number exceeds 1.3 million people.

⁷ Z. Brzeziński, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, New York 1997.

The societies of Poland and Ukraine are getting closer as well. Their difficult history plays an important role at each level of mutual interactions, and this is certainly a major challenge for both countries. However, the trend towards growth and acceptance can be observed year after year. Many Ukrainians enrol in educational institutions in Poland, especially at the tertiary level. Cooperation between universities is also thriving. The Ukrainian minority can receive an education and take their final secondary school exams in their language. Many Ukrainian cultural entities and institutions operate in Poland. Polish tourists represent a large group among visitors who travel to and explore attractive destinations in Ukraine.

Considering the relations and experience of Poland and Ukraine to date, one can identify several common challenges and opportunities. They are crucial for the stabilisation of mutual contacts between the two countries themselves and also for their other neighbours. Some of these considerations are directly associated with the activities undertaken by both countries while others are independent. This, however, does not mean that the two countries are powerless in their efforts to influence these contexts. With joint determination and successful diplomatic activities, there seems to be a chance to exert a positive influence on these spheres.

1.2.2. Geopolitical Challenges Faced by Poland and Ukraine

The political challenges faced by Poland and Ukraine are mostly related to security. The security environment in the region is dynamic, and Russia's policy as a superpower poses a particular challenge for both countries in this sphere. This policy is expressed in Russia's adherence to the concept of "near abroad." It is a comeback to the times of the USSR, when the Soviet republics were under Moscow's full control. This included Ukraine and the so-called „satellite countries" that included Poland. This has become particularly evident under Vladimir Putin. Russia's apparent democracy in fact legitimises the authoritarian rule whose objective is to revive the pre-1993 empire. In this respect, Ukraine is the key to Russian success. Putin aims to significantly weaken the countries in Central and Eastern Europe while subordinating them to Russian domination. These measures are multidimensional, spanning across areas of security, politics, economy and society.

In the area of security, Poland faces several challenges. Even though they are not associated with any imminent threat or territorial interference by Russia, its activity in the countries bordering Poland is a clear signal for Poland

to take decisive steps to strengthen its security. Also, multiple incidents and attempts at asymmetric measures have been noted. The surveillance carried out by intelligence services, violations of airspace, information war and cyber attacks are all examples of Russia's activity targeted at Poland. Attempts to break up the sense of unity and community of Central European countries pose a significant threat (for example, within the Visegrad Group, the Three Seas Initiative or the Bucharest Nine). Russia has been constantly trying to divide the countries which undertake various initiatives, both those launched at the regional level and those pursued within their NATO and EU membership.

Successive provocations and interference in the affairs of sovereign states provide further examples of this kind of activity by Russia. Ukraine has experienced this several times, especially during the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan⁸. The aggression peaked during the war in eastern Ukraine, ongoing since 2014. The destabilisation of this region clearly undermines Ukraine's ability to successfully integrate with NATO and the EU. It is difficult to imagine a country *de facto* in a state of war, with Russian troops stationed in its territory (Crimea), to be considered as a potential candidate for membership.


The question of Ukraine's potential membership in the Euro-Atlantic structures has been a subject in the research that provided an empirical basis for his monograph. The respondents were asked about the issue of potential Ukrainian membership and their opinion as to the time period within which such membership may be possible. The answers reflect clear differences in how Poles and Ukrainians assess the situation.

The respondents were asked: Do you believe that Ukraine will become a member of the trans-Atlantic organisations listed below? The replies given by Polish respondents clearly indicate their lack of faith in this possibility (Figure 1). „Yes” was chosen by 41.3% (EU) and 40.7% (NATO), with 58.7%

⁸ Other countries are also exposed to such activities, with Georgia in 2008 being among the most prominent examples. At the time, Russia carried out armed aggression, effectively subjugating Abkhazia and South Ossetia, tearing both those territories away from Georgia. Poland's President at that time, Lech Kaczyński, together with the presidents of Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, supported the Georgians in Tbilisi. On August 12, 2008, he uttered important words that highlighted the consequences of a lack of reaction to Russia's actions, leaving them without visible international objection. Among others, Lech Kaczyński stressed: „Russia believes that the old days of the empire that collapsed less than 20 years ago are coming back, and that domination will again be a feature of the region. No, it won't! (...). Let me say this not only to you. Let me say this also to those of our common European Union that Central Europe, Georgia, that our entire region will be important, that we are an entity. And we also know very well that it may be Georgia today, Ukraine tomorrow, the Baltic States the day after, and then perhaps time will come also for my country, Poland.”

and 59.3% choosing „No” to this question⁹. This seems to stem from the respondents' assessment of the situation in Ukraine rather than their reluctance about this prospect. As regards the surveyed Ukrainians, most of them expressed their faith in Euro-Atlantic membership, with 78.2% (EU) and 66.1% (NATO) answering „Yes” and correspondingly 21.8% and 33.9% opting for „No.”¹⁰

Figure 1. Do you believe that Ukraine will become a member of the trans-Atlantic organisations listed below? [among civilian respondents and members of border services total (%)]




The respondents were also asked about the possible timing of Ukraine's membership in Euro-Atlantic structures: **When do you think Ukraine will become a member of these transatlantic institutions?** Also, in this case, Polish respondents answered differently from their Ukrainian counterparts. The vast majority of Poles, 64.1%, said that this would become possible in ten years (or more) at the earliest. The respondents from Ukraine were more likely to believe that this could happen even within up to five years (nearly 30% of the answers).

⁹ Even more diverse results can be observed among the surveyed border guard officers from Poland. „Yes” was chosen by only 21.6% of them, with 78.4% choosing „No” as a reply.

¹⁰ At the same time, there are no differences in responses between Ukrainian civilians and border guards.

Figure 2. When do you believe Ukraine will become a member of the trans-Atlantic organisations listed below? [among civilian respondents and members of border services total (%)]



When talking about economic challenges, several problems need to be highlighted. In 1991, Poland and Ukraine were at a similar level of economic development. GDP per capita was almost equal for both. However, their political transformations and economic reforms followed completely different trajectories, and at a different pace. After 30 years of economic transformations, it is clear that the differences between the two countries are very significant and the gap is widening further. Of course, this is not beneficial for equitable cooperation, which is supposed to play a strategic role. In 2019, Poland's GDP growth was 4.0%, with its GDP per capita standing at USD 14,902. The respective figures for Ukraine are 3.2% and USD 10,310. Macroeconomic data and studies performed by many analysts indicate that with the current level and dynamics of economic growth, Ukraine will reach Poland's current level in 50 years. Quite obviously, Poland will not stand still during this period but will record optimal growth.

For a few years now, Poland has been recording good economic growth. However, there are noticeable problems in the economic sector. They are partly due to economic backwardness, or complications arising during the privatisation or liquidation of major industrial enterprises. This led to high unemployment rates, including structural unemployment. Another common problem was the excessive concentration of capital in the hands of foreign,

external economic operators. The reforms carried out in Poland over many years destabilised the economy and marginalised large groups of people. The concentration of many enterprises, especially those of key importance to the economy, in the hands of external capital resulted in unfavourable development trends, hampered the growth of domestic industries or created significant competitive disadvantages for domestic capital. Sectors such as energy, banking and media, with high concentrations of corporate ownership in foreign hands, led to numerous developmental barriers. The process of “reclaiming the economy” through re-Polonisation or capital support for companies in Poland was long and complicated.

Shortly after Poland joined the EU and the labour markets opened up, the migration processes in Poland intensified. The loss of nearly two million young, economically active, well-educated workers affected many industries and the economy as a whole. This loss became particularly evident during the period of economic growth when many industries needed more workforce.

Ukraine has been struggling with unstable levels of economic development. This can be clearly seen when we analyse its economic indicators over the last few years. Periods of growth alternate with significant slumps and recession. Currency fluctuations also cause serious problems. A significantly disadvantageous situation is evident in industrial production and agriculture. Internal demand also shows great fluctuations. It is unlikely that the long-term economic policy can benefit from the plans for almost completely privatising key sectors of the economy and for selling agricultural land on a mass scale. In many cases, a consequence of this process would be the domination of foreign capital or accumulation of capital in the hands of powerful oligarchs. Incidentally, the activity of the latter is among the major problems that hinder the harmonious development and improvement of living standards among large social groups.

The mass migration of workers to other countries represents a significant challenge for Ukraine’s economy. Migrants to a significant extent support their families and the country’s economy through financial transfers. On the other hand, however, workforce migration clearly depletes the resources that could be used to develop various economic sectors within Ukraine. This process is constantly getting more intense. Migrants are mostly young, well-educated and highly skilled people. It is also difficult to predict whether they will be willing to return to Ukraine in the future.

Political and social problems pose a significant challenge to the development of both Poland and Ukraine. They can be seen as the inevitable cost

of profound reforms connected with the systemic transformation after 1989. While some of these problems are objective costs, others, however, are the result of a kind of political game, speculation and cold calculations made by some individuals and political groups.

Poland commenced its transformation from the so-called Round Table negotiations in 1989. As a consequence, they brought a peculiar political deal between part of the democratic opposition and the communist authorities. It was symbolised by the so-called „thick line” proposed by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, prime minister in the government formed after the June 4, 1989 elections. The „thick line policy” meant giving up the idea of thorough settlements with the previous regime and not holding communists accountable. As a result, a significant proportion of the people who had made up that system were able to maintain influence over many areas of public life, including the government, the economy, the media, etc. The consequences of the Round Table arrangements are felt until today. Many prominent politicians of the pre-1989 governments either held or still hold important public functions, also at the EU level. They are active in the economic and social sphere. For many years, parliament and government instability has been a significant problem. Frequently organised elections and changes in the executive branch of power were not conducive to dynamic growth in many spheres. Another problem in this regard concerns the lack of political authority figures, as well as low quality, relativism and unchanging political views among some politicians.

During the political transformation, members of the general public were left to their own devices in many cases. Large numbers of people who used to work for state-owned enterprises lost their jobs and the possibility of decent living for many years. Phenomena such as permanent unemployment, poverty and social exclusion emerged. In several cases, deep social divides emerged and became reinforced. People involved in the special services of communist Poland and foreign-owned media played an important role in this process. Two events were of particular significance in this respect. The first were the parliamentary elections of 2005, which resulted in a split within the former democratic opposition. The second event was the tragic crash of a government plane near Smolensk in Russia, with President Lech Kaczyński and 95 other people on board¹¹. The death of the President and significant figures

¹¹ The investigation into the Smolensk plane crash by the Russians was very significant in terms of how Poland was treated. Steps such as destroying the aircraft wreck (the evidence in the case) just after the disaster, immediately putting the blame on the pilots, and issuing a verdict after just a few days of superficial investigation raise many doubts.

for the country's politics, economy and social life brought the nation closer together for a while. This process, however, was effectively undermined by groups that seek to achieve social fragmentation and social divides. Some of them have their origins abroad.

Depopulation is also a serious social problem, with Poland having one of the lowest birth rates in Europe, around 1.45. The consequences of this unfavourable phenomenon entail the rapid ageing of the population, the declining real economic potential, the collapse of the pension system and the defence potential.

Ukraine has been undergoing political transformation since 1991. The political and social challenges it faces that are a consequence of the country's efforts to build its sovereign statehood after a long period of being a part of the USSR. Ukraine's main political problem, evident for many years, was its attempt to drift between Russia and the West. For a long time, Ukraine did not explicitly express its strategic goal to become a full member of the Euro-Atlantic system. Some of the most prominent politicians changed their minds about strategic issues even when serving in the executive branch of power. There were also numerous cases of unclear links between politics and business. A numerous and influential caste of oligarchs has emerged. Almost all of them clearly influenced those in power, both at the national and regional levels. Some important politicians amassed huge fortunes, got involved in corruption and entered into shady deals, also at the international level. In the vast majority of cases, a kind of family clan system developed.

Ukrainian society is highly diverse, with significant unpredictability and occasional bouts of quick-temper as its characteristic traits. This was demonstrated during the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan. Ukrainians are capable of engaging in an important fight to defend important values. It seems, however, that their zeal easily turns into discouragement. What is missing is the will to be consistent and lead matters to completion. There may be several underlying reasons for this. It is difficult to find a clear, uniform Ukrainian national identity. This is certainly not facilitated by the lack of unambiguous figures of authority, whether from recent history or from the present. Presumably, political subordination during Soviet times is responsible for considerable damage in this respect. The lack of its statehood model and models imposed by Soviet ideologies and attitudes clearly influenced Ukrainian society. One can hardly identify any figures of authority that would be universally accepted. A significant proportion of the population use Russian as their main language (even over 40%, according to some estimates).

The social groups in the east and west of Ukraine have taken on different shapes. The presence of oligarchs, as mentioned earlier, certainly does not help to build a community. Ukrainians do not show much interest in sustainable civic movements. The social capital, especially those represented by young people, is leveraged mostly abroad¹².

Ukraine is also grappling with major demographic challenges¹³. The fertility rate is almost the same as in Poland (1.45). This should be mentioned in the context of the rising emigration. Moreover, a large part of the population inhabits the territories that are currently under the occupation of either separatists or Russians. Adding to this the fact that Ukraine is inhabited by numerous minorities, one should seriously look at the estimates presented by some analysts, whereby the actual current physical population of Ukraine is around 38 million people (official figures published by national and global institutions mention approx. 45 million).

Both Poland and Ukraine are certainly faced with the challenge of the moral changes taking place around the world. The groups promoting the so-called „minority rights” have been trying to challenge the ways of life that had been established in the society for a long time. In many cases, this can lead to anarchy, alien behaviours being imposed on the majority and even to profound changes that go against the national identity. Europe has become a source of inspiration and a political and social model for the world thanks to the achievements of its civilisation, rooted in the Greco-Roman and Christian traditions. Attempts to change this order will inevitably lead to disaster.

The list of challenges faced by Poland and Ukraine that have been described in this chapter is certainly not exhaustive. They only serve as examples of the important issues that both countries need to grapple with regularly.

1.2.3. Geopolitical Opportunities for Poland and Ukraine

Geopolitical opportunities are an element of the *raison d'état* of each country. However, they have their dynamics and usually open up for a relatively short time. When a reaction is too late and opportunities are not grasped immediately, this may mean that they are irretrievably lost. Pursuing them will

¹² Students from Ukraine can be taken as an example here. In the academic year 2019/2020, over 40,000 Ukrainians were studying in Poland. Less than 10% of them declare they will return to their homeland after graduation.

