


Inspire policy making by territorial evidence



Impacts of refugee flows to territorial development in Europe

Applied Research

**Case study – Labour market initiatives in
Södertälje (Sweden)**

Version 18/07/2019

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Executive summary

This case study focuses on Södertälje, a city with a very diverse population: in 2017, it was one of the only three only Swedish municipalities where the majority of the population (53%) had a foreign background. Moreover, the city has accepted more Iraqi and Syrian refugees than the US and UK combined, which poses the usual challenges when there is a high concentration of refugees.

There are two interventions that are analysed in this case study, both focusing on the labour market access and labour market integration of refugees. The reason for this area of focus is that unemployment in Södertälje is higher than the Swedish average, while employment rates are lower among refugees than among the Swedish population as a whole.

In response to these challenges, some innovative interventions have been developed in Södertälje. The main focus of this case study is the private-public partnership called the 'Telge model', where the municipality is cooperating with the private sector to find business-led solutions to social problems. This intervention specifically, but not exclusively, targets refugees in order to foster integration by employing refugees and long-term unemployed Swedish youths simultaneously. In addition to this intervention, there is a specific programme in place for new arrivals (refugees). This involves organising collective meetings among relevant government officials from different organisations to plan the labour market accession of the new arrivals.

Since the start of the Telge programme in 2011, the largest public-private company involved in the programme, *Tillväxt* (Growth), has provided 150-200 young people per year with jobs. By the time the programme ended in 2017, 84% had entered the labour market or further education, and one year after 76% were still employed or in education. These are impressive numbers for the challenging target group. They are much higher than, for instance, the overall figures for refugees in Sweden (where after two years, 24% of refugees were employed).

There is also a major social benefit to the programme as every person has the chance to earn their own livelihood. In the long term, the programme benefits society as a whole by combating long-term unemployment and all the costs that society bears from this. The total cost savings are estimated at around EUR 1.5-2 million per individual until retirement age.

The second intervention is an introduction programme specific to Södertälje. Some 6-10 new arrivals join this programme each week - 390 took part in total in 2016. At the peak of the migration crisis, there were 716 new arrivals taking part in the programme. Results show that within 90 days of completing the introduction programme, 60% of participants have gone on to work or into further education. Every month 5.2% of participants leave the programme because they have found a job or enrolled in education.

The strengths of the two programmes are as follows:

- the cooperation of all the different relevant organisations involved;

- the fact that participants of the Telge Programme gain real work experience and valuable references;
- the guidance and mentoring that is provided throughout the process;
- the complementarity with other programmes in Södertälje; and
- the situation in the local labour market.

Participating companies cite flexibility as a particular strong point of the Telge programme: a company can call in the morning and have somebody working for them for a few hours that same afternoon.

One thing to note about this intervention is a danger of potential conflicts with trade unions and employers' organisations.

Sweden has a dispersal policy in place, which ensures that refugees are settled throughout the country. Previously, there were disproportionately many refugees in Södertälje, which according to interviewees put a strain on the programme as there was a limited budget available. Now, refugees are more evenly distributed across the country; and as a consequence, the number of refugees in Södertälje has sharply decreased. For Telge, this means that there are fewer new arrivals to help, and more unemployed youths from other backgrounds taking part in the programme. Interviewees have a mixed opinion on the impact of the dispersal policy: on the one hand, they mentioned that in general, the current system is fairer than before; but for the programme in particular, they said that fewer refugees could be helped than before because fewer newcomers are settling in Södertälje.

1 Profile of the area

In this section, the profile of the area that forms the subject of this case study (Södertälje) will be presented. Consecutively, the socio-economic context, the current stock and flows of asylum seekers, refugees and migrants, the challenges, opportunities and impacts and the institutional and policy framework dealing with asylum seekers and refugees will be discussed.

1.1 Socio-economic context

Figure 1: Map of Sweden - Södertälje



Södertälje is a Swedish city 30 kilometres south-west of Stockholm, with a population of around 70,000 inhabitants. It is an industrial city, home to, for instance, Swedish truck maker Scania and British multinational pharmaceutical company AstraZeneca.

The city is of interest to the study, as it has a population with a very diverse background: in 2017, it was one of only three Swedish municipalities where the majority of the population (53%) had a foreign background.¹ Moreover, the city accepted more Iraqi and Syrian refugees than the US and UK combined in 2015.²

Södertälje is an urban area located on the coast of Sweden. The city falls within the NUTS 2 region of Stockholm (SE11) and as such it has been classified as a Cluster 1 region (strongly attractive metropolitan area and great centre of financial services)³. This classification is primarily due to the fact that the capital of Sweden is part of this region.

The population of Södertälje⁴ municipality has been steadily growing in recent years: from around 80,000 in 2002 to around 97,000 in 2018 (see Figure 2). For the period 2002-2018, average population growth was 1.3%, compared to 0.8% for the whole of Sweden. In 2018, 51% of the population was male and 49% of the population was female. There are relatively

¹ Defined as being either born abroad or having two parents who were born abroad. Source: Statistics Sweden.


² Financial Times (2015) Sweden immigration: Don't look back. <https://www.ft.com/content/a8573532-65bf-11e5-97e9-7f0bf5e7177b>.

³ For more information about the cluster see ESPON MIGRARE Final Report.

⁴ Most statistical information in Sweden is available on the municipality level; as the city of Södertälje is the most important part of the municipality (forming around 75% of its population), this information can be used here.

slightly more males in Södertälje municipality than in Sweden as a whole (50% male, 50% female in 2018).