¹³ V. L. Knodel, *Ukraine: past, present, future*, Kyiv 2019; E. Gugnin, *Political, socio-demographic and economic aspects of state instability as a factor of external influence in Ukraine: a sociological perspective*, Grani, no. 6-7/2020, pp. 26-38.

be less effective or their potential impact on the country's position will be diminished. In the case of Poland and Ukraine, this is particularly important given their geographical locations.

When we look at opportunities in the sphere of security, the issues of sovereignty, independence and territorial security come to the fore. It is the fundamental duty of every government to take steps to strengthen their country's position.

Today, Poland enjoys the best security position since the time of the first partition (1772), the main reason for this being that the key political forces in Poland have maintained a uniform stance in this respect since 1989. During this period, there have been hardly any major disputes as to which direction to choose in order to build the country's security. Of course, some divergent detailed proposals were voiced, largely stemming from the current agendas pursued by individual political parties. However, the overall direction was maintained. For Poland, there is no alternative to NATO membership. This does not mean, however, that Poland is disregarding its obligations in strengthening its defence capabilities.

For several years now, the situation of the armed forces has been steadily improving. The personnel capabilities and equipment are being reinforced. More volunteers want to join the army. Regular, professional training is available for soldiers. They receive high-quality equipment. The government allocates over 2.0% of GDP for defence (aiming to reach 2.5% by 2025). As a result, Poland is one of a few NATO member states to fulfil its financial obligations as an ally. The Polish army regularly takes part in allied missions. Important manoeuvres by NATO troops take place on Poland's territory.

The United States is the key partner for Poland. This defence partnership is based on an alliance. The presence of U.S. troops is among the most important elements that build Poland's defence position. Poland is the main partner of the United States in the region. This has been mutually confirmed at the level of Presidents Andrzej Duda and Donald Trump. The tangible effects of these actions include Poland's investments and purchasing of equipment (including F-35 aircraft), and the 5,500 U.S. troops stationing on Poland's territory.

Poland's activities within the EU have grown in importance. One example is Poland's position on illegal migration into Europe. In 2015, after the change of government, Poland objected to the so-called forced relocation of migrants. Despite strong criticism from some EU countries, Poland consistently defended its position. Several years later, the actions of the EU confirmed Poland's

view about the failure of the solutions which had been adopted. Uncontrolled migration is not conducive to European security. As a country with a significantly lengthy EU external border, Poland has been fulfilling its commitments.

It should be stressed at this point that Poland's actions are not confrontational towards any country. These actions are largely aimed at strengthening Poland's own and allied defence potential.

Despite the ongoing war in Donbas, Ukraine has a chance of strengthening its security. Since 1994, it has cooperated with NATO under the Partnership for Peace programme. The process of allied cooperation has had its ups and downs. There have been objective problems related to the war in Donbas and the annexation of Crimea. Moreover, the Ukrainian authorities were not always favourably predisposed towards NATO (especially during Viktor Yanukovich's term as the country's president). However, cooperation continues. In June 2020, it was raised to a new height when Ukraine was included in the Enhanced Opportunities Programme (EOP). The benefits are related to Ukraine's increased participation in terms of access to information as well as participation in NATO missions and exercises. The stability in the region must maintain and deepen cooperation between the two entities. This will help Ukraine be much better prepared for effective and multidimensional cooperation with NATO. Although the Programme does not guarantee membership, it will certainly have a decisive impact on Ukraine's defence potential.

The Lithuanian–Polish–Ukrainian Brigade, LITPOLUKRBRIG, is an important example of Ukraine's cooperation with NATO countries. The brigade, stationed in Lublin (Poland), is formed by the armed forces of Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine. It draws on the shared historical heritage, based on the good experience of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth established in 1569. The importance of this formation is based on peacekeeping efforts under the objectives of the UN, NATO and the EU, support for stabilising the security in the region and the possibility to establish combat groups. The brigade numbers approx. 4,500 soldiers from the three countries. For Ukrainian servicemen, especially commanders, this provides the opportunity to participate in joint military activities with two NATO member states on a day-to-day basis. The result is valuable experience accumulated while building a strong foundation for Ukraine's security, defence and armed forces.

Economic opportunities for Poland and Ukraine arise both from the activities of the two countries and the external economic circumstances. It is very important to maintain the direction of reforms and to systematically leverage and strengthen the economic potential.

For several years now, Poland has maintained high economic growth (4% in 2019). Nearly all of its macroeconomic indicators are satisfactory and remain stable. The economic downturns in recent years, although noticed, have not affected Poland negatively. Economic growth remains steady, reaching one of the highest rates in Europe. This translates into an increased standard of living, the attractiveness of Poland as an investment destination and its credibility as a country. Internal demand is strong. Structurally speaking, exports exceed imports. The resulting trade surplus is skilfully leveraged in the economy. The labour market is stable and satisfactory and the unemployment rate is low (approx. 5.2% in 2019). The strong, positive performance of domestic companies, particularly in the construction and energy sectors, plays an important role.

Key public investments, both planned and ongoing, are of crucial importance, as they are likely to build the strength of the Polish economy for many years to come. Some of them seem particularly important, among them the Central Transport Hub (CPK), planned to be built near Warsaw in an effort to raise Poland's profile in Europe's transport network. A huge airport, together with a rapid railway network and access roads, is likely to boost Poland's attractiveness as a transport hub for passenger and freight transport alike. Another strategically important investment, which will also improve the attractiveness of the eastern parts of the EU, is the construction of the Via Carpathia. This road, connecting the North (Baltic States) with the South of Europe (Greece), will attract more investments and tourist traffic. Investments in the fuel sector are being undertaken to diversify energy sources and gain independence from Russia. The gradual extension of the Świnoujście LNG Terminal and the completion of the Baltic Pipe will help Poland to expand its energy capabilities thanks to fuel supplies, notably from the USA and Norway.

Poland has successfully resolved the issue of negotiations for the new long-term EU budget in 2021–2027. The amount obtained in July 2020 under various financial facilities totals EUR 160 billion. Regardless of doubts and critical opinions from some analysts, it should be clearly stressed that this is one of the highest amounts that can be obtained by a member state. Full success will depend on the rational utilisation of these funds, especially for innovation, investment, development-oriented research, agriculture and energy.

Ukraine's economy has been improving slowly yet steadily. The economic growth rate in 2019 was approx. 3.5%. The labour market has improved slightly, becoming ever more attractive (in 2019, the unemployment rate was approx. 7.3%). The income earned by the average citizen has also increased

(by approx. 16% in 2019). Ukraine still has great potential, particularly in agriculture and the investment sector. For years, large areas of arable land have been the country's great treasure. It is not without reason that Ukraine is called the „granary of Europe.” Agricultural production can boost economic growth. Moreover, Ukraine is a large and attractive market for goods. However, the existing economic opportunities should be leveraged in connection with the dynamic, fast and effective reforms of the government system, measures to facilitate business activity and fight corruption. The utilisation of aid funds must be based on transparent and clear rules. Financial transfers made by Ukrainian economic migrants can certainly help to stimulate domestic demand. A large part of Ukraine's economic sector needs reasonable privatisation, which is likely to drive more growth. In this context, an important opportunity has also emerged for companies from Poland.

Ukraine is in the process of making major investments, including those in construction and road infrastructure, with more investments to come. The infrastructural acceleration will benefit major players with international capital and their investment plans. The importance of such activities was proven during the period before the 2012 UEFA European Football Championship, a sporting event organised jointly by Poland and Ukraine.

Political and social opportunities should be considered in the context of citizens' attitudes. The systemic transformation has empowered citizens, boosting awareness of their rights and duties. This is particularly evident at breakthrough moments, when most members of the society can unite around important issues. However, there is a need to build a sustainable community that will resist apparent divisions and differences. This is particularly significant in the context of major global processes and transitions.

Politics in Poland firmly relies on democratic principles. The authorities are elected in free elections. Members of the public are increasingly aware that every single vote counts. Some politicians understand that the *raison d'état* is to build a country that is empowered, equal and independent of the will of other countries or organisations. Naturally, this does not preclude bilateral cooperation or collaboration within international organisations. Poland's society shows the strongest support for the Euro-Atlantic structures among all other countries in Europe¹⁴. The idea of a civil society has been successfully

¹⁴ EU membership is supported by 89% of the population, with NATO enjoying the support of 83%. This should be kept in mind in the context of false opinions that are being spread about alleged attempts at Polesxit or about Poland allegedly challenging the principles of European integration.

implanted and is thriving¹⁵. Non-governmental organisations are being established, people get involved in volunteer work, showing a sense of social solidarity, especially with those most deprived, disadvantaged or wronged.

Poland is a nation-state, with Poles representing almost 90% of its population. National unity, together with the commonly declared Roman Catholic faith, is instrumental in building and maintaining its identity. This is essential for the country to survive and develop. For the most part, Polish society demonstrates patriotic attitudes. This is evident in commemorating important anniversaries, celebrating national holidays and remembering important events in Poland's history¹⁶. National minorities in Poland, including the Ukrainian minority, enjoy full rights that enable them to develop, run schools and cultivate their traditions. Moreover, Polish society demonstrates a great deal of empathy, especially in emergencies, whenever aid is needed for affected individuals or groups. Examples include financial and personal support provided to victims of disasters, floods and other emergencies that occur in various parts of Poland or elsewhere in the world. Poles demonstrate their belief in inviolable values and are particularly attached to the family, understood as a union between a woman and a man. They want to raise children in the spirit of those values. Therefore, the processes involving a change of mores are neither widely nor rapidly embraced in Poland. In most cases, members of the Polish society identify with the motto *God, Honour, the Homeland*¹⁷.

Ukraine is a country that has embarked on difficult political reforms. Ukrainians are gradually developing their identity as citizens. The last decade or so has shown that Ukrainians are aware of the need for lasting changes and systematic work to build modern statehood. The potential of the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan, not fully leveraged, gives hope for the future. Ukrainians from the young generation are open to the world and undertake education outside the country. This helps them explore new communities and appreciate the quality of political and social life in well-established democracies. It seems important that the awareness of the need to undertake difficult reforms is firmly embedded in people's minds. Ukrainians have grown tired of seeing that the quality of the government in their country has not

¹⁵ Poles became famous in 1980, when the Solidarity movement was formed during the difficult period of struggle for workers' rights. At its peak, Solidarity had up to 10 million members.

¹⁶ Patriotism is an attitude based on the love of one's own homeland while respecting other nationalities. Thus, patriotism should not be confused with nationalism, which challenges the rights of other nations.

¹⁷ During World War II, these ideals were permanently placed on the flags used by the armed forces fighting for Poland's freedom on the western front.

improved in any visible way. This disillusionment inspires them to search for a new opening in politics, with new people who are not yet „contaminated” by being part of the power structures. This is reflected in Volodymyr Zelensky’s success in the presidential elections. However, more civic activity is needed, supported by effort and involvement, for instance through non-governmental organisations. This will boost the chances for the middle class to evolve in a stable way, since this class builds the prosperity of any country. As a result, the empowered society will be able to develop without being dependent on the group of oligarchs.

CHAPTER II. CHARACTERISTICS OF POLAND AND UKRAINE'S CROSS-BORDER REGION

Any country active in foreign policy supports cross-border cooperation. This brings real benefits to both the country and its society, especially for people living in border areas. These benefits are linked to the promotion of a positive image of the country. They help the local communities get to know each other better and overcome prejudices or difficulties, including historical ones. This also holds true for Poland and Ukraine. The length of the border, historical and cultural similarities, trade, tourism, educational exchange and even family encounters are conducive to frequent mutual contacts.

Obviously, cross-border cooperation within the EU develops more dynamically between member states which share open borders under the Schengen rules¹⁸. Basically, societies on both sides of the border have unrestricted opportunities for everyday contact and cooperation. The EU also supports cooperation at its external borders, also with Ukraine. In Poland, there are 16 Euroregions within its territory, and two of them involve cooperation with Ukraine (the Carpathian Euroregion, 1993, and the Bug Euroregion, 1995).

2.1. The Bug Euroregion

The establishment of the Bug Euroregion in 1995 reflected the great determination among Poland, Ukraine and Belarus to develop regional cooperation¹⁹. At that time, the authorities realised that it was necessary to undertake stronger cooperation between Poland and the sovereign states of Ukraine and Belarus, both of which were reborn after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

¹⁸ A. Miszczuk, R. Szul, (eds.), *The EU's New Borderland. Cross-border relations and regional development*, New York 2019.

¹⁹ N. Kotsan, H. Kopachynska, *The functioning of the polish-ukrainian border within conditions of european integration process intensification (on the example of euroregion „bug”)*, *Journal of Geography, Politics and Society*, no 7/2017, pp. 43-47.

Therefore, it was necessary to revive contacts, especially in the context of the Good Neighbourhood Treaties that had been signed with each country neighbouring Poland²⁰. The main objective behind the Euroregion is to enable cooperation in the areas of economy, science and culture. This is facilitated by the specific profile of the region, both in geographical and socio-economic terms.

The Bug Euroregion is one of the largest transnational structures of this kind in Europe. It is located at the border of Central Europe and Eastern Europe. It covers an area of nearly 81,000 sq. km and is inhabited by approx. 5 million people. The Euroregion covers the Lublin Voivodship and the Lutsk Oblast²¹. The terrain essentially consists of lowlands. Agricultural land covers half of the area, nearly one third being forests. As a result, the area is an important centre of agriculture and forestry. Beautiful lands, with many lakes, protected as natural parks established within the Euroregion, offer favourable conditions for tourism and recreation. The area is rich in mineral water deposits and clean air²². Natural resources, including hard coal, natural gas and oil, are important for the economy.

The Bug Euroregion is important for the East-West and North-South transport network. An important transport route, both by road and rail, runs across this area. However, it requires significant investment to improve infrastructure and throughput.


Within the Bug Euroregion, many initiatives are pursued that aim to improve the quality of life and the economy, financed from the budgets of Poland, Ukraine and, especially, the EU. Funds that were crucial for many initiatives came from PHARE, Interreg IIIA and CCP PL-BY-UA 2014–2020. Benefits derived from this have been shared by many public institutions, local governments and non-governmental organisations. The support was directed to all initiatives pursuing the objective that was formulated for the Bug Euroregion upon its establishment.

²⁰ This process took place in 1991–1994, when relevant treaties were signed with each of Poland's seven neighbours, countries established as a result of geopolitical changes after 1990. The Treaty between the Republic of Poland and Ukraine on Good Neighbourhood, Friendly Relations and Cooperation was drawn up in Warsaw on May 18, 1992.

²¹ In the case of Belarus, the Bug Euroregion includes the Brest Oblast. The Belarusian part has the largest in area, occupying more than 40% of the Euroregion, with Brest as the largest city in this part.

²² The Bug Euroregion comprises four natural parks: the Polesie National Park, the Roztocze National Park, the Białowieża National Park and the Szacki National Park.

Map 3. Map of Lubelskie and Volyn, 2020.



2.1.1. Lublin Voivodship

The Lublin Voivodship is Poland's easternmost voivodship (province). It covers an area of over 25,100 sq. km between two large rivers: the Vistula to the west and the Bug to the east. The area is geographically defined by five regions: the Lublin Uplands, Polesie Lublin, the South Podlasie Lowlands, Roztocze and the Sandomierz Basin. The voivodship is inhabited by over 2.1 million people, with the majority of them living in rural areas (over 1.1 million). The key urban centres are Lublin, Zamość, Chełm and Biała Podlaska. The Lublin Voivodship borders two countries in the east: Belarus (170 km) and Ukraine (296 km), and it also borders four other Polish voivodships²³. Due to the long external border with two non-EU countries, the Lublin Voivodship has 12 border crossing points²⁴. Border traffic at these points is very intense. In 2019, a total of 13,136,898 people and 4,322,442 vehicles crossed the border at all border crossing points under the jurisdiction of the Nadbużański Border Guard Department in Chełm (NOSG). The value of the smuggled goods detected by customs and border services of the Polish National Revenue Administration (KAS) exceeded PLN 72.25 million. A total of 535 people were detained upon attempted or actual illegal border crossing²⁵. The selected details on the border with Ukraine are presented in the table below.

The presented data indicate that the Lublin Voivodship is a place with intense international traffic. The Lublin region is both a destination and a transit area. For this reason, the effectiveness of both the NOSG and KAS officers is crucial for cross-border security. The NOSG employs approx. 1,500 people, including nearly 1,200 officers. The KAS employs approx. 1,700 border officers in the Lublin Voivodship.

The Lublin Voivodship is very much an agricultural area with a small number of major industrial plants. Good loess soils, mainly brown and black earth, offer favourable conditions for farming. Several crops that are mainly cultivated in the region include sugar beet, cereals, tobacco, hops and soft fruit. The Lublin region is the main producer of these crops in the country.

²³ With Mazowieckie to the north-west, Podlaskie to the north-east, Podkarpackie to the south and Świętokrzyskie to the west.

²⁴ Four with Belarus: road BCPs (Kukuryki, Terespol, Sławatycze), railway BCP (Terespol); seven with Ukraine: road BCPs (Dorohusk, Zosin, Dołhobyczów, Hrebenne), railway BCPs (Dorohusk, Hrubieszów, Hrebenne) and one air BCP (Świdnik).

²⁵ *It is worth noting that the activities of customs and border services are also carried out outside the border, in the border area and inside the country.*

In order to boost agricultural efficiency, it is essential to prevent the fragmentation of acreage and make additional investments in infrastructure. It is also necessary to stop the depopulation of agricultural areas and improve water conditions.

The industry in the region is mainly based on agriculture-related sectors, with the dominance of food production, confectionery and animal husbandry. Because of the hard coal deposits, the coal mine in Bogdanka is of significant importance in the region. The coal extracted in Bogdanka is an important source of energy for industrial and individual customers throughout Poland.

In addition to the aforementioned sectors, services and commerce are a source of income for the local population. The unemployment rate in the region is approx. 8%. The average pay is just over PLN 4,000. The Lublin Voivodship is constantly developing, with a lot of capabilities still waiting to be utilised. However, it continues to be the poorest region in Poland and one of the poorest regions in the whole EU.

The city of Lublin, the capital of the voivodship, is also the most important centre of the region and the largest city on the right bank of the Vistula river. With a population of approx. 340,000, Lublin is a major academic centre with five public and several private universities. Moreover, given its location and historical heritage, Lublin is also an important cultural centre. It also has symbolic significance for Poland's statehood traditions. In 1569, a treaty between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, known as the Union of Lublin, was signed here. This event, initiating the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, became the foundation of a political power that remained a major player in Central Europe for over 200 years.

Thanks to its location on the transport route heading to Ukraine, Lublin is a natural place to initiate and develop multifaceted cross-border cooperation. Such cooperation is effectively and efficiently implemented at various levels, including universities, schools, cultural institutions and local governments. The city of Lutsk in Ukraine is one of Lublin's partner cities. Cooperation between the two regions is carried out based on formal arrangements, set out in agreements and long-term strategies²⁶.

²⁶ The agreement of June 16, 2004 between the Lublin Voivodship and the Volyn Oblast on Economic, Commercial, Scientific, Technical and Cultural Cooperation as well as the Attachment to the Resolution of the Local Parliament of the Lublin Voivodship of April 30, 2014 entitled „Cross-Border Cooperation Strategy for the Lublin Voivodship, Lviv Oblast, Volyn Oblast and Brest Oblast.”

2.1.2. Volyn Oblast

The Volyn Oblast is the fourth of the westernmost oblasts (provinces) in Ukraine. It covers an area of over 20,100 sq. km, delineated by the Bug, Lug and Pripjat rivers. This area comprises the historical lands of Volyn and Volhynian Polesia and is inhabited by approximately one million people. The most important urban centres are Lutsk, Kovel, Novovolynsk and Volodymyr-Volynskyi.

The Volyn Oblast borders the Lviv Oblast in the south, the Rivne Oblast in the east, with Poland in the west and Belarus in the north. For this reason, much like the Lublin Voivodship and its surroundings, the whole region is an important cross-border area with intense border traffic, which is handled by 16 border crossing points²⁷. The operations of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, the North Region, and the Lutsk Border Guard Detachment and State Customs Service, Volyn Oblast are of crucial importance for cross-border security, including the cooperation with Poland. The main flow of border traffic to and from Poland is handled by the border crossing points (BCPs) in Yahodyn and Ustyluh.

Due to its geographical proximity to the Lublin region, the Volyn Oblast also relies largely on agriculture. The soils are diverse, from weak marshy lands to fertile chernozem. The dominant crops include cereals, sugar beets and vegetables (especially potatoes).

As regards the industrial sector, light industry linked to agricultural production plays the greatest role. Cattle farming is focused on dairy production and meat processing. The geographical location within the Lviv-Volyn Basin means that the extraction of hard coal, copper and phosphates play an important role. The Volyn Oblast can also boast significant deposits of sapropel, a raw material used in agriculture and the medical industry.

The Volyn Oblast has good conditions for tourism and recreation, including health and wellness tourism. Many spas and sanatoriums have been established in the region, relying on abundant local water resources, lakes and forests. Mineral waters have properties supporting the treatment of various diseases.

Entrepreneurship remains a major challenge in the Volyn Oblast. This is important from the viewpoint of developing local trade and services, both of which could become a significant part of the region's economy. While the

²⁷ Of these, 12 are road BCPs, three are rail BCPs and one is an air BCP.

number of economic operators is constantly rising, the growth should be much more dynamic.

Unemployment in the region is comparable to that in Poland and the Lublin region and stands at approx. 8.2% (2019). The low average pay, amounting to approx. 1000 UAH remains a serious issue.

Lutsk is the largest city in the Volyn Oblast and an important urban centre of north-eastern Ukraine, with approx. 217,000 inhabitants. The city, with its historical significance and playing the role of the capital of Volyn, has numerous historical monuments and is a thriving tourist destination and educational centre, with two important universities. Lutsk is also an important transport hub. The city has established smooth cooperation in partnership with several cities in Poland, including Lublin. The settlement of historical issues certainly poses a great challenge in the context of cooperation with Poland. During the times of World War II, Volyn was inhabited by a large Polish minority. Due to a conflict between the two nationalities, which at that time erupted in brutal killings of Poles (the Volyn Massacre), more work on the politics of memory is needed in the Polish-Ukrainian relations.

CHAPTER III. SPECIFICS OF BORDER CROSSING BETWEEN POLAND AND UKRAINE

The analysis of regional cross-border cooperation will now focus on border crossing points (BCPs). Contrary to the typical definitions found in dictionaries, a BCP is not just a point where the border is crossed. It is also a place of intensified communication between the two sides, an intersection of social and economic relations, and a node of transit and tourist flows. At the same time, a BCP is a valuable resource for the neighbouring territories and local communities, especially when they create a space for mobility between countries that differ in terms of their economies (e.g. concerning product prices, labour costs, the (un)availability of certain goods and services), generating additional activity in this area, which also has its social and cultural consequences²⁸. All these activities build a dense network of relations and are life-blood for cross-border cooperation that flows through border crossing points. The efficient operation of BCPs, properly performing their tasks, is crucial for the entire system of neighbourly relations and contacts.

The assessment of the accessibility of BCPs at the Polish-Ukrainian border, the infrastructure, estimated crossing time as well as the work and competence of border services, made by those crossing the border to and from Poland, will enable us to reconstruct the social image of border crossing points between the two countries and identify their importance for cross-border cooperation. This perception will be confronted with the opinions expressed by the employees of border services, who – in contrast to the relatively ephemeral experiences of individuals crossing the border – monitor the situation at BCPs on a constant basis.

²⁸ Cf. W. Gizicki, P. Sheremeta, O. Kovalchuk, (eds.), *Polish-Ukrainian Cross-Border Cooperation. Opportunities and Challenges*, Toruń 2019; D. Studzińska, S. Domaniewski, *The Border as a Resource for the Development of Borderland: A Comparative Analysis of Two Polish Urban Centres at the External Border of the European Union*, *Quaestiones Geographicae*, no 4/2016, p. 145-155; Sohn C, *Modelling Cross-Border Integration: The Role of Borders as a Resource*, *Geopolitics*, vol. 19, no. 3/2014, pp. 587-608; E. Matejko, *Przejście graniczne jako zasób społeczności lokalnej*, *Pogranicze. Studia Społeczne*, T. XIV, 2008, p. 61-77.

3.1. Four Perspectives: Respondents at the Border Crossing Point

The essential differentiating feature in the two groups of respondents mentioned above (i.e. among the individuals crossing the Polish-Ukrainian border and among the representatives of border services of the two countries) is the country of origin. This variable differentiates both groups and, under the intended sample structure, divides them almost equally into halves (49.5% of Poles to 50.5% of Ukrainians among border crossers and, respectively, 51.5% to 48.5% among the respondents from border services). The respondents on both sides of the border provided very similar answers to many questions. However, each country has its singularities, and there are also differences between the border flows on each side (e.g. the prevalence of economic agendas on the Ukrainian side and tourist trips on the Polish side) that influence the socio-cultural characteristics of border crossers and the frequency of crossing, and probably also their perceptions of BCPs and cross-border cooperation as such.

When presenting the results of empirical research discussed here, we will make sure to draw attention to the effect of the country of origin on the distribution of responses. Distribution of responses with a breakdown according to citizenship (Polish vs. Ukrainian) will often reveal differences between the two nationalities, which will be clearly shown in the tables and figures provided further in this book, to put the research findings in a broader context and provide the framework for interpretation, also to the readers. This means that when describing the reality investigated in the survey, we will constantly note and communicate the existence of four perspectives: Polish border-crossers (1), Ukrainian border-crossers (2), as well as personnel of border services of Poland (3) and Ukraine (4).

Table 2. Frequency of crossing the border [among civilian respondents crossing the border (%)]

	People crossing the border – total (PL+UKR n=294)	Poles crossing the border (n=143)	Ukrainians crossing the border (n=151)
Every day	3.7	2.8	4.6
A few times per week	19.7	6.3	32.5
A few times per month	26.9	16.1	37.1
Once per month	3.7	1.4	6.0
A few times per year	19.4	21.7	17.2
Once per year	26.5	51.7	2.6

Source: Own work.

The core group in the sample was composed of the citizens of both countries who cross the border at least once a year. According to their declarations, more than half of them (54%) cross the border at least once a month, with one in four respondents crossing it several times a week (*Table 1*). Such regular border crossing is declared mainly by Ukrainian respondents (80% of them, with 37% crossing the border a few times a week or every day). On the Polish side, 27% of respondents travel to Ukraine once a month or more often, and over half declare that they do it only once a year. When confronting these data with the purpose of travel to Poland and/or Ukraine (*Figure 1*), it is worth noting that over 66% of the surveyed Ukrainians declare that they go to Poland mainly for economic or work-related reasons, i.e. their trips are related to private gainful employment (38.0%), work-related purposes (18.7%) or shopping (9.4%). The respective percentage of Polish respondents who declare an economic or work-related purpose of travel is much lower and stands at approx. 37%. For Polish respondents, the most prevalent reason for travelling to Ukraine was tourism (38.6%) – while this answer was chosen least frequently by Ukrainian citizens interviewed in the survey (11.7%). This means that the surveyed Ukrainians most often cross the border for economic and work-related purposes, while Poles are more likely to go to Ukraine for non-economic purposes and reasons not related to work. In total, 53.8%

of Polish respondents declared that the purpose of their trip was either tourism or personal reasons (i.e. travelling to see family and friends).

Figure 3. The most frequent objective for crossing the Polish-Ukrainian border [among civilian respondents crossing the border (%)]



Currently, Ukraine is the most important source of foreign economic migration to Poland. The scale of the phenomenon is so massive that, according to *International Migration Outlook 2018* (OECD)²⁹, Poland has turned into a global leader in terms of the inflow of a short-term foreign workforce. The official data (which, of course, do not include the informal „grey economy”) show an extraordinary surge in such mobility flows in recent years. According to the data based on employers’ declarations, over 90% of all workers from third countries legally employed in Poland in 2011–2018 were Ukrainians (with a record figure of 98% reached in 2015). Considering the number of work permits issued in Poland in the last decade, the share of Ukrainian citizens rose from 46% in 2011 to over 80% in 2016–2017³⁰. The political situation in Ukraine, the outbreak of war and the economic slump of 2014–2015, coupled with the liberal system enabling the employment of foreign nationals

²⁹ OECD, *International Migration Outlook 2018*, OECD Publishing, Paris 2018.

³⁰ A. Barwińska-Małajowicz, *Imigracja obywateli Ukrainy do Polski – przyczyny oraz aspekty popytowe i strukturalne*, *Handel Wewnętrzny*, nr 6/2018, p. 43.

in Poland, differences in wages/salaries and the proximity of both countries in terms of geography (low travel costs) and culture (similar languages and cultures), boosted the expansion of specific migration networks. According to M. Jaroszewicz, this migration wave of Ukrainians to Poland is sometimes described in the literature as “local mobility,” which refers to frequent and short trips to Poland to earn money. This enables border crossers to earn money for their work and, at the same time, reduce the living expenses in Poland and concentrate their life activities on the Ukrainian side (in the past, migration always involved a change of the centre of personal interests; the characteristics of modern-day mobility are different)³¹. This high number of border crossings is possible thanks to the Local Border Traffic Agreement, which permits the inhabitants of border zones to move between both countries frequently and quickly (up to 30 km from the border). This is why Ukrainian respondents commonly declared that they cross the western border of their country very frequently.