Figure 2: Population of Södertälje municipality, 2002-2018



Source: Statistics Sweden


For the breakdown of the population of Södertälje municipality by age compared to Sweden, see

Figure 3. The figure shows that there are relatively more young people in the Södertälje municipality: the shares of the six lowest age categories (up to 54 years old) are higher in Södertälje (on average 0.7% higher), while the shares of the five highest age categories are higher in Sweden (on average 0.8% higher). Similarly, the average age in Sweden in 2017 was 41.2 years, while in Södertälje it was 39.3 years.⁵ This age difference is partly related to Södertälje's population of refugees and asylum seekers, since the age of this group is significantly lower than that of the general population (see Section 1.2 and

⁵ Statistics Sweden. <https://www.scb.se/en/>.

Figure 9).

Figure 3: Age breakdown of population, 2018



Source: Statistics Sweden

If the backgrounds of the population of Södertälje municipality and Sweden are compared, large differences are apparent (see **Error! Reference source not found.**). The share of the population that is born in Sweden with two parents born in Sweden is much higher nationally than in Södertälje. Conversely, in Södertälje the share of the population that is either foreign born or born in Sweden with two foreign-born parents is much higher than the national average.

Table 1: Background of population, 2017


| | Södertälje municipality | Sweden |
|---|-------------------------|--------|
| Born in Sweden with one parent born in Sweden and one foreign-born parent | 8.2% | 7.5% |
| Born in Sweden with two foreign-born parents | 13.9% | 5.6% |
| Born in Sweden with two parents born in Sweden | 38.8% | 68.4% |

| | | |
|--------------|-------|-------|
| Foreign born | 39.1% | 18.5% |
|--------------|-------|-------|

Source: Statistics Sweden

Moreover, if domestic migration within Sweden is considered, Södertälje municipality is a region of emigration for Swedish-born people, and a region of immigration for foreign born people (see 4). An important underlying reason for this, as confirmed by interviewees, is that Södertälje is an industrial area providing mostly low-skilled jobs and few other opportunities.


Figure 4: Södertälje migration within Sweden



Source: Statistics Sweden

Figure 5 shows that the level of education is lower in Södertälje municipality than in the Swedish population as a whole. The share of the population in the three lowest educational attainment categories is higher in Södertälje (16% higher on average), while the share of the population in the four highest educational attainment categories is higher in Sweden (23% higher on average).


Figure 5: Level of education, 2017



Source: Statistics Sweden

In terms of economic performance, the Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) per capita was on average 90% higher in Södertälje than the GDP of Sweden over the period 2014-2016. While the GDP of Sweden rose steadily (3.3% on average over the three years), the GRDP of Södertälje declined sharply at the beginning of the period and increased sharply towards the end, resulting in an average growth of 5% for 2014-2016 (see Figure 6).


Figure 6: Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP), per capita, in SEK thousand



Source: Statistics Sweden

Lastly, in terms of the labour market, unemployment in Södertälje is higher than in Sweden as a whole (see Figure 7). During the period 2008-2018, it was on average 5 percentage points higher. As of 2018, unemployment in Södertälje municipality stood at 11.8%, compared with 7.0% nationally. The gap grew until 2016, since when it has been declining. The unemployment rate also fluctuates more in Södertälje than in Sweden.

Figure 7: Unemployment as percentage of total population



Source: Ekonomifakta SE

1.2 Current stock and flows of asylum seekers, refugees, and migrants in the area of analysis



The Migration Agency (*Migrationsverket*) is the authority responsible for registering asylum applications in Sweden. Applications can be made at designated offices of the Migration Agency in Stockholm (Solna and Märsta), Gävle, Flen, Boden, Norrköping, Gothenburg or Malmö. If a person seeks asylum at an airport or port, they are referred to the Migration Agency.⁶ Therefore, it is not possible to file a claim in Södertälje.

The best indication for the number of asylum seekers and refugees is the number of people in the Migration Agency's system. In 2018, there were 729 persons in its system living in Södertälje, or around 0.8% of the total population of the municipality. In total, the Migration Agency had 60,692 people in its system in 2018, which is around 0.6% of the total population of Sweden.

The number of migrants has evolved over time: in 2015, there was a peak and since then the number has been declining, both in Södertälje and in Sweden as a whole (see Figure 8). This is consistent with the general image of a peak in asylum seekers and the resulting crisis in 2015. Comparing the situation in 2018 to that of 2014, the number of people in the system of the *Migrationsverket* has declined (-34.7% for the Södertälje municipality and -23.5% for all of Sweden).

Figure 8: People in the *Migrationsverket* system

⁶ AIDA (2016) Country Report: Sweden. https://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/report-download/aida_se_2016update.pdf




Source: *Migrationsverket*

In terms of gender composition, in 2018, 61.5% of the people in the Migration Agency's system in Södertälje municipality were male and 38.5% female, compared with the national average of 33.1% male and 66.9% female. Compared to the general population, there were many more males in the system - 20% more males in Södertälje municipality and 34% more males in all of Sweden.

Figure 9 shows the age composition of the people in the *Migrationsverket* system. There are more people in the lowest four age categories in all of Sweden (on average 3.4% more), while there are more people in the highest three age categories in Södertälje municipality (on average 4.6% more). Similarly, the estimated average age of people in the *Migrationsverket* system in

Södertälje is 32.5 years, while in Sweden it is 28.2 years.⁷ Comparing this to the age of the total population, it is interesting to note that for the general population on average people are younger in Södertälje municipality, while for the people in the *Migrationsverket* system, on average people are younger in the rest of Sweden. Overall, people in the *Migrationsverket* system are younger than the general population (17.4% younger for Södertälje municipality and 31.5% younger for all of Sweden). The 20-59 age is overrepresented in the *Migrationsverket* system, while for the total population, there is a much more even distribution over the different age categories.