Border traffic surveys conducted under the supervision of the Rzeszów Statistical Office³² have shown that shopping is the main purpose for Ukrainian citizens travelling to Poland (approx. 80%). However, shopping is part of the whole system of cross-border trade, where individuals do their shopping in the neighbouring country and transport the goods across the border without having to undergo customs clearance (within the limits set by law). They use those purchases for their consumption, but also petty trade, including informal sector activities. According to the data collected by the Rzeszów Statistical Office, over 70% of foreign nationals (most of them Ukrainians: approx. 97%) cross the Polish-Ukrainian border at least several times a week, while 66% of these people live within a radius of 50 km of the border (51%: up to 30 km). The question is how many of them shop for their own needs, and how many do so for „private gainful purposes.”

Going back to our empirical research, it is worth mentioning that earning money or work-related purposes were declared almost twice as often by men than by women (on both sides of the border). More than half of the Polish women (50.8%) declared tourism as the most common reason for going to Ukraine, while the same answer was chosen by only one in ten Ukrainian women (11.5%). Travel for private gainful employment was a response chosen by Ukrainian respondents most frequently, regardless of their level

³¹ M. Jaroszewicz, *Migracje z Ukrainy do Polski. Stabilizacja trendu*, OSW, Warszawa 2018.

³² *Ruch graniczny oraz wydatki cudzoziemców w Polsce i Polaków za granicą w 2018 r.*, GUS / US w Rzeszowie, Warszawa/Rzeszów 2019.

of education: it was declared by one in every two respondents with secondary education (54.5%), one in three among those with basic vocational education (35.7%) and more than one in four among people with tertiary education (28.6%). In the case of Polish respondents, the proportion of responses indicating money-earning purposes decreases with increasing level of education (basic vocational: 25.9%, secondary: 14.5%, tertiary: 10%), while tourism-related motivations increase (18.5%, 38.2% and 50% respectively).

The purpose of travel is also determined by respondents' economic status ($p=0.000$). Among the surveyed Poles, tourism is declared as the most common purpose by those employed in the public sector (60.8%, $n=51$) as well as students (38.5%, $n=26$). Gainful employment is indicated mainly by those who identify themselves as unemployed (66.7%, six out of $n=9$) and public sector employees (15.7%, eight out of $n=51$). Among the surveyed Ukrainians, earning money is the most frequent answer for three occupational groups: public sector employees ($n=11$), unemployed ($n=61$), and old age/health pensioners ($n=20$). In each of these groups, the percentage is close to 50% (respectively: 45.5%, 50% and 52.6%). While the survey sample is not representative of Poles or Ukrainians crossing the border, the mere presence of so many unemployed Ukrainians (40% of all individuals on the Ukrainian side who completed the questionnaire versus only 6% of the unemployed among Polish respondents) offers another reason to claim that economic and work-related motivations for border crossing visibly prevail among Ukrainian citizens. Interestingly, as the respondents' age increases, the percentage of those travelling for tourism decreases, while the share of those travelling for private gainful employment goes up ($p = 0.001$). This pattern is clearly visible on both sides of the border.

Meanwhile, although members of border services spend many hours at the border between Poland and Ukraine, they cross it relatively rarely. Only 5% of the Polish border officers indicated doing so fairly regularly, i.e. once a month. The vast majority (86.5%) declared they do it "once a year." Nearly half of those respondents cross the border for reasons related to official duties in border services (48.9%) while tourism was indicated by 40% of the respondents in this group. The Ukrainian border officers interviewed in the survey are slightly more likely to cross the border, with one in two crossing the border several times a year (57.4%), and almost one in five doing so at least once a month (19.2%). It is important to note, however, that less than 16% of them mention official duties as the reason for going to the other side of the border while the vast majority (65.9%) declare trips for tourist

purposes. Differences between the responses of Polish and Ukrainian border officers may be connected with the higher proportion of managerial staff in the Polish subsample: managers cross the border (although not very often) as part of their official duties.

Table 3. Frequency of crossing the border [among members of border services (%)]

	Polish border officers (n=51)	Ukrainian border officers (n=48)
Every day	0	4.3
A few times per week	0	2.1
A few times per month	0	6.4
Once per month	5.4	6.4
A few times per year	8.1	57.4
Once per year	86.5	23.4

Before moving on to further analyses, it is a good idea to reiterate the most important findings so far: four out of five Ukrainian „civilian” respondents cross the border relatively frequently (at least once a month), with one in three do so almost every day. The majority of them declare work or earning money as the principal reason for travelling across the border. Most people in the Polish subsample cross the border less frequently than their eastern neighbours: one in two respondents goes to Ukraine once a year, and one in four does so several times a year (the remaining 1/4 of the respondents cross the border once a month or more frequently). Only one in three respondents cross the border for economic and work-related reasons, while the majority declared that they undertake trips to Ukraine for family reasons or for socialising.


3.2. Main Problems at the Polish-Ukrainian Border as Perceived by Respondents

Cross-border cooperation shapes the environment for good neighbourly relations. It also provides a way to overcome various negative aspects of the peripheral location of border areas (since this is how the eastern parts of the Lublin region and the western territories of the Volyn Oblast can be

perceived) and an opportunity for growth resulting from the proximity of the neighbouring areas. Therefore, the operation of a BCP – including accessibility, handling of border traffic, sanitation facilities and infrastructure – is crucial to the success of regional cross-border cooperation.

The respondents were asked about the main problems occurring at the border between Poland and Ukraine, including issues such as cross-border traffic, the time needed to cross the border, the infrastructure at the BCP, crime and the handling of border traffic. The responses were intended to serve as an input to prioritise the crucial issues at the Polish-Ukrainian border.

Figure 4. The main issues affecting the Polish-Ukrainian border
[the possibility of marking 2 answers / results do not add up to 100 (%)]



The distribution of answers to this question should be considered in the breakdown into the four groups of respondents, as described above: Polish and Ukrainian citizens who cross the border, and Polish and Ukrainian border officers. The purpose of this is to identify the similarities of hierarchies emerging for the four groups, despite the inevitable differences (*Figure 4*).

In all four groups, the option „excessively long waiting time to cross the border” was by far the most frequent response: chosen by 85% of the Ukrainians and 90% of Poles travelling across the border, and by 64–65% of the members of border personnel. This was certainly the most critical problem identified by individuals travelling between Poland and Ukraine, while none of the remaining options received more than 23% of responses (respondents were able to select two answers in this question). Another issue they identified as a problem at the border, namely „excessive border traffic,” is strongly linked to the first one, and indicates a problem with accessibility at the BCPs. The third most pressing issue mentioned by the respondents was the „unavailability of adequate sanitary facilities” for civilian border crossers and „unavailability of sufficient infrastructure” for border personnel, both of which can be seen as two facets of the same problem. Let us consider these issues one by one.


Table 3. Estimated average time of crossing the border (needed by a person to cross the border) - arithmetic mean for 4 groups of respondents (in minutes)

	From Poland to Ukraine	From Ukraine to Poland
Poles crossing the border	320.04	337.32
Ukrainians crossing the border	77.02	142.02
Polish border officers	503.47	462.76
Ukrainian border officers	173.36	121.17

When assessing the operation and accessibility of BCPs, the main indicators include the waiting time for border checks/clearance and the time taken to perform checks/clearances (i.e. how much time a traveller needs to enter the neighbouring country). In the survey discussed in this publication, the respondents were asked to estimate the average crossing time (in minutes) needed for a person to cross the border between Poland and Ukraine (in both directions). The responses suggest that it takes less time to leave one’s own country than to return to it (*Table 3, Figure 5 and Figure 6*). According to the declarations made by Polish respondents, going to Ukraine takes, on average, about half an hour less than crossing the border in the other direction

(according to Polish border guards, the waiting time is over one hour shorter). The same conclusions can be reached by analysing the estimations provided by the Ukrainian respondents: according to them, there is, on average, an estimated difference of about 40 minutes between the time needed to leave Ukraine and the time needed to return there from Poland (in favour of the out-of-Ukraine direction).


Figure 5. Estimated average time of crossing the border (needed by a person to cross the border) – categories in hours [From Poland to Ukraine] (%)



Estimates provided by respondents lead to two other important conclusions. The first one is that the estimates provided by border personnel are much more optimistic than those provided by civilian border crossers. While the employees of border services assume that it takes about two hours on average to cross the border (both ways, with differences in a few minutes at the group average), the average estimate provided by civilian respondents is almost seven hours. These differences in estimates are striking, and – interestingly – they are highly pronounced in both the Polish and Ukrainian subsample. However, there is one essential difference, which is also the second important finding, namely that Poles declare, on average, a much shorter crossing time in both directions in comparison to the surveyed Ukrainians. While the average waiting time reported by the Polish

respondents is four to five hours, the average time for the Ukrainian subsample is six to seven hours.

Figure 6. Estimated average time of crossing the border (needed by a person to cross the border) – categories in hours [From Ukraine to Poland] (%)



To outline these differences in more detail, we can look at the categorisation of estimates and check the shares of particular groups of respondents who declared that the time needed to cross the border (in either direction) is up to two hours on average (“120 minutes” is the mode reaching more than ten percent for the respondents’ assessment of the crossing time in both directions; it is also the median time for crossing the border from Poland to Ukraine; the median in the opposite direction is 180 minutes).

Nearly 93% of Polish border service personnel interviewed in the survey believe that on average it takes up to two hours to cross from Poland to Ukraine. This opinion was also expressed by almost 60% of Polish civilian respondents, 55% of Ukrainian border guards and by only 34% of Ukrainian civilian border crossers who took part in the survey (almost 55% of them think it takes more than four hours). When it comes to crossing the border in the opposite direction (i.e. from Ukraine to Poland), the border service personnel (on both sides of the border) was the only group in which the majority estimated that it takes „up to two hours” to cross the border, and this view was held by 70% of the surveyed Ukrainian and 69% of the Polish guards.

Estimations of the time needed for crossing from Ukraine to Poland provided by civilian respondents were different, with 43% of Poles and 39% of Ukrainians estimating the time as “up to two hours” and a large proportion of them thinking that it takes more than four hours (27% and 38%, respectively).

The purpose of travel is, of course, relevant for the estimated time ($p=0.000$). The longest estimated time is declared by individuals crossing the border „for private gainful purposes” (half of them believe that the crossing time in either direction exceeds four hours, while 28% think it falls within two hours). Individuals declaring themselves tourists give different estimates of time needed for crossing the border: 17% say it takes more than four hours on average while the majority believe it takes at most two hours (this is the opinion of 65% of those crossing from Poland to Ukraine and 54% travelling in the opposite direction). Likewise, there is a connection between the aforementioned estimates and the frequency of border crossing from Poland to Ukraine ($p=0.000$) and from Ukraine to Poland ($p=0.004$), which means that usually, the more often a respondent crossed the border, the longer the time declared for crossing.

Table 4. Rating of accessibility of Polish-Ukrainian border crossings (%)


	People crossing the border – total (n=300)	Poles crossing the border (n=148)	Ukrainians crossing the border (n=152)	Polish border officers (n=51)	Ukrainian border officers (n=48)
There are too many of them	3.6	3.4	3.9	3.9	4.2
There are enough of them	52.1	58.8	47.4	47.1	43.8
There are decidedly too few of them	42.6	37.8	48.7	49.0	52.1

Despite the reported dissatisfaction with the time needed to cross the border and the declarations that border traffic is a significant problem at the border, more than half (52.1%) of those crossing the external border of the EU between Poland and Ukraine believe that the number of BCPs is sufficient and 42.6% think there are far too few BCPs. Only a handful of respondents complain that there are too many BCPs (3.6%). The distribution of answers depends largely on the perspective. The number of BCPs is assessed more

positively by Poles: almost 59% of them accept the current situation versus 47.4% of the Ukrainians. The latter were more likely to opt for „there are definitely too few BCPs” (48.7%). The lowest satisfaction with the accessibility of BCPs was reported by respondents who cross the border frequently (at least once a month). The answer „too few BCPs” was chosen by approx. 47% of Poles, with Ukrainians giving a more negative assessment – 54% of them selected this response. Of course, the perception of this issue is also related to the purpose of travel. The highest percentage of critical voices comes from people who cross the border in connection with work, gainful employment or shopping (as we know from previous analysis, most of them need to cross the border more frequently than others). In the Ukrainian subsample, the highest percentage of dissatisfied respondents is found among tourists, but it should be remembered that tourism was relatively rarely declared by the respondents from Ukraine.

Border guards assess the availability of BCPs less favourably than civilian respondents, and the differences between national groups are, again, quite significant. Polish border staff rate the number of BCPs more positively but the most critical answer option, i.e. „there are definitely too few of them” is the one chosen most frequently, even though it is still less than half (49%). In the Ukrainian subsample, there is quite a clear prevalence of opinions criticising the current number of BCPs between Poland and Ukraine (52.1%).

Figure 7. Rating of the infrastructure of Polish-Ukrainian border crossings [among all respondents, n=400] (%)



If we look at the second most severe border issue, i.e. infrastructure at the Polish-Ukrainian border (*Figure 7*), we see that 39.2% of all respondents assess it as good (most respondents chose the moderate option: „quite good”), 27.7% see the infrastructure as bad (again, mainly in a moderate way: „quite poor”), and almost exactly one third (33.2%) expressed a neutral view (“neither good nor poor”). Differences between Poles and Ukrainians or between civilians and members of uniformed services are only slight, reaching a few percentage points. Nationality becomes a differentiating factor only within the subgroup of border personnel and, although to a slightly lesser extent, in the case of civilian border-crossers (opinions among Poles are somewhat more favourable). The group that stands out are the representatives of Poland’s border services, who are most critical about the infrastructure of the BCPs. Compared with the total sample, the percentage of people who assess the infrastructure positively was lower (34.7%) as was the percentage of those who expressed a neutral view (20.4%), while a much larger proportion chose negative answers (44.9%). Among their Ukrainian counterparts, a positive assessment was given by 43.7% of respondents, with 23% giving a negative assessment (*Table 5*).