Figure 9: Age composition of people in the *Migrationsverket* system, 2018



Source: *Migrationsverket*


In total, there were 21,502 new asylum applications made in Sweden in 2018, which represents around 35.4% of the total number of people in the *Migrationsverket* system. At the same time, 35,512 decisions were taken in asylum cases by the *Migrationsverket* in first instance in Sweden in 2018; of these, 11,217 (31.6%) were granted and 17,908 (50.4%) were rejected, 2,424 decisions (6.8%) were taken by other states as part of the Dublin scheme and there were 3,963 (11.2%) instances where no decision was taken.⁸

⁷ Calculated by taking the midpoint of the age categories, multiplying it by the number of persons in that age category and dividing the total by the total number of people.

⁸ In these cases, the *Migrationsverket* has not considered the applications materially, this concerns for example applications that were written off. An application is written off, among other reasons, if the applicant absconded or withdrew their application.

Regarding the origin of people in the *Migrationsverket* system, data only exists for Sweden as a whole. Figure 10 showcases the five largest nationalities, which together make up almost two-thirds of the total number of people. The five largest countries are affected by conflict, suggesting that these are crisis-related refugees rather than economic refugees. For the people coming from other countries (more than one third of the total) it is not possible to estimate whether their motivation is crisis-related or economic.

Figure 10: Nationality of people in the *Migrationsverket* system, 2018



Source: *Migrationsverket*

Regarding irregular migration, the only information that is available is on the national level. In 2017, according to Eurostat, 880 people were refused entry into Sweden at the external borders because they were travelling irregularly. This is considerably fewer than in 2016, when 1,405 people were refused entry. Additionally, 2,145 third country nationals were found to be illegally present on Swedish territory in 2017, which is a much higher number than in 2016 (1,210); this partly reflects the stricter immigration system which is described in more detail in Section 1.4.

However, overall the number is much lower than in the period 2009-2015, when it was 27,477 on average per year.⁹

1.3 Challenges, opportunities and impacts

Given the socio-economic background of Södertälje and the current stock of asylum seekers and refugees in the area, certain challenges and opportunities can be distinguished, especially considering the impacts of refugees. In this section, the most important findings are discussed, while more detailed information about economic costs and financial impacts can be found in Annex I.


With regards to the financial impact of refugees, a Swedish study from 2015 took a closer look at refugees and public finance in Sweden by comparing the public revenues and public costs for both the total population and refugees. The data used were from 2007 as this was the last year before Statistics Sweden enacted a policy of only providing researchers with less detailed information on individual country of birth in micro datasets. The conclusion of the study was that refugees generated total public revenues of 49.4 billion SEK, while the total public costs of refugees amounted to 81.8 billion SEK, a net result was -32.4 billion SEK. For the total population, the public revenues and public costs balanced each other out, both equalling 1,473.3 billion SEK. Therefore, the total estimated redistribution through the public sector corresponds to 1.0% of Swedish GDP in the same year (2007). Four-fifths of this is due to lower public per-capita revenues from refugees compared with the total population, and one-fifth of this is due to higher per-capita public costs. The estimate for 2015 is that the redistribution was around 1.35% of GDP based on scaling up the redistribution of 2007 by the increase in the refugee population.¹⁰

Regarding the economic impact of refugees, employment rates are lower amongst refugees than amongst the total Swedish population (see Figure 11). The data are based on a longitudinal study following refugees from the period 1997-1999. After two years, 24% of the refugees were employed, after five years this number had increased to 46%, and after 10 years to 62.5%. This is still well below the average employment rate of 80% of the total Swedish population, but it clearly shows a gradual growth, it also shows that the length of stay in Sweden plays a major role in employment rates of refugees.

Figure 11: Employment of refugees compared to total Swedish population

⁹ Eurostat: Third country nationals refused entry at the external borders - annual data (rounded), [migr_eirfs]; Third country nationals found to be illegally present - annual data (rounded), [migr_eipre]. An important caveat to make here is that it only considers persons who have been apprehended or otherwise have come to the attention of national immigration authorities; therefore, it is not a measure of the total number of persons who are present in the country on an unauthorised basis.

¹⁰ Joakim Ruist, *Refugee immigration and public finances in Sweden* (2015): https://economics.gu.se/digitalAssets/1544/1544920_refugee-immigration-public-finances.pdf.



Source: Statistics Sweden

Regarding the social and political impacts of refugees, about 70% of Swedish citizens feel “well informed” about immigration- and integration-related matters. A majority of Swedish voters (60%) want Sweden to accept fewer refugees than it currently does. During the most recent elections in September 2018, the anti-immigration Sweden Democrats became the third-largest party in the *Riksdag* with 49 seats, trailing only the Social Democrats and Moderates. This was an increase of 20 seats compared to the previous elections in 2014; however, this increase was much lower than opinion polls forecast. Nevertheless, the Sweden Democrats were considered the big winners of the election. The election resulted in a hung parliament, with the red-green and centre-right coalitions each holding about 40% of the seats, and the Sweden Democrats holding the remainder. Initially the Sweden Democrats were considered kingmakers, possibly giving support to either a minority centre-right or centre-left government. In the end, a deal was struck between the Social Democrats, the Greens, the Centre Party, and the Liberals resulting in a centre government led by the previous Prime Minister, the Social-Democrat Stefan Löfven.¹¹

Regarding Södertälje, the specific challenges are the following:

- A high level of unemployment;
- challenges in matching the needs of the local labour market; and
- a large population from a non-Swedish background, specifically also a large refugee population.

¹¹ Foreign Policy (2018) Sweden’s Far Right Has Won the War of Ideas. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/10/swedens-nazi-offspring-won-the-war-of-ideas/>.

1.4 Institutional and policy framework dealing with asylum seekers and refugees¹²

Policies concerning asylum seekers and refugees are decided at the national level. Some of these policies are funded from the state budget, while others may be funded from municipal budgets. The main act on migrants, laying out the basic principles regarding visas, residents, permits, refugees, asylum seekers, etc., is the Aliens Act (2005:716). Additionally, the Law on Reception of Asylum Seekers and Others (1994:137, amended 2016:381) sets out more specific rules regarding asylum applications.

On 1 March 2016, a new Act for a solidarity-based refugee reception system entered into force in Sweden. It foresees that all municipalities within Sweden can be required to receive newly arrived refugees and other beneficiaries of protection, as well as their family members, for settlement. According to the law, the assignment of such persons to municipalities is based on each municipality's local labour market, its population size and the overall number of newly arrived immigrants, unaccompanied minors and asylum seekers already living in the municipality.¹³ This new approach effectively extended the system that was already in place for unaccompanied minors to all asylum seekers and refugees. This Act has been introduced because of the large influx of refugees and asylum seekers around 2015 and the uneven distribution throughout the country resulting in agglomerations in certain areas (including Södertälje). This temporary Act has been renewed several times with the latest renewal in place until 19 July 2019.

The *Migrationsverket* (Swedish Migration Agency) is the main organisation responsible for asylum seekers, refugees and persons with subsidiary protection. It decides whether asylum applications will be granted and whether existing (temporary) residence permits will be renewed. Three-year temporary permits are issued to refugees allowing family reunification if the application is made within three months of the reference person receiving their permit. It issues temporary residence permits for 13 months to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection with no right to family reunification. Temporary permits allow the holder to live and work in Sweden, but there are limitations regarding sectors requiring certified skills for which a temporary permit does not automatically grant the right to work in the country (e.g. healthcare and medicine).

Regarding the housing of asylum seekers, people have three options: i) housing offered by the *Migrationsverket* (normally an apartment in an apartment building), ii) own accommodation organised by the asylum seeker via relatives or acquaintances and iii) other housing, which

¹² Table 5 in Annex II presents detailed information on the different policies in Sweden for asylum seekers and refugees both on the international/national level and on the regional/local levels. Table 6 presents the main actors involved in the asylum seekers and refugees' system at country level. In this section, the most important findings are discussed in a narrative form.


¹³ EMN (2017) EMN Annual Report on Migration and Asylum 2016 – Sweden. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/27a_sweden_apr2016_part2_final_en.pdf

mainly consists of unaccompanied minors in municipal housing/family homes/with relatives. In Södertälje in 2018, 0.5% of the people fell into the first category, 96.3% in the second category and 3.2% in the final category. In Sweden overall in 2018, 42.8% were in the first category, 52.5% in the second category, and 4.7% in the final category. The fact that almost all asylum seekers in Södertälje arranged their own accommodation seems to suggest a strong diaspora effect in the municipality. Reception centres are run by private entities that are subsidised by the state and municipalities. If an asylum seeker arranges their own accommodation, the *Migrationsverket* does not subsidise it.

Asylum seekers have the right to free medical examination, emergency, urgent medical, gynaecological, prenatal or dental care. Asylum seekers under the age of 18 are entitled to the same care as other children in Sweden. Additional medical services are available on payment basis. The city councils/regions decide which type of health care asylum seekers can get. Persons under the age of 18 have the right to free health and dental care. Municipalities are also responsible for ensuring that asylum seekers under the age of 18 have access to education.

Figure 12 presents an initial assessment of the policies in place in Södertälje municipality, more details can be found in Annex II. The figure shows that nearly all of the policies address the problem in an effective or efficient way or with only small problems (concerning education and training and social and political integration). Only the policy for relocation is assessed as not effective and/or efficient enough as it is now exempted from the scheme by a Council decision.

Figure 12: Radar chart of policies in place



Source: author (2019)

Legend:

0 no policy in this domain

1 there is a policy, however, information on the policy results achieved are not available

2 information on the policy results is available and they show relevant problems in terms of effectiveness and/or efficiency

3 information on the policy results is available and shows positive trends; the policy is perceived as able to address the problem in an effective or efficient way

4 the policy in this domain is a good practice/a benchmark.

2 Analysis of selected policies/challenges

This section presents the case study focus, which is on the labour market integration, since there are some innovative initiatives currently implemented in the city. Consecutively, the topic and motivation for the choice, the objectives and logic of the intervention, the actors involved, the implementation and the outcomes, impacts and results will be discussed.

2.1 Topic and motivation

There are two interventions which are analysed in this case study, both focusing on the labour market access and labour market integration of refugees. The rationale behind this choice of focus is that unemployment in Södertälje municipality is higher than in Sweden as a whole, as described in Section 1.1. On average, the unemployment was 5 percent point higher in Södertälje compared to all of Sweden during the period 2008-2018. At the time of writing, it is 11.8% in Södertälje municipality, and 7.0% in Sweden. Moreover, as discussed in Section 1.3, employment rates are also lower among refugees than among the total Swedish population (after two years, 24% of the refugees were employed, after five years this number had increased to 46%, and after 10 years to 62.5%, which is still well below the average employment rate of 80% of the total Swedish population).