Table 5. Rating of the infrastructure of Polish-Ukrainian border crossings [among 4 groups of respondents] (%)

	Poles crossing the border (n=148)	Ukrainians crossing the border (n=152)	Polish border officers (n=51)	Ukrainian border officers (n=48)
Very good	2.7	1.3	10.2	8.3
Quite good	39.9	34.6	24.5	35.4
Neither good nor poor	33.8	36.6	20.4	33.3
Quite poor	18.9	19.6	36.7	18.8
Very poor	4.7	7.8	8.2	4.2

Interestingly, neither the purpose of cross-border travel nor the frequency of travelling to the neighbouring country differentiate the opinions about the border infrastructure. It can be said that the infrastructure is assessed slightly better by women than men, and more critically by people living in urban areas versus those coming from the countryside, but these differences only reach a few percentage points.

Summarizing the answers to the first question cited in this chapter, i.e. the question about the main problems at the border, the issue of border service personnel was among the least frequently selected responses. This does not mean, however, that the assessment of border guards' activities and competencies does not deserve any attention. The operation of a border crossing point largely depends on the efficient and effective work of border services. This, in turn, depends on the decision-making and executive processes, personnel management, the available technologies, modern and efficient equipment but also, to a considerable extent, on the human factor, i.e. the competencies of border officers. These issues will be addressed in the next section of this book.

3.3. Evaluation of Border Services in Terms of their Operation and Competencies

Professionalism is the main requirement expected of border service personnel. They have to perform their duties competently to ensure high quality of work. The survey carried out among people crossing the Polish-Ukrainian border enabled us to check how the border protection services are assessed on both sides, what kind of characteristics of members of uniformed features are noticed and appreciated by civilians, and what kind of competencies are thought to be lacking.


Table 6. Rating of the work of border services [among civilian respondents crossing the border (%)]

	Polish Border Guard	Polish customs services	Ukrainian Border Guard	Ukrainian customs services
Very good	18.9	13.9	15.7	11.6
Quite good	42.2	40.5	37.5	36.3
Neither good nor poor	23.6	28.0	25.9	29.8
Quite poor	8.8	11.5	15.4	14.4
Very poor	6.4	6.1	5.5	7.9

If we look at the ratings of border services provided by individuals crossing the border (*Table 6*), the Polish Border Guard was rated highest – 61%

of positive ratings (total of “fairly good” and „very good”), versus 15% of negative ratings, (total of “fairly bad” and „very bad”). It was followed by the Polish Customs Service (54% and 18% respectively), the Ukrainian Border Guard (53% and 21% respectively) and the Ukrainian Customs Service (48% and 22% respectively). However, these ratings were quite strongly influenced by the country of origin: the respondents tended to be more lenient when assessing the work of their countrymen at the border, as shown in *Figure 8*. While the difference in the ratings given by the Ukrainian respondents to Ukrainian and Polish border services amounts to a few percentage points in favour of the former, Poles rate the Ukrainian Border Guard much more negatively (a difference of over 20 percentage points between the positive ratings for both services: 67% versus 44%). A similar pattern can be observed between the ratings given to the customs services of both countries.

Figure 8. Rating the work of particular border services [among Poles and Ukrainian crossing the border] (%)



The questions about border personnel who expect to receive an offer of illicit payments or gifts from those crossing the border provide interesting data (*Table 7*). Polish respondents said that kickbacks or gifts were only occasionally expected by members of the Polish border services, but one-third said they had encountered an expectation to hand in money or in-kind benefits from the employees of Ukrainian border services. The impressions of the Polish subsample are confirmed by the surveyed Ukrainian border crossers: one in ten had faced such a situation in an encounter with Polish border services

while one in five faced such an expectation in contact with the Ukrainian Border Guard, and one in four experienced it when interacting with the Ukrainian Customs Service.

Table 7. *Have you met with an expectation of offering pecuniary or other benefits from border service employees? [among Poles and Ukrainians crossing the border] (%)*

		Polish Border Guard	Polish customs services	Ukrainian Border Guard	Ukrainian customs services
Poles	Yes	5.0	5.1	32.4	33.3
	No	95.0	94.9	67.6	66.7
Ukrainians	Yes	11.3	10.7	22.0	24.5
	No	88.7	89.3	78.0	75.5


When a similar question was asked to the surveyed border guard officers (Table 8), Poles indicated that they had not received any such corruptive offers from Polish border crossers. Yet, 30% of Polish border guards said they had encountered such a situation in contact with Ukrainian citizens, and 7% – with citizens of other countries. The answers obtained from the surveyed members of the Ukrainian border services indicate that they had not encountered any offers of financial or in-kind benefits when performing checks/clearance procedures at the border. However, in the context of the other findings, the credibility of these responses gives rise to considerable doubts.

Table 8. *Have you met with an expectation of offering pecuniary or other benefits from border crossers? [among Polish and Ukrainian border services] (%)*

		From Poles	From Ukrainians	From citizens of other countries
Polish b. s.	Yes	0	29.2	6.8
	No	100	70.8	93.2
Ukrainian b. s.	Yes	0	0	0
	No	100	100	100


The respondents were asked to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the uniformed services (*Figure 9 and Figure 10*). Interestingly, there is quite a lot of consensus when it comes to identifying the weakest points. The weakness that was mentioned most often was „lack of good personal manners (including lack of empathy, lack of understanding, discrimination),” identified by 33–42% of respondents (members of Polish uniformed services are an exception: they chose this option less frequently, at the level of 20%). The second most-often identified weakness was „[poor] command of foreign languages” identified by 26–38% of respondents. Insufficient legal and psychological knowledge was also chosen by considerable percentages of the respondents.

Figure 9. The most important strengths of border service employees in the opinion of 4 groups of respondents [possibility to mark 2 answers / results do not add up to 100 (%)]



On the other hand, the set of strengths seems to be more diversified, with answers depending on their respondent group, i.e. the perspective. While the identified strengths vary across the subgroups, they nevertheless create a fairly consistent picture. In the opinion of Polish border crossers, the greatest strengths of border personnel include „decisiveness in action” and „resistance to stress” while the Ukrainian respondents mentioned „psychological knowledge,” „legal knowledge” and „resistance to stress.” Polish border officers point out mainly to “legal knowledge,” „decisiveness in action” and „effective operation” while members of the Ukrainian border personnel most often identified „decisiveness in action” and „resistance to stress.”

Figure 10. The most important weaknesses of border service employees in the opinion of 4 groups of respondents [possibility to mark 2 answers / results do not add up to 100 (%)]



The assessment of the functioning of border services should be considered quite good, especially when compared to other assessed aspects of the border and the places where it can be crossed. The research shows, however, the image of the crossing as an underinvested, slightly overcrowded place, which is especially noticed by those who often cross the border, waiting in long lines, going through time-consuming check-ins over and over. Time seems to be the key assessment criterion for people crossing the border, while border service workers see the main problem as being the low-quality crossing infrastructure.

CHAPTER IV: THE SPECIFIC NATURE OF CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION BETWEEN POLAND AND UKRAINE

Cross-border cooperation on the Polish-Ukrainian border is of strategic importance today for both Poland and the entire European Union. The regions of both countries that border each other also constitute part of the external eastern border of the UE. On the one hand, this sets additional barriers to cross-border movement and deepens the asymmetry of economic and political systems. On the other, however, this provides both sides an opportunity to obtain resources, utilise their potential, and accelerate development based on, among others, inter-regional cooperation. Support for cross-border regions in European states today is not just an essential feature of national policies. It is one of the most important challenges for the entire European development policy which aims to make border regions less peripheral.

The specific nature of the Polish-Ukrainian border areas has been detailed in chapter two of this book. These areas have a peripheral character, both in Poland and Ukraine. They are characterised by poor accessibility in terms of communications, a relatively high unemployment rate, low GDP per capita, underdeveloped transport infrastructure, gradual outflow of inhabitants and ageing populations on both sides of the border. Even though various provisions and agreements on cross-border cooperation between Poland and Ukraine have been in force for many years, yet, so far, these efforts generally failed to overcome the peripheral character of these border regions. The areas on both sides of the border are among the least developed regions in their countries, located far from the places where the most intense international links emerge.

In addition, a characteristic feature of these areas is the large gap between the Polish and Ukrainian side. This gives rise to specific economic, social, and political consequences mentioned in the third chapter of this publication, which particularly includes:

- economic migration of the workforce from Ukraine to Poland,
- intensified cross-border traffic resulting in fragmented trade links within an informal economy,

- trade in border regions concentrated on markets and bazaars, resulting in more intense traffic and decreasing the capacity of border crossings.

This situation additionally affects the strengthening of the border regime on the external UE border. It also highlights the differences in legal and institutional systems, possibly leading to specific social tensions, including those based on prejudices and stereotypes.

Cross-border cooperation, on the other hand, allows reducing the tension, decreasing the distance, and helps both sides understand each other. Joint cross-border initiatives play a key role here in building good neighbourly relations. At the same time, these initiatives are a platform for diffusing economic innovations, cultural flows, and mutual inspirations. Such cooperation between societies across borders is one of the spatial drivers of regional development, making possible the mobility of people, goods, and capital³³.

The geopolitical situation, economic differences, and a large amount of EU funds for cross-border initiatives have resulted in a decisive increase in the activities of societies on both sides of the border. Until 2019, border traffic has been steadily rising, and there has been a noticeable increase in the number of economic contacts and trade exchange. There remain, however, some questions. What does cross-border cooperation look like from the viewpoint of the inhabitants of both countries? How easily can these changes be noticed by those who cross the border? How important for them is cross-border cooperation between neighbouring states and regions? Who should initiate and manage the cooperation? What barriers and opportunities do they perceive? In short: what is the current and expected status of cross-border cooperation between Poland and Ukraine? The fourth chapter will answer these questions, describing the specific nature of Polish-Ukrainian cross-border cooperation in the eyes of the interviewed Poles and Ukrainians, both individuals crossing the border and border guard officers working at border crossings.

4.1 Evaluation of Cross-Border Cooperation: Current Status

The inter-regional relationships that are essential to cross-border cooperation are formed on many dimensions, among them political and institutional, economic, cultural, and social. The political and institutional dimension

³³ See H. I. Melehanych, *The Strategic Role Of the Local Communities in the Development of Cross Border Cooperation Between Ukraine and the EU (on the example of the Transcarpathian Region)*, Pogranicze. Polish Borderlands Studies, vol. 8, no. 1/2020, p. 7-20.

is noticeable on both the central (state) level and regionally, where it is managed by local governments or specific public institutions whose operations affect the affairs of border areas or Polish-Ukrainian relations. These relations also create solutions to joint challenges concerning the environment, migration, public health, or security. This is also a sphere that ordinary residents and individuals crossing the border are less aware of.


The economic dimension mentioned above primarily means direct trade exchange, economic cooperation between enterprises, development of transport, and the mobility of goods, capital, and people as a workforce. It is also a dimension on which the incentives in the form of various political initiatives, investments, infrastructure modernisations or cash transfers are supposed to contribute to the economic development of border areas.

The cultural dimension is strongly tied to tourism and the promotion of local culture and its historic heritage. Public institutions, educational facilities, non-governmental organizations, or private entities that enter into cooperation tend to strengthen cultural ties, improve the image of regions, and increase their attractiveness, also by activating local communities.

The social dimension is directly related to the cultural one. Existing or emerging social relations in border areas are often the result of historic events, the drawing of borders, and family migrations. Local communities on both sides of the border, although separate from each other, often produce some sort of common experience, recognising their linguistic or cultural closeness. On the other hand, it sometimes happens that historical experiences generate various tensions or give rise to prejudices, disputes, and conflicts. Often, however, social relations are based on bonds among families, friends, or lovers.

Cross-border cooperation is present in all these dimensions, although it manifests itself at these places to varying degrees, due, among others, to the specific nature of the relations between various nationalities. In order for cross-border cooperation to be effective, it is necessary to properly identify: what types of contacts dominate between Poles and Ukrainians, at what levels do neighbours meet most often, and finally, in which areas cross-border cooperation develops best and in which areas is the least progress made.

Figure 11. Predominant contacts between the inhabitants of Poland and Ukraine in the opinion of respondents crossing the border (n=299) (%)




A decisive majority of border-crossers (78.3%) note (*Figure 11*) that Polish-Ukrainian relations are dominated by trade contacts, such as shopping, seeking services, etc. An important role is also played by contacts with family and friends (27.8%) which, together with social contacts (9.4%), form a similar category of non-political and non-economic contacts. One in four respondents (26.8%) also mentioned economic and professional contacts (for example between enterprises) and more than one in five (22.1%) indicated tourist contacts.

Table 9. Predominant contacts between the inhabitants of Poland and Ukraine in the opinion of 4 groups of respondents [possibility to mark 2 answers / results do not add up to 100 (%)]

	Poles crossing the border (n=149)	Ukrainians crossing the border (n=150)	Polish border officers (n=51)	Ukrainian border officers (n=45)
Contacts with friends and family	20.8	34.7	11.8	28.9
Trade contacts such as shopping, services, etc.	81.9	74.7	82.4	44.4
Economic and professional contacts, e.g. between enterprises	28.2	25.3	39.2	51.1
Social contacts	9.4	9.3	9.8	13.3
Tourist contacts	27.5	16.7	19.6	28.9
Other	3.4	1.3	2.0	0.0

Polish respondents are more disposed to believe that Polish-Ukrainian relations are based on trade (81.9%) and economic (28.2%) contacts, while for Ukrainians, these figures are 74.7% and 25.3%, respectively. The essential difference between the two nations, however, appears in the order in which subsequent categories of relations were named (*Table 9*). For a large majority of Ukrainians crossing the border, the dominant type of contacts between Poles and Ukrainians are contacts with friends and family (34.7%, plus social contacts indicated by 9.3%), while tourism was indicated by merely 16.7% of them (among Poles, the figures are respectively 20.8% for friends and family, 9.4% for social contacts and 27.5% for tourism). The difference in evaluating the importance of tourism was already visible in the purposes for crossing the border; the higher importance of friends and family contact for the Ukrainian section of the sample may also be the result of the migratory situation and the dominating direction of mobility (from Ukraine to Poland).

Figure 12. Areas where cross-border cooperation works best and worst in the opinion of crossing the border (n=300/296) [possibility to mark 2 answers / results do not add up to 100 (%)]




Respondents assessed (*Figure 12*) that cross-border cooperation between both countries works best in areas such as transport (48% of respondents), education and higher education (25%), tourism, including nature and landscape protection (21.3%) and economic cooperation (20.3%). Other areas with a relatively high percentage of indications were youth exchanges and integration meetings (19.3%), as well as culture, sport, and recreation (18%). A low percentage of indications can be observed for areas in which cooperation is undertaken on the level of central and regional authorities (such as administrative cooperation, security, or promotion and development planning). On the one hand, this is probably because the inhabitants are less aware of the initiatives undertaken and meetings taking place on the political level. On the other hand, this also provides important information for decision-makers that their actions (if any) are not really noticed by citizens on both sides of the border.