In response to these developments, some innovative interventions have been developed in Södertälje. The intervention that will be the main focus of this case study is the private-public partnership called the Telge model where the municipality is cooperating with the private sector to find business-led solutions to social problems. This intervention specifically, but not exclusively, targets refugees in order to foster integration and cultural exchange by employing refugees and long-term unemployed Swedish youths simultaneously. In addition to this programme, there is a specific programme in place for new arrivals (refugees),¹⁴ where collective meetings are organised with several relevant government officials from different organisations at the same time to plan the labour market accession of the new arrivals.

Interviewees confirmed that these two programmes constitute the main elements of the unique approach to refugees and asylum seekers in Södertälje.

2.2 Objectives and logic of intervention


Telge AB is the mother company of the Telge Group, which comprises 10 companies all owned - with one exception - by Södertälje municipality. Three of these companies are jointly owned by the municipality and private companies such as Coop, Scania, Mekonomen, Peab, Manpower and Folksam. These three companies are Manpower Telge Jobbstart, Telge Peab and Telge *Tillväxt* (Growth). The first of these three was founded in 2009 with the goal of helping newly arrived adults, mainly from Iraq, to join the labour market. In 2013, management of the company was taken over by Manpower and the measure was discontinued as it became

¹⁴ Refugees are called new arrivals by the Programme; this case study uses the same terminology as the Programme itself in the sections where the Programme is described.

politically undesirable to maintain. Telge *Tillväxt* is currently the largest company and the focus of the remainder of the case study. Information comes from an interview with the CEO of the company.

The aim of Telge *Tillväxt* is to enable young inhabitants of the municipality (aged 18-29), especially those with interrupted educations and poor language skills, to reach the labour market as quickly and efficiently as possible, by providing them with proper jobs with contractual pay. The original aim of the programme in 2011 was to cut the youth unemployment level of 1,100 people in half within three years. The programme was specifically set up in Södertälje because of its high unemployment level and because it is an industrial area with a sizeable job market. There are many large companies, such as the truck company Scania, offering low-skilled jobs that may be within the reach of refugees and long-term unemployed youths. The figure below summarises the logic of the intervention describing its strategic objectives, specific objectives, inputs, outputs, outcomes and results.

Figure 13: Intervention logic of the programme



Source: author, confirmed by interviewees (2019)

Interviewees involved in the programme in their different capacities have confirmed the different elements of this intervention logic and its underlying ideas.

In addition, there are specialised officers within the Swedish Public Employment Service who focus full-time on new arrivals. Some of the new arrivals participate in the Telge programme, but there is also a targeted introduction programme in place for them alongside the Telge programme. The objective of the introduction programme is to help an explicitly vulnerable group integrating in society through labour market access. The introduction programme is open

to people between 20 and 64 years old who have been granted a residence permit as a refugee or a quota refugee, need protection, or are a close relative of someone who is any of these.¹⁵

2.3 The actors¹⁶

The actors involved in the Telge programme are very diverse including both public institutions and private companies; in fact, this is one of its main strengths. The legal framework of the programme is set by the Ministry of Employment. The programme itself is designed by Södertälje municipality which is (in the person of the Mayor) also responsible politically, as well as the main supporter of the programme. The Telge Group and its individual companies are responsible technically for the programme. Telge Tillväxt is 95%-owned by the municipality, but as a private company it is still responsible for its own finances; there are no direct subsidies from the municipality or any other public body for the programme. People employed by the programme work for the municipality (28,000 hours per year) and get paid for this. This accounts for one-third of the income of the company. The other two-thirds come from private companies employing its people. There are four organisations involved in programming the intervention:

- *Abetsförmedlingen* (Swedish Public Employment Service), which plays a central role within the programme and can be seen as the coordinator of the implementation phase;
- *Försäkringskassan* (Swedish Social Insurance Agency), as this organisation pays out social benefits when applicable;
- *Skatteverket* (Swedish Tax Agency), as the people in the programme often need an explanation of how the Swedish tax system works;
- *Migrationsverket* (Swedish Migration Agency), if there are new arrivals involved, especially if the housing is provided by the Agency.

The introduction programme starts when a collective meeting is organised between the new arrival and officers from the relevant public organisations listed above to plan his or her labour market accession. The municipality of Södertälje may also be involved as well, depending on the situation of the new arrival, especially if they require housing or an additional social contribution.


Figures 14 and 15 summarise the actors and their roles in the programme. The larger fonts represent central actors while the smaller fonts represent actors with a secondary role; the Figures also represent relations among the actors. Figure 14 relates to the programming phase, while Figure 15 relates to the implementation phase.

¹⁵Information om Sverige (2018) Introduction programme from Arbetsförmedlingen. <https://www.informationsverige.se/en/jag-har-fatt-uppehallstillstand/om-du-vill-arbeta/etableringsprogram-fran-arbetsformedlingen/>.

¹⁶ Annex III presents a detailed network analysis of the Telge programme and lists consecutively: the actors involved (Table 7), the actors and their roles (Table 8), a relationship matrix of the programming phase (Table 9) and a relationship matrix of the implementation phase (Table 10). In this section, the most important findings are discussed in a narrative form.


For both phases there are 15 actors in total, 10 of these are involved in the programming phase and 11 in the implementation phase. The programming phase has a lower density (i.e. fewer ties) than the implementation one. In the programming phase, actors involved are national or local while the implementation phase involves only local actors. In both phases, public institutions and special interest actors are involved, while in the programming phase politicians are also represented. In the implementation phase, NGOs (diffused-interest actors), which are not involved in the programming, play an important role. In fact, the core/central actors in the programming phase are the Ministry of Employment, the *Arbetsförmedlingen* (Swedish Public Employment Service) and the municipality of Södertälje while the core of the implementation phase presents a higher number of actors including the Telge Group and related actors.