When the respondents are asked about the areas in which cooperation is making the least progress, their answers are very diverse (*Figure 12*). The area with the highest percentage of indications of poor progress is security (e.g. preventing risks, illegal migration, smuggling, etc.), noted by 35.5% of the individuals crossing the border. The second place, with 24.7%, was taken by tourism.

Two other areas that were also identified (transport and youth exchange) were chosen by nearly 20% of the respondents; other areas were indicated by 11-16% of respondents each, so they are not as important in the hierarchy.


Figure 13. In what areas do you believe cross-border cooperation is doing best? Among 4 groups of respondents [possibility to mark 2 answers / results do not add up to 100 (%)]



The country of origin has no particular bearing on the distribution of answers, except for minor shifts (*Figure 13*). For interviewed Poles, the most developed cross-border cooperation area was certainly transport (55%) and, with only half as many indications, youth exchange (24.5%). The results for the remaining categories do not exceed 20%. For Ukrainians, transport comes


first as well (40.9%), but a large number of respondents also pointed to education and tertiary education (31.5%), economic cooperation (26.8%) and tourism (24.2%). Asked about areas of Polish-Ukrainian cooperation that develop poorly (*Figure 14*), slightly more Ukrainians indicated tourism, nature and landscape protection (37.9%) rather than security (34.5%). The third place was taken by youth exchange (26.9%). Among Poles, security (36.4%) followed by transport and economic cooperation were named as areas in which the effects of cross-border cooperation are still weak.

Figure 14. In what areas do you believe cross-border cooperation is doing worst? Among 4 groups of respondents [possibility to mark 2 answers / results do not add up to 100 (%)]



Generally, however, respondents of either nationality display a predominant feeling that the effects of cross-border cooperation in Poland and Ukraine are quite noticeable (*Figure 15*). An affirmative answer was given by 66.1% of border crossers who filled out the survey (65.3% of Poles and 66.9% of Ukrainians), with one in six responding „definitely yes.” Such a percentage also means that one-third of the respondents think otherwise and do not perceive any particular effects of this cooperation (while only a few, about 5.6%, answered „definitely not”). Interestingly, men slightly predominate among the sceptics (58.5% compared to 41.5% of women), as do urban dwellers (58% compared to 42% of rural dwellers). Other social and demographic variables and issues such as the purpose of crossing the border do not affect the distribution of the results.


Figure 15. Do you believe that the effects of cross-border cooperation are noticeable? Among 4 groups of respondents (%)



Hence the question: is cross-border cooperation between Poland and Ukraine necessary at all? Another question: is such cooperation necessary between regions located near the Polish-Ukrainian border? The respondents are almost unanimous (*Figure 16* and *Figure 17*): both these questions are answered affirmatively by 94% of them (90% and 92% of Poles and 98% and 96% of Ukrainians). Less certainty in this affirmation can be seen in the Polish section of the sample, where the answer „definitely yes” was selected by 43% of respondents for the first question and 38% for the second. Among

Ukrainian respondents, certainty as to the need to pursue cross-border cooperation was decidedly higher, with 74.5% and 71.2%, respectively, giving definitely affirmative answers.


Figure 16. *Do you believe that cross-border cooperation between Poland and Ukraine is necessary? Among 4 groups of respondents (%)*



Comparing these results to answers obtained from border guard officers, it should be stated that the guards, just like people who travel across the border, are convinced that cross-border cooperation is necessary on both the state and regional levels (*Figure 16* and *Figure 17*). In total, 96% of border service officers in the survey gave an affirmative answer to the first question and 97% to the second. In both cases, almost 70% marked „definitely yes.” Analysing these results by country of origin, differences among border officers can be noticed which are similar to the differences found in the group of “civilian” respondents. Polish officers marked the moderate affirmative answer (“probably yes”) slightly more often than their Ukrainian counterparts, while they selected „definitely yes” slightly less often. The chart provides a good illustration of differences between the main subgroups in the sample, showing from left to right the least convinced Polish “civilians,” through Polish border officers, Ukrainian „civilians,” and the most cooperation-favouring Ukrainian officers. Of course, support for cross-border

cooperation is very high in all these groups, and the highlighted differences only serve to better nuance the presented data.

Figure 17. Do you believe that cross-border cooperation between regions located near the Polish-Ukrainian border is necessary? Among 4 groups of respondents (%)



Looking at the frequency distribution of responses to the question „Do you believe that the effects of cross-border cooperation are noticeable?” (Figure 15), broken down by the four respondent groups, one can note an interesting relationship. Differences between nationalities are more pronounced among border service personnel, and less noticeable among „civilians.” For example, while a strong majority (three fourths) of the respondents from Polish services confirmed that the effects are noticeable, they rarely (just 7.8% of them) marked the „definitely yes” response. Their Ukrainian counterparts (for whom the percentage of affirmative answers also exceeds 75%) marked the strongly positive answer much more often (in about 33.3% of cases). Once again, Ukrainian respondents demonstrate more certainty and firmness of opinion than Poles.

While discussing the results of research among border guard officers, it can be noticed that the „principle of intensification” mentioned above applies to many issues. The differences that exist between Poles and Ukrainians

crossing the border are even more pronounced in the group of border officers, who are usually even more diversified by their nationality.

Border guard officers (n=99) indicate that the predominant types of contacts between the inhabitants of the two countries primarily concern trade (64.6%) and economic relations (44.8%). Only one in four (24%) chose tourist contacts. Distinguishing border officers according to their country of origin shows key differences between Polish and Ukrainian officers (*Table 9*). It can clearly be seen that the Polish section of the sample indicated trade (82.4%) and economic contacts (39.2%) as the dominant categories. The other categories scored below 20%. Tourist contacts took third place (19.6%), and friend and family contacts (11.8%) or social contacts (9.8%) were not considered especially essential or dominant. The distribution of answers is slightly different among Ukrainian officers, whose choices are more evenly distributed. Unlike other groups of respondents, trade contacts are indicated by slightly less than half of them (44.4%). The score is higher for economic contacts (51.1%), and contacts with friends and family (28.9%) as well as tourist contacts (28.9%) were also chosen more often than in other groups.

The responses of border officers concerning the question about the best and least developing areas of cross-border cooperation between Poland and Ukraine (*Figure 13* and *Figure 14*) offer an excellent addition to the image of cooperation between the two countries. Among Polish officers, education and tertiary education (44%), transport (34%), and culture, sport, and recreation (24%) are identified as the areas in which cooperation develops best. The Ukrainian officers more often indicated tourism, nature and landscape protection (38.3%), education and tertiary education (34%) and youth exchange and integration meetings (29.8%). Transport, education, and tourism (43%, 29%, 23%) are the answers selected most often among all respondents (n=397). These are the areas in which, according to respondents, cooperation is making the most progress. Interestingly, two of these answers also appear among the three areas most often selected as those making the least progress in cooperation. These are primarily security (40%), but also transport and tourism (22% and 21%).


It should be noted that security was indicated most often especially by border officers, half of whom (both on the Polish and Ukrainian side) responded that cross-border cooperation was not doing well in that respect. For Polish officers, other weak areas are cooperation with the administration (25.5%), the promotion of regions abroad and development planning. Ukrainians pointed mainly to transport (35.4%) and to promotion abroad (22.9%).

4.2 Imagined Cross-Border Cooperation: What Should it Be Like?

Social awareness is not merely the total of thoughts and feelings of individuals. It is rather something that binds people together, producing a common frame of reference and building traits peculiar to or dominating in the attitudes of surveyed communities. Humans cannot live among things without forming ideas about them and using these ideas to drive their behaviour. Therefore, awareness is not so much or not only the result of knowledge or lack of knowledge about specific circumstances (i.e. what something is like), but mainly of the image of those circumstances in the mind (i.e. what something seems to be like), usually with valuing and emotional judgements (due to the contrast concerning what something should be like). Thus, when asking questions about what cross-border cooperation should be like, by whom it should be pursued and what actions could support it, we are inquiring mainly about the image of such cooperation, a certain „template” that exists in the minds of respondents. This, in turn, will depend on individual knowledge, the accepted framework for understanding the world, and also people’s personal interests.

In the opinion of the survey respondents, cross-border cooperation should be pursued mostly by municipal or regional authorities (*Figure 18*). This statement was indicated by 68% of “civilian” respondents and 75.5% of border service officers on the Polish side and, respectively, 51% of civilians and 64.6% of officers on the Ukrainian side. Only in the last group (Ukrainian border officers) this answer was not the most frequently chosen one, with 2 percentage points more respondents who pointed to central government institutions as the entities which, in their opinion, should be responsible for pursuing cross-border cooperation. Government institutions were also often indicated in other groups, coming second among the most popular answers (Polish civilians – 37.4%, Polish border officers – 40.8%, and Ukrainian civilians – 38.9%). However, the alternative that came third among the most frequently indicated answers depends on nationality. Among Poles, between 20% (individuals crossing the border) and 29% (border service personnel) of respondents believe that cooperation between the countries should also be pursued by non-governmental organizations. Ukrainians, perhaps due to the low development level of the so-called third sector, tend to rely directly on the inhabitants of a city or region (as indicated by 31% of “civilians” and 23% of border officers).

**Figure 18. Who do you think should develop cross-border cooperation?
Among 4 groups of respondents [possibility to mark 2 answers
/ results do not add up to 100 (%)]**



The kind of cross-border cooperation is largely determined by the entities that pursue and develop it. Therefore, respondents were asked which kind of cooperation (transnational, international or local and/or regional) is the most effective, i.e. which of these has the most favourable impact on the development of relations between communities on both sides of the border (Table 10). Border officers, regardless of nationality, decidedly indicate (Poles 70.6%, Ukrainians 53.3%) that cooperation is most effective when pursued through local and regional agreements (for example between cities, provinces/oblasts). This is also the answer indicated most often among Polish individuals crossing the border, but on the level of 43.2% of the sample. The answers of Polish individuals and border officers (16.4% and 9.8% respectively) show that cooperation based on transnational agreements (for example within the UE) is of least importance. However, it is valued by Ukrainian guards (24.4%) on par with, or perhaps more, than cooperation based on international

agreements (22.2%). The preferences of Ukrainian border crossers are entirely different, however. Transnational agreements were the most often indicated answer (37.4%), followed by international agreements (34%), while local and regional agreements came only third with a result of 28.6%. This does not fully align with their earlier answers to the question about who should pursue cross-border cooperation (one half of them indicated city and regional authorities).


Table 10. The most effective form of cross-border cooperation in the opinion of 4 groups of respondents (%)

	Poles crossing the border (n=146)	Ukrainians crossing the border (n=147)	Polish border officers (n=51)	Ukrainian border officers (n=45)
Based on transnational agreements (i.e. within the EU)	16.4	37.4	9.8	24.4
Based on international agreements	40.4	34.0	19.6	22.2
Based on local and regional agreements (e.g. between cities, provinces/oblasts)	43.2	28.6	70.6	53.3

Only a small percent of respondents believe that cross-border cooperation should develop spontaneously, without top-down coordination, while a clear majority believe that a plan or at least some rules to initiate and pursue such cooperation should be established to provide a framework for various emerging initiatives (*Figure 19*). Thus, over half (53%) of Polish respondents (regardless of whether they are border officers or not) believe that a previously accepted cross-border cooperation strategy should be followed. Another two alternatives: „only in areas where interest in cooperation is shown,” and „on par with cooperation with other states or regions,” ended up with slightly more than 20% of the answers among Polish respondents. For Ukrainians, strategy-based activities are the answer indicated most often (40%), but only among border officers. Although Ukrainian individuals selected this response equally often (39.9%), in their group, even more people, precisely 45.3%, chose the „on par with cooperation with other states or regions” answer. The differences between the groups are illustrated clearly in the chart. Based


on the provided answers on cooperation, Ukrainian „civilians” once again appear to be the most heterogeneous group in the sample.

Figure 19. *On what level should cross-border cooperation between Poland and Ukraine be developed? Among 4 groups of respondents (%)*



What supports the development of cross-border cooperation? There are primarily four points: first, the similarity of cultures that allows meeting and understanding the other party, rapidly producing a common foundation; second, the language similarities, because these facilitate communication, allowing for quick adaptation in the foreign language environment and reduce the risk of mistakes in contacts; third, shared economic interests that result in a network of mutual goals and needs, fostering the feeling that both parties benefit from cooperation; and fourth, mutual understanding that can build and strengthen ties, supports dialogue and the need to learn about the other party. All of these were the four answers most often indicated by respondents when asked about factors that support cooperation between Poles and Ukrainians (*Figure 20*) in almost each of the four groups of respondents mentioned above (this time Ukrainian border officers stand out the most). Although the core answers are similar in each group, a more detailed analysis of emerging differences may provide interesting and nuanced knowledge about the way respondents think.


Figure 20. Factors supporting the development of cross-border cooperation in the opinion of 4 groups of respondents [possibility to mark 2 answers / results do not add up to 100 (%)]



The similarity of these cultures was noticed by all groups to a similar degree (above 20%). The similarity of these languages was the answer most often indicated in all groups except Polish individuals, but it was the case among border service officers (Poles – 43%, Ukrainians – 45.5%) that this response was indicated more often (the frequency was several percentage points higher than among civilian respondents (33-37%). Poles declared more frequently that the development of cooperation is supported by shared economic interests (41-47% compared to 26-32% of Ukrainians), while Ukrainians opted for mutual sympathy and understanding between the nations (PL: 18-19%, UKR:

32% among civilians). Ukrainian border officers pointed out yet another essential factor supporting the development of cross-border cooperation which was not of interest for the other groups, namely mutual political interests (this answer was chosen by 32% of Ukrainian officers).

Figure 21. Factors hindering the development of cross-border cooperation in the opinion of 4 groups of respondents [possibility to mark 2 answers / results do not add up to 100 (%)]



In turn, the respondents believe that the main factor hindering the development of cooperation is the historical past that has been creating tensions and mutual grievances persisting until this day (Figure 21). This is indicated primarily by border officers: 80% among Poles and 50% among Ukrainians. Among

individuals crossing the border, this answer was also selected most often, but less frequently than among border officers, including 45.6% of Poles and 34% of Ukrainians. The border officers (especially Ukrainians – 43.2%) also noted the lack of understanding fostering possible effects of cooperation, while Poles (35.4% of civilians and 32% of border officers) indicate legal barriers, including administrative barriers (the figures for the latter are: Polish civilians – 29.9%, Ukrainian civilians – 23.3% and Ukrainian officers – 20.5%). In the group of individuals crossing the border, one in four people on the Ukrainian side and one in five on the Polish side also indicated „insufficient UE and own funds to develop cooperation” as an answer in this question. Analysis of the results also demonstrates a very low proportion of responses related to cultural and language barriers or the differing interests of cities or regions.

Table 11. What forms of facilitation would in your opinion increase the effectiveness of cross-border cooperation? Among 4 groups of respondents [possibility to mark 2 answers / results do not add up to 100 (%)]

	Poles crossing the border (n=146)	Ukrainians crossing the border (n=147)	Polish border officers (n=51)	Ukrainian border officers (n=45)
Simplifying regulations related to crossing the border by inhabitants of border areas	61.5	55.6	29.4	43.8
Increasing the number of border crossing points	29.7	35.9	27.5	39.6
Improving the existing border infrastructure	29.7	32.0	52.9	29.2
Improving communications availability (e.g. regular and more frequent public transport services)	18.9	20.9	13.7	18.8
A precise definition of areas covered by the cooperation	14.9	6.5	21.6	16.7
More state and EU funds for joint cross-border projects	14.2	11.1	27.5	22.9

Therefore, being aware of the existence of specific barriers, the respondents tried to answer the question what forms of facilitation would result in the increased effectiveness of cross-border cooperation (*Table 11*). Generally

speaking, three such forms could be distinguished in the answers most often indicated in all groups of respondents. The first is simplifying the regulations related to crossing the border by inhabitants of border areas. This answer was obviously chosen primarily by individuals crossing the border (61.5% of the Poles and 55.6% of Ukrainians surveyed at the border), but also noted by service officers (PL: 29.4%, UKR: 43.8%). The second is increasing the number of border crossings, as proposed by 30-40% of respondents in each group (which aligns with the percentage of people unsatisfied with the accessibility of BCPs, as described in chapter 3). The third is improving the border crossing infrastructure, which is particularly clear in the opinions of Polish border service personnel (52.9%, as only 35% of Polish border officers rated the infrastructure as good – see chapter 3). But in other groups, also about one-third of respondents are not indifferent to this problem as well.

Representatives of both nations perceive cross-border cooperation between the two countries slightly differently. Poles see it primarily through the prism of economic and trade relations, although they also notice relations in the field of education, and see Ukraine as an attractive tourist destination. Ukrainians also see their western partners mainly as a contractor for trade, transit and economic agreements, but also understand that Poland is a good place for education and a partner in building social and amicable relations, a country that is culturally close and friendly to Ukrainian citizens. At the same time, there is a conviction on both sides that cooperation is not only necessary - both at the governmental and local level, between border regions and individual towns - but that the Polish-Ukrainian relations so far have borne fruit (this was expressed by 2/3 of the respondents, both Polish and Ukrainian). The main barriers to the development of cross-border cooperation between neighbours, apart from economic and legal barriers and border infrastructure assessed differently, are also social barriers, such as particularly negative historical experiences or differences in mentality.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Poland and Ukraine demonstrate considerable activity in bilateral and multi-lateral cooperation. An essential effect of the activities undertaken to strengthen the declared strategic partnership is the cross-border cooperation between the two countries. The Lublin Voivodship and the Volyn Oblast, which both form part of the Bug Euroregion, are the natural participants of this cooperation, which is pursued on various levels and multiple dimensions. Its effects must be seen and appreciated not only on the government level. The key positive effects must be shared by Polish and Ukrainian societies living in border areas and making intensive use of the cross-border exchange.

The research analysis conducted in this monograph allows us to formulate several general conclusions and recommendations. These result from adopted objectives and are closely tied to the issues discussed in the introduction to the methodology of the research.

First, cooperation between Poland and Ukraine must take into account multi-dimensional challenges and geopolitical opportunities. These are both external to the two countries and, in some cases, internal, strictly dependent on mutual or particular capabilities and intents.

It appears that political reality, especially in the area of security, should be interpreted similarly concerning the most essential issues. Strengthening their positions as independent entities and stabilising their sovereignty is an imperative interest for Poland and Ukraine. The starting point and the key issue is to once and for all resolve the historical issues of the past that bear on the present in the form of the „politics of history.” This does not mean that difficult historical moments should be forgotten. Memory and identity, including in international relations, are built on truth and forgiveness. The strategic partnership must not be dependent on momentary or sudden political shifts that are a consequence of unresolved topics in the past.

Second, cross-border cooperation between adjacent regions is a natural development and results from multi-dimensional intents and necessities. Support in this respect is provided by activities of the central and regional authorities of Poland and Ukraine. An undoubted benefit is also the support

granted by transnational institutions, including the EU. An example of these multi-subject activities is the Bug Euroregion. Both analysed regions, i.e. the Lublin Voivodship and the Volyn Oblast, struggle with numerous social and economic problems. Despite this, they engage in dynamic mutual cooperation. Improving the current state of affairs and more intense cooperation is a challenge on both sides of the border.

Third, the survey research undertaken as part of the project mentioned in the book resulted in several interesting observations. The research results discussed in this publication provide an opportunity to evaluate cross-border cooperation between Poland and Ukraine. It should be remembered that the research was more focused on the awareness of cooperation among Poles and Ukrainians than the cooperation itself. No analysis of border traffic, movement of goods, legal conditions of crossing the border, or economic consequences for both economies was conducted. Nor was the number of cross-border initiatives, signed agreements, entities involved and their sectoral membership checked. The research was supposed to help investigate and provide knowledge on how people crossing the Polish-Ukrainian border view cross-border cooperation between the two states, what importance they attach to it, how they rate it and what effects they can see. This means that a positive or negative evaluation of these events does not reflect reality but the perception of those who see and meet with the effects of this cooperation most often, and hence such evaluation may be a good indicator of whether something is working well or not.

It should be noted that respondents appeared to know how important cross-border initiatives are for them. Almost all of them believed that cooperation is necessary for both Poland and Ukraine and the neighbouring areas on both sides of the border. A large number of respondents were aware that the core of the cooperation is located in the border areas and it is the authorities of cities and regions located near the border, local government organisations and the inhabitants of those areas who have the largest impact on how this cooperation will develop. At the same time, the respondents realised that the current and future course of cooperation also depends on the activities of central authorities.

However, political initiatives and cooperation at the central level were rarely mentioned or valued as important. It can be felt that there is a certain deficiency of interest and initiatives by political authorities. This can, of course, be a result of the fact that cross-border relations are mainly of an economic, social and cultural nature, and the main actors are local communities. This might testify to the success of such cooperation, as this is how it should be pursued. There

is also a possibility that political initiatives are not numerous and that, other than being provided with a general legal and administrative framework, local communities and their activities have been left to their own devices.

If the main objective of cross-border cooperation is to be the elimination of restrictions caused by the existence of state borders, achieving this on the Polish-Ukrainian border will not be fully possible as long as the border represents the external frontier of the European Union. Legal circumstances and restrictions related to border crossing mean that the availability of border crossing points (BCPs) and the border traffic itself are of key importance for the development of cross-border cooperation. Therefore, this is not only about security issues, because the impact of the border extends significantly beyond this sphere. It has great social, economic and cultural significance, both at the national and regional levels and on both sides of the border.

Border crossing points are a considerable barrier, particularly for Ukrainians, because of their frequency of crossing the border and an economic objective causing additional frustration related to border check queues, inspections, etc. People who cross the border sporadically, mostly as tourists, or for social and family-related purposes, have a more favourable view of the accessibility of BCPs, their infrastructure, waiting time and quality of service. Hence, Poles rate border crossings slightly better than Ukrainians. The more often a person visits and crosses the border, the more they notice the congestion, long queues and time lost while waiting for border checks. In all evaluated aspects, there was almost always a group of 30-50% of respondents who had a negative opinion. It appears that these percentages are too high to be satisfied with the assessment of border crossings and the infrastructure there. An exception is the assessment of border service personnel, which should be considered rather good.

The cross-border cooperation between the two countries, as viewed by respondents, is best primarily in the economic and trade sector. Trade relations predominate, cross-border cooperation is developing best in transport, and shared economic interests are what facilitates building cross-border relations. This certainly appears as a factor that is most saliently present in the awareness of not only border crossers, but also border service personnel, who are often even more aware that economic interests are what provides the foundation for cooperation between Poland and Ukraine. Obviously, this is not the whole truth. Considerable traffic and quite intense activity can be noticed in areas such as education or tourism. Social and family considerations (e.g. visiting friends or relatives) are also present, but they may be somewhat marginal compared to everyday trade and transport-related challenges at the border.

It seems important to give these areas more breathing space in cross-border cooperation, especially since the respondents are highly aware of how many cultural links there are between the two nations. Therefore, economic interests do not have to be the main driver of cross-border cooperation.

Active regional cooperation across borders is to foster communication, develop infrastructure and tourism, as well as strengthen educational and cultural exchange and shared experiences. Good relations at the local level usually translate into good official relations between the governments of these countries in the long run. Therefore, H. Melehanych³⁴ points out that the main topic and subject of cross-border cooperation should primarily be border communities, since they are most aware of problems and often express their readiness to work together. National minorities on both sides of the border (Ukrainians in Poland and Poles in Ukraine) also play an important role here, as they act as a transmission belt, an intermediary in building relations between the two nations.

While slightly simplifying the complex and multi-faceted nature of the problem, two different action strategies and two objectives which the authorities might set for themselves can be imagined, based on the conclusions from the research presented above.

The first would be related to a more streamlined strategy, sometimes called „aggressive,” as it is supposed to utilise the strengths, multiply benefits and rely on dominating factors. In this case, our focus should be on the economic relations between Poland and Ukraine and everything that strengthens and develops these relations.

The other would have a more multi-directional and moderate nature, related to a sustainable development strategy, appreciating the dominant trade and economic relations, but also seeking space for other areas and relations between the two countries and their inhabitants.

The initial effects of the first approach might appear quite soon, although they would occur only within a single dimension. The latter approach appears to be less spectacular and would provide its main benefits only in the long term. There also might be a third solution, consisting in not adopting a strategic approach. However, leaving cross-border cooperation to social dynamics and activities of local communities would certainly not allow for taking advantage of the many opportunities provided by the proximity of the border and might perpetuate the peripheral status of the border areas of both countries, the same status which they have held for many years.

³⁴ H. Melehanych, work cited.

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Streszczenie

Monografia powstała jako część projektu *Cooperation of Universities supporting the development of security and crisis management of the Lublin and Lutsk transborder regions*. Był on finansowany w ramach środków Programu Współpracy Transgranicznej PL-BY-UA 2014-2020. Projekt był realizowany w latach 2018-2020 we współpracy międzynarodowej dwóch Uniwersytetów: Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego Jana Pawła II w Lublinie, Polska i Łuckiego Narodowego Uniwersytetu Technicznego, Ukraina.

Projekt obejmował wielostronne działania w Polsce i na Ukrainie związane z: 1. prowadzeniem badań naukowych (badania empiryczne, 2 konferencje naukowe, 3 publikacje); 2. szkolenia interpersonalne dla pracowników służb granicznych (w tym biofeedback); 3. dwie edycje studiów podyplomowych.

Książka zawiera analizę wybranych zagadnień wpływających na partnerstwo i współpracę transgraniczną Polski i Ukrainy. Główna oś analizy jest jednak oparta o materiał empirycznego zebranego na podstawie przeprowadzonych badań ankietowych na grupie 404 osób po obu stronach granicy. Zakres czasowy pracy jest zasadniczo oparty o koniec 2019 roku. Badania zostały przeprowadzone w tym właśnie okresie. W przypadku wyjątkowo ważnych zdarzeń danych zakres analizy obejmuje też 2020 rok. W książce nie uwzględnia się, co do zasady, konsekwencji występowania COVID-19. Trudno bowiem o konkretne wskazania i prognozy. Jedynie w części przypadków podjęto próbę odniesienia się do wybranych problemów związanych z tym zjawiskiem.

W pracy dokonano także przeglądu wybranej literatury. Dotyczy to szczególnie części teoretycznej. Przegląd literatury został ograniczony do wybranych, najważniejszych pozycji, które według autorów wnoszą najwięcej treści do przedmiotowej problematyki. Zasadnicza część analizy, zarówno w części teoretycznej, jak i empirycznej, oparta jest o perspektywę analityczno-badawczą autorów. Dokonano wyboru zagadnień, które charakteryzują kluczowe zjawiska zachodzące w przedmiotowej przestrzeni.

Praca składa się z rozbudowanego Wprowadzenia metodologicznego wraz z przeglądem literatury, czterech rozdziałów i zakończenia w formie wniosków

i rekomendacji. Struktura pracy ma pomóc odbiorcom w jak najbardziej przystępny sposób w przyswojeniu przyjętych założeń. Dane prezentowane są zarówno w formie graficznej, jak i opisowej.

We Wprowadzeniu do metodologii badań dokonano przeglądu literatury oraz przybliżono specyfikę pozycji Polski i Ukrainy oraz wzajemnych relacji. Dokonano także charakterystyki wskaźników dotyczących respondentów i założeń związanych z badaniami własnymi.

W pierwszym rozdziale dokonano nakreślenia sytuacji geopolitycznej Polski i Ukrainy. Kluczowe znaczenie ma w tym przypadku wskazanie na kilka wybranych wyzwań i szans. Dotyczy to zarówno relacji bilateralnych, jak i tych na poziomie międzynarodowych. Część wskazanych uwarunkowań ma charakter niezależny. Oba państwa muszą podejmować je w zależności od występowania i intensyfikacji ze strony lub w ramach aktywności innych podmiotów. W kilku innych przypadkach konieczność podjęcia określonych działań leży wspólnie po stronie obu państw lub każdego z osobna.

Drugi rozdział zawiera charakterystykę Euroregionu Bug, który najpełniej odzwierciedla specyfikę wybranych do analizy regionów: Województwa Lubelskiego i Obwodu Wołyńskiego. Rozdział jest zbudowany z podstawowych treści, niezbędnych do przybliżenia specyfiki, podobieństw i różnicowania obu regionów transgranicznych. Wskazane dane pozwalają przybliżyć kontekst geograficzny i społeczny.

Trzeci rozdział przedstawi analizę specyfiki przekraczania granicy między Polską a Ukrainą. Zasadnicze znaczenie ma nakreślenie oceny dostępności, funkcjonalności oraz czasu potrzebnego do dokonania odprawy granicznej. Granica państwa nie jest jedynie barierą techniczną. Odgrywa duże znaczenie społeczne. Wskazane wyżej uwarunkowania mogą wpływać na zbudowanie w świadomości społecznej osób korzystających z przejścia granicznego i służb obsługujących ruch graniczny swoistego obrazu sytuacyjno-osobowego.