Figure 14: Network analysis of the programming phase



Source: author (2019)

Figure 15: Network analysis of the implementation phase



Source: author (2019)

2.4 Implementation

The Telge programme runs for six months for each individual participating in it. The first four weeks is an introduction course in practical skills useful for the labour. Then, for the next two-to-three months, they do hands-on work that benefits the community, such as gardening communal places. This forms part of the previously mentioned 28,000-hour contract with the municipality. Throughout the programme, participants are followed by someone from the Abetsförmedlingen and they receive further training and help with things such as CVs, cover letters and interview skills. After first 3-4 months, participants usually get a short-term contract, usually with one of the five companies participating in the programme (who are on the board of Telge Group): ICA Maxi, Mekonomen, Peab, Scania and Sodexo. During this period, the participant gains relevant work experience and gathers a good reference. When the six months is up, the programme can be extended for another six months. After a year, the participant is supposed to have found a permanent job, either with the employer they worked for during the programme, or with another company.

Prior to the application of the new legal framework and dispersal policy, there were relatively more refugees in Södertälje than in other regions in Sweden. Now, refugees are more evenly distributed throughout the country. Interviewees have a mixed opinion on the impact of the dispersal policy: on the one hand, they mentioned that in general, the current dispersal system is fairer than before; but for the programme in particular, they said that fewer refugees could be helped than before because fewer newcomers are settling in Södertälje (because of the dispersal system in place). Most agree that more new arrivals could be helped by the Telge programme if they were settled in Södertälje.

The introduction programme operates as follows: firstly, any documents the new arrival has that prove their education background and work experience need to be verified. This helps to establish the areas where complementary education and training is necessary. This step can be characterised as a skill-screening and skill-matching procedure. The design of the programme depends on the individual new arrival, but in the short term, language training is often the area of priority as many jobs require proficiency in Swedish. The introduction programme thus offers a targeted course: Swedish for Immigrants (SFI). There is also an introduction to Swedish society course, which gives the new arrival fundamental knowledge about Swedish society. The programme also helps the newly arrived to prepare for employment; either through traineeships or temporary work. After this, the programme works in a similar way to the Telge programme. It provides 40 hours employment each week and runs for up to 24 months. During this period, the applicant receives an introduction benefit.

2.5 Outcomes, impacts, and results of the specific policy

Figure 13 presented the main outputs, outcomes and results of the policy. These will now be discussed in more detail in this section, with a particular focus on quantifiable impacts.

Since 2011, Telge *Tillväxt* has provided 150-200 young people per year with jobs. In 2017, 84% of those taking part in the programme entered the labour market or further education and 76% were still employed or in education one year after completing the programme. Considering the challenging group that the programme targets, these are impressive numbers and much higher than, for instance, the general number for refugees in Sweden (after two years, 24% of the refugees were employed).

There is also a major social benefit to the programme as every person has the chance to earn their own livelihood. In the long term, the programme benefits society as a whole by combating long-term unemployment and all the costs that society bears for this. The total cost savings are estimated at around EUR 1.5-2 million per individual until retirement age.¹⁷

From the perspective of the companies taking part, the programme is not necessarily a source of cheaper labour. Rather, there are three main outcomes:

- increased goodwill through contributing to resolving social issues;
- Replacing over-qualified personnel, which has been considered a challenge for companies in Södertälje; and
- flexible work arrangements and hours, since a company can call in the morning and have somebody working for them for a few hours that same afternoon.

For the introduction programme, participation levels largely depend on the inflow of refugees, which fluctuates constantly. At the time of writing, around 6-10 new arrivals are starting the introduction programme every week. A total of 390 took part in 2016, while during the migration peak there were 716 taking part. During the migration peak there were around 50 people working on the Introduction Programme, now there are seven. In total, there are around 360 people in the *Abetsförmedlingen* office in Södertälje right now, while the maximum has been around 1,000.

However, even with these diminishing resources, the results are still good. The interviewees cite the following reasons for this:

- cooperation with all the different relevant organisations;
- complementarity with other programmes;
- the situation in the local labour market; and
- participants employed in real jobs gaining valuable work experience and references (unlike similar interventions aimed at short-term unemployment relief).

All of these points can be considered the key successes of the introduction programme. As a result, within 90 days of completing the introduction programme, 60% of participants go on to

¹⁷ Telge (2019) About Telge Growth. <https://www.telge.se/tillvaxt/om-telge-tillvaxt/> (consulted: 25/02/2019).

work or further education. Every month 5.2% of participants leave the programme because they have found a job or enrolled in education.

3 Conclusions and lessons learnt

Södertälje municipality can be considered an example of integration. As an industrial area, it has a long tradition of (labour) immigration. Assyrians and Syrians formed the first large refugee groups to arrive in Södertälje; today these groups make up the most well-established and well-integrated groups. More recently, the municipality has received large waves of refugees, mostly coming from war-ravaged countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Telge model is a private-public partnership in the labour market where the municipality is cooperating with the private sector to find business-led solutions to social problems. The main conclusion based on the analysis in this case study is that the programme has delivered what was expected from it. This is also exemplified by the fact that the stakeholders who have been interviewed were content with the general performance of the programme in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. Moreover, it was awarded the “Social Capitalist award”, by the Swedish business weekly *Veckans Affärer* (The Week's Business).¹⁸

The main strength of the programme is the cooperation of all the different relevant organisations involved. This enhances the effectiveness and efficiency of the programme and reduces coordination costs. Moreover, this is especially beneficial for refugees, as it reduces the danger of getting caught up in bureaucratic procedures with multiple organisations in a system with which they are usually not familiar.

Another strong point of the programme is that while similar interventions are usually aimed at short-term unemployment relief, participants in the Telge programme are employed straight away in real jobs gaining actual work experience and valuable references.

Other strong points of the programme are the guidance and mentoring that is provided throughout the process, the complementarity with other programmes in Södertälje, and lastly, the local labour market situation.

For participating companies, flexibility has been mentioned as a notable strength of the programme: a company can call in the morning and have somebody working for them for a few hours that same afternoon.

It is important to note that the intervention may be a cause of conflict with trade unions and employers' organisations. The participants in the programme could be considered by these social partners to have a preferential position compared to other employees, since the programme is supported and promoted by government institutions. The parties involved in the programme are well aware of this and measures are in place to prevent it from becoming a big issue.

¹⁸Gunhild Wahlin (2010) Sweden's Södertälje: a public-private solution to immigrant challenges, *Nordic Labour Journal*. <http://www.nordiclabourjournal.org/i-fokus/in-focus-2010/theme-trust-a-weakening-of-the-bond/soedertaelje-in-swedens-public-private-solution-for-jobs>.

In conclusion, in the short term the benefits of the programme are mostly for the companies participating in it and the unemployed youths and refugees gaining work experience through it. In the long term, the programme benefits society as a whole by combating long-term unemployment and all the costs society bears as a consequence.

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List of interviewees

| Type of organisation | Organisation |
|----------------------|---|
| Public authority | <i>Migrationsverket</i> (Swedish Migration Agency) |
| Public authority | <i>Arbetsförmedlingen</i> (Swedish Public Employment Service) |
| Company | Telge Tillväxt |
| Local authority | Office of the Municipal Executive Committee of Södertälje |

List of Annexes

Annex I Impacts

Table 2: Financial impacts and their indicators - regional/local level

| Impacts | Selected indicators | Last available data* | Forecast of growth or decrease in ten years** | Forecast of growth or decrease in twenty years* | Source | Regional / local*** |
|-----------------|--|-------------------------|---|---|---|---------------------|
| Public revenues | Average social security contributions and taxes (payroll/business) per employed refugee ^{19,20} | 15.3 billion SEK (2007) | | | | National |
| Public revenues | Consumption tax on spending of refugees per refugee ²¹ | 15.9 billion SEK (2007) | | | https://economics.gu.se/digitalAssets/1544/1544920_refugee-immigration-public-finances.pdf | National |
| Public revenues | Direct taxes, individuals | 16.2 billion SEK (2007) | | | https://economics.gu.se/digitalAssets/1544/1544920_refugee-immigration-public-finances.pdf | National |
| Public revenues | Other taxes | 2.0 billion SEK (2007) | | | https://economics.gu.se/digitalAssets/1544/1544920_refugee-immigration-public-finances.pdf | National |
| Public spending | Spending on integration and initial reception measures ²² per refugee | 2.1 billion SEK (2007) | | | https://economics.gu.se/digitalAssets/1544/1544920_refugee-immigration-public-finances.pdf | National |
| Public spending | Spending on integration into education system (per refugee pupil) | | | | | |
| Public spending | Education and language training spending | 5.7 billion SEK (2007) | | | https://economics.gu.se/digitalAssets/1544/1544920_refugee-immigration-public-finances.pdf | National |

¹⁹ Here it is mainly asked whether data exist and if interviewees have views on the matter. Please leave the space blank if there is no evidence available.

²⁰ Calculated by average values for the active population with a discount for immigrants from literature.

²¹ Here it is mainly asked whether data exist and if interviewees have views on the matter. Please leave the space blank if there is no evidence available.

²² Housing, sustenance, language course, employment integration courses other integration courses

| | | | | | | |
|-----------------|--|-------------------------|--|--|---|----------|
| Public spending | Health care | 11.2 billion SEK (2007) | | | https://economics.gu.se/digitalAssets/1544/1544920_refugee-immigration-public-finances.pdf | National |
| Public spending | Housing subsidies per person and year in the country (total population ²³) | | | | | |
| Public spending | Social assistance | 4.3 billion SEK (2007) | | | https://economics.gu.se/digitalAssets/1544/1544920_refugee-immigration-public-finances.pdf | National |
| Public spending | Pensions | 3.3 billion SEK (2007) | | | https://economics.gu.se/digitalAssets/1544/1544920_refugee-immigration-public-finances.pdf | National |
| Public spending | Other individual transfers | 18.8 billion SEK (2007) | | | https://economics.gu.se/digitalAssets/1544/1544920_refugee-immigration-public-finances.pdf | National |
| Public spending | Crime and justice | 7.7 billion SEK (2007) | | | https://economics.gu.se/digitalAssets/1544/1544920_refugee-immigration-public-finances.pdf | National |
| Public spending | Labour market policy | 3.5 billion SEK (2007) | | | https://economics.gu.se/digitalAssets/1544/1544920_refugee-immigration-public-finances.pdf | National |
| Public spending | Other spending | 25.3 billion SEK | | | https://economics.gu.se/digitalAssets/1544/1544920_refugee-immigration-public-finances.pdf | National |

Table 3: Economic impacts and their indicators

| Impacts | Selected indicators | Last available data* | Forecast of growth or decrease in ten years** | Forecast of growth or decrease in twenty years* | Data source | Regional / local*** |
|-------------------|--|----------------------|---|---|---|---------------------|
| Employment (rate) | Number and proportion (%) of refugees finding a job (within 2 years) | 24% (2014) | | | https://www.scb.se/Statistik/_Publikationer/LE0105_2014A01_BR_BE57BR1401.pdf | National |
| | Number and proportion (%) of refugees | 46% (2014) | | | https://www.scb.se/Statistik/_Publikationer/LE0105_2014A01_BR_BE57BR1401.pdf | National |

²³ The assumption is that after some time the spending amounts will be comparable to the amounts spent on the native population.