W czwartym rozdziale zawarto zagadnienia związane z perspektywą oceny zasadności i efektywności współpracy transgranicznej między Polską a Ukrainą. Współpraca transgraniczna może stanowić domenę działań formalnych na różnym poziomie. Główne jednak znaczenie ma wówczas, gdy jej efekty są pozytywnie odczuwane i odbierane przez samych mieszkańców regionów granicznych. Ma ona bowiem realny wpływ na wiele wymiarów codziennego funkcjonowania regionu, jego atrakcyjności i dostępności.

Autorzy monografii dziękują za współpracę i wsparcie ze strony Centrum Projektów Europejskich w Warszawie, Działu Projektów Międzynarodowych KUL, Nadbużańskiego Oddziału Straży Granicznej w Chełmie, Krajowej Administracji Skarbowej w Lublinie. Słowa uznania kierujemy do partnerów z Ukrainy: Łuckiego Narodowego Uniwersytetu Technicznego i służb granicznych. Podziękowania kierowane są także do recenzentów.

Резюме

Дана монографія є частиною проекту *Cooperation of Universities supporting the development of security and crisis management of the Lublin and Lutsk transborder regions*, який профінансовано в рамках Програми Транскордонного Співробітництва PL-BY-UA 2014-2020. Проект був реалізований в період 2018-2020 рр. у міжнародній співпраці двох університетів: Католицького Люблінського Університету Івана Павла II в Любліні та Луцького Національного Технічного Університету, Україна.

Проектом охоплено багатосторонню діяльність в Польщі та Україні, зокрема пов'язану із: 1. Проведенням наукових досліджень (емпіричні дослідження, 2 наукові конференції, 3 публікації); 2. Міждисциплінарні навчання для працівників прикордонних служб (включно із biofeedback); 3. Дві серії післядипломних студій.

До книги включено аналіз вибраних тем, які впливають на партнерство і транскордонну співпрацю Польщі та України. Проте, головна вісь аналізу зосереджена на емпіричному матеріалі, зібраному на підставі анкетування проведеного у групі 404 осіб бо обидві сторони кордону. Часові рамки проведеної роботи – це здебільшого кінець 2019 року. Дослідження проведено саме в цей період. У випадку винятково важливих подій аналіз даних охоплює також 2020 рік. В книзі не взято до уваги наслідки розповсюдження COVID-19, тому що виникають труднощі з конкретними вказівками та прогнозами. Лише в деяких випадках автори зосередилися на вибраних проблемах, пов'язаних із даним явищем.

В праці також міститься перегляд вибраної літератури. Це, насамперед, стосується теоретичної частини. Огляд літератури обмежено до вибраних, найважливіших джерел, які, на думку авторів, є найбільш змістовними для предметної проблематики. Основна частина аналізу, як в теоретичній, так і емпіричній частині, спирається на аналітично-дослідницьке бачення авторів. Вибрано теми, які характеризують ключові явища, що відбуваються у предметному просторі.

Праця складається з розширеного Методологічного вступу разом із оглядом літератури, чотирьох розділів і закінчення у формі Висновків та рекомендацій. Структура праці повинна найбільш доступно

допомогти адресатам засвоїти поставлені тези. Дані представлено в описовій та графічній формі.

У Вступі до методології досліджень представлено огляд літератури, а також описано специфіку позиції Польщі та України, їх взаємовідносини. Також охарактеризовано респондентів та тези, пов'язані із власними дослідженнями.

У першому розділі накреслено геополітичну ситуацію Польщі та України. Ключовим у цьому випадку є зазначення кількох вибраних викликів та шансів. Це стосується як білатеральних відносин, так і відносин на міжнародному рівні. Деякі із вказаних чинників мають незалежний характер. Обидві держави мусять їх впроваджувати, не залежно від появи чи інтенсивності з боку або в рамках активності інших суб'єктів. В кількох інших випадках певні необхідні дії повинні провести обидві держави спільно або ж кожна зокрема.

Другий розділ присвячений характеристиці Єврорегіону Буг, який найповнішою мірою відображає специфіку проаналізованих регіонів: Люблінського воєводства та Волинської області. Розділ складається із базових відомостей, які необхідні для наближення специфіки, схожості та різниці обох транскордонних регіонів. Представлені дані дають змогу наблизити географічний та суспільний контекст.

У третьому розділі проаналізовано специфіку перетину кордону між Польщею та Україною. Основною є оцінка доступності, функціональності та часу потрібного для проходження митного контролю. Державний кордон є не лише технічним бар'єром. Він відіграє значу суспільну роль. Вищевказані чинники можуть впливати на побудову у суспільній свідомості осіб, які користуються переходом на кордоні, а також служб, які обслуговують прикордонний рух, певного ситуаційно-персонального образу.

До четвертого розділу включено тематику, яка пов'язана із перспективою оцінки доцільності та ефективності транскордонної співпраці між Польщею та Україною. Транскордонна співпраця може становити галузь для формальних дій на різному рівні. Однак, основне значення вона має тоді, коли позитивні ефекти відчувають та сприймають самі мешканці прикордонних регіонів. Оскільки вона має реальний вплив на багато вимірів щоденного функціонування регіону, його привабливість та доступність.

Автори монографії дякують за співпрацю і підтримку з боку Центру Європейських Проектів у Варшаві, Відділу Міжнародних Проектів КЛУ, Надбужанського Відділу Прикордонної Служби в Хелмі, Державної Податкової Адміністрації в Любліні. Слова вдячності керуємо до партнерів з України: Луцького Національного Технічного Університету і прикордонних служб. Також висловлюємо подяку рецензентам.

Annex 1

Cross-Border Cooperation between Poland and Ukraine

Survey Questionnaire

The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin and the Lutsk National Technical University are jointly conducting a project co-financed from European Union funds as part of the Cross-Border Cooperation Project Poland-Belarus-Ukraine 2014-2020.

The objective of the project is to support the cooperation, security, and crisis management processes on both sides of the Polish-Ukrainian border, which is also the external border of the EU. In-depth research will contribute to the advancement of knowledge in the area in question, while disseminating its results will affect the understanding of the specifics of cross-border cooperation and the work of border services.

The survey is anonymous and the collected data will be used solely in academic work within the project.

- 1. Do you believe that cross-border cooperation between Poland and Ukraine is necessary?**
 1. Definitely yes
 2. Probably yes
 3. Probably not
 4. Definitely not

- 2. Do you believe that cross-border cooperation between regions located near the Polish-Ukrainian border is necessary?**
 1. Definitely yes
 2. Probably yes
 3. Probably not
 4. Definitely not

- 3. Who do you think should develop cross-border cooperation? Please select no more than 2 answers.**
 1. City or region inhabitants
 2. City or region authorities
 3. Euroregions (such as the Bug Euroregion)

4. Government institutions
 5. Non-governmental organizations (such as cultural associations and societies, sports clubs)
 6. Schools and universities
 7. Enterprises
 8. Other (please specify)
- 4. In what areas do you believe cross-border cooperation is doing best? Please select no more than 2 answers.**
1. Transport
 2. General education and tertiary education
 3. Security (e.g. preventing risks, illegal migration, smuggling, etc.)
 4. Tourism, nature and landscape protection
 5. Youth exchange and integration meetings
 6. Culture, sport, and recreation
 7. Administrative cooperation
 8. Economic cooperation
 9. Promotion of regions abroad and development planning
 10. Other (please specify)
- 5. In what areas do you believe cross-border cooperation is doing worst? Please select no more than 2 answers.**
1. Transport
 2. General education and tertiary education
 3. Security (e.g. preventing risks, illegal migration, smuggling, etc.)
 4. Tourism, nature and landscape protection
 5. Youth exchange and integration meetings
 6. Culture, sport, and recreation
 7. Administrative cooperation
 8. Economic cooperation
 9. Promotion of regions abroad and development planning
 10. Other (please specify)
- 6. What do you believe supports the development of cross-border cooperation? Please select no more than 2 answers.**
1. Mutual sympathy and understanding between Poles and Ukrainians
 2. Similar languages
 3. Similar culture
 4. Similar lifestyles
 5. Shared political interests

6. Shared economic interests
 7. Availability of EU funds for that purpose
 8. Favourable self-government policy supporting Polish-Ukrainian cross-border cooperation
 9. Availability of EU means
 10. Other (please specify)
- 7. What do you believe hinders the development of cross-border cooperation? Please select no more than 2 answers.**
1. Language barriers
 2. Legal barriers
 3. Administrative barriers
 4. Cultural barriers
 5. Historical past
 6. Differing interests of cities or regions
 7. Insufficient UE and own funds to develop cooperation
 8. Lack of interest in cooperation on both sides of the border
 9. Lack of understanding of possible effects of cooperation
 10. Other (please specify)
- 8. Do you believe that the effects of cross-border cooperation are noticeable?**
1. Definitely yes
 2. Probably yes
 3. Probably not
 4. Definitely not
- 9. On what level should cross-border cooperation between Poland and Ukraine be developed?**
1. According to a cross-border cooperation strategy
 2. Spontaneously
 3. Only in areas where interest in cooperation is shown
 4. On par with cooperation with other states or regions
 5. Other (please specify)
- 10. What form of cross-border cooperation do you believe is the most effective?**
1. Based on transnational agreements (i.e. within the EU)
 2. Based on international agreements
 3. Based on local and regional agreements (e.g. between cities, provinces/oblasts)

11. What contacts do you believe predominate between the inhabitants of Poland and Ukraine? Please select no more than 2 answers.

1. Contacts with friends and family
2. Trade contacts such as shopping, use of services, etc.
3. Economic and professional contacts, e.g. between enterprises
4. Social contacts
5. Tourist contacts
6. Other (please specify)

12. What forms of facilitation would in your opinion increase the effectiveness of cross-border cooperation? Please select no more than 2 answers.

1. A precise definition of areas covered by the cooperation
2. Simplifying regulations related to crossing the border by inhabitants of border areas
3. Increasing the number of border crossing points
4. Improving the existing border infrastructure
5. Improving communications availability (e.g. regular and more frequent public transport services)
6. More state and EU funds for joint cross-border projects

13. How often do you cross the Polish-Ukrainian border?

1. Every day
2. A few times per week
3. A few times per month
4. Once per month
5. A few times per year
6. Once per year

14. What is your most frequent objective for crossing the Polish-Ukrainian border?

1. Visiting family or friends
2. Tourist trip
3. Business travel
4. Private work-related travel
5. Other (please specify)

15. How do you rate the accessibility of Polish-Ukrainian border crossing points?

1. There are too many of them
2. There are enough of them
3. There are decidedly too few of them

16. How do you rate the infrastructure of Polish-Ukrainian border crossings?

1. Very good
2. Quite good
3. Neither good nor poor
4. Quite poor
5. Very poor

18. What is in your opinion the average time in minutes spent waiting to cross the Polish-Ukrainian border?

	Minutes
From Poland to Ukraine	
From Ukraine to Poland	

19. How do you rate the work of border services generally?

	Polish Border Guard	Polish customs services	Ukrainian Border Guard	Ukrainian customs services
Very good				
Quite good				
Neither good nor poor				
Quite poor				
Very poor				

20. Have you met with an expectation of offering pecuniary or other benefits from border-crossers (for border service employees) or border service employees (for border crossers)?

	Polish Border Guard	Polish customs services	Ukrainian Border Guard	Ukrainian customs services
Yes				
No				

21. What do you believe are the most important strengths of border service employees? Please select no more than 2 answers.

1. Knowledge of the law
2. Psychological knowledge (observation skills, good memory, divisibility of attention)

3. Physical condition
 4. Firm action
 5. Effective action
 6. Uncompromising attitude
 7. Resistance to stress
 8. Command of foreign languages
 9. Impeccable manners (including empathy, understanding, non-discrimination)
- 22. What do you believe are the most important weaknesses of border service employees? Please select no more than 2 answers.**
1. Knowledge of the law
 2. Psychological knowledge (observation skills, good memory, divisibility of attention)
 3. Physical condition
 4. Firm action
 5. Effective action
 6. Uncompromising attitude
 7. Resistance to stress
 8. Command of foreign languages
 9. Less than impeccable manners (including lack of empathy/understanding, discrimination)
- 23. What do you believe are the main issues affecting the Polish-Ukrainian border? Please select no more than 2 answers.**
1. Excessive time spent waiting to cross the border
 2. Excessive border traffic
 3. Lack of sufficient infrastructure
 4. Lack of suitable sanitary facilities
 5. Lack of support from border services
 6. Presence of organised smuggling groups
 7. Other (please specify)
- 24. Do you believe that Poland and Ukraine are strategic partners in politics and the economy?**
1. Definitely yes
 2. Probably yes
 3. Probably not
 4. Definitely not

25. Do you believe that Ukraine will become a member of trans-Atlantic organisations listed below?

	Yes	No
EU		
NATO		

26. When do you believe will Ukraine become a member of the trans-Atlantic organisations listed below?

	Within 5 years	Within 5-10 years	In over 10 years
EU			
NATO			

What is your country of origin?

1. Poland
2. Ukraine

Please state your gender

1. Male
2. Female

Please provide your age: years

1. Please state your education:
2. Primary
3. Vocational
4. Secondary
5. University

Please state your economic status:

1. Student (in school or at university)
2. State sector employee
3. Private sector employee
4. Unemployed
5. Age/disability pensioner

Where do you live?

1. City/town
2. Countryside

Annex 2

Sample Structure – Table

%	Poles crossing the border (n=151)	Ukrainians crossing the border (n=154)	Polish border officers (n=51)	Ukrainian border officers (n=48)
Female	42.4	41.6	45.1	43.5
Male	57.6	58.4	54.9	56.5
18-25 y. o.	16.6	17.6	2.3	4.3
26-40 y. o.	31.8	33.3	46.5	63.0
41-60 y. o.	37.7	31.4	51.2	32.6
61 y. o. and over	13.9	17.6	0	0
Primary	2.0	0.7	n/a	n/a
Vocational	18.5	9.3	n/a	n/a
Secondary	37.7	37.1	n/a	n/a
University	41.7	53.0	n/a	n/a
An employee of the border traffic management	n/a	n/a	34.7	2.2
Employee of direct border traffic service	n/a	n/a	30.6	87.0
Other	n/a	n/a	34.7	10.9
Student (in school or at university)	17.6	6.0	n/a	n/a
State sector employee	37.2	7.3	n/a	n/a
Private sector employee	24.3	33.1	n/a	n/a
Unemployed	6.1	40.4	n/a	n/a