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|--------------|--|--|---|----------|
| | finding a job (within 5 years) | | | | | |
| | Number and proportion (%) of refugees finding a job (within 10 years) | 62.5% (2014) | | | https://www.scb.se/Statistik/_Publikationer/LE0105_2014A01_BR_BE57BR1401.pdf | National |
| Entrepreneurship | Number and proportion (% of self-employed among those finding a job) of new enterprises founded by refugees ²⁴ | | | | | National |
| Underemployed or not employed low-skilled workers | Number and proportion of long-term unemployed refugees ²⁵ | | | | | National |
| | Number and proportion of underemployed refugees ²⁶ | | | | | National |
| | Number and proportion of precariously-employed refugees ²⁷ | | | | | National |

Table 4: Social and political impacts and their indicators

| Impacts | Selected indicators | Last available data* | Forecast of growth or decrease in ten years** | Forecast of growth or decrease in twenty years* | Data sources | Regional / local*** |
|--------------------|--|-----------------------|---|---|---|---------------------|
| Demography | Impact on dependency ratio | | | | | National |
| Cultural diversity | No quantitative indicator | | | | | National |
| Security | Impact on crime rate (of refugee/total population) | | | | | National |
| Perception | Perception rates for immigration as a problem | A majority of Swedish | | | https://www.thelocal.se/20180421/six-out-of-ten-voters-in-sweden- | National |

²⁴ Calculated based on historic precedence of past immigrant flows.

²⁵ Calculated based on historic precedence of past immigrant flows.

²⁶ Calculated based on historic precedence of past immigrant flows.

²⁷ Calculated based on historic precedence of past immigrant flows.

| | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|--|--|--------------------------|----------|
| | | voters (60%) want Sweden to accept fewer refugees than it currently does. | | | want-fewer-refugees-poll | |
| Political tensions caused by migration | The relevance of immigration in political debates and elections | | | | | National |

Annex II Policy and actors' classification

Table 5: Policy classification: different types of policies for different targets at country and local level

| Category | Types | Country-level policies targeting: | | Regional or local-level policies targeting: | | Assessment* |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|-------------|
| | | Asylum seekers | Refugee status holders | Asylum seekers | Refugee status holders | |
| Initial reception, emergency measures, and referrals | Emergency housing Emergency health care Basic subsistence needs Reception and recognition provisions Residence permits Family reunification Settlement restrictions Referrals | Initial registration by the Migrationsverket (in eight specific locations), then distribution to regional asylum centres or own accommodation. | Three-year temporary permit for refugees allowing family reunification if the application is made within three months of the reference person receiving their permit. 13 Months' temporary residence permits for beneficiaries of subsidiarity protection with no right to family reunification. Temporary permit allows the holder to live and work in Sweden. | N/A Initial reception, emergency measures and referrals are organised on the country-level. | N/A Initial reception, emergency measures and referrals are organised on the country level. | 3 |
| Relocation | Sharing responsibility for receiving refugees | N/A Relocation is only applicable to refugees. | Sweden participated in initial relocation from Greece and Italy before being exempted by Council Decision. | N/A Relocation is only applicable to refugees. | N/A Relocation is organised on the country level. | 2 |
| Resettlement | Humanitarian corridors | N/A Resettlement is only applicable to refugees. | Each year, the Swedish Government and Parliament provide the Migrationsverket with the resources to resettle a certain number of refugees to Sweden. The focus of the selections is determined by the Swedish Government. In 2017, Sweden received 3,400 quota refugees, and in 2018, the number of places was increased to 5,000. The Migrationsverket, in collaboration with UNHCR, determines which refugee groups will be considered for | N/A Resettlement is only applicable to refugees. | N/A Resettlement is organised on the country level. | 3 |

| | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|---|
| | | | resettlement from different countries. | | | |
| Housing / accommodation | Housing/accommodation Housing support | Asylum seekers have three options regarding housing: firstly, housing offered by the Migrationsverket (normally an apartment in an apartment building). In this case, accommodation is provided for free (in case asylum seekers do not possess any resources), these apartment buildings are privately operated. The second option is own accommodation organised by the asylum seekers via relatives or acquaintances. In this case, the Migrationsverket does not subsidise it. The last option is other housing, which mainly consists of unaccompanied minors in municipal housing/family homes/with relatives. | A small number of people in the system of the Migrationsverket have valid refugee status (in 2018 3.3% in all of Sweden). If an asylum seeker is granted a residence permit based on employment, they should arrange their own housing. | In Sweden, a solidarity-based refugee reception system has been in place since 2016, which foresees that all municipalities within Sweden can be required to receive newly arrived refugees and other beneficiaries of protection, as well as their family members, for settlement. This assignment shall be based on each municipality's local labour market, its population size and the overall number of newly arrived immigrants, unaccompanied minors and asylum seekers already living in the municipality. | A small number of people in the system of the Migrationsverket have valid refugee status (in 2018 3.3% in all of Sweden). If an asylum seeker is granted a residence permit based on employment, they should arrange their own housing. | 3 |
| Healthcare | Emergency/urgent healthcare Full health care | Asylum seekers have the right to free medical examination, emergency, urgent medical, gynaecological, prenatal or dental care. Asylum seekers under the age of 18 are entitled to the same care as other children in Sweden. Additional medical services are available on payment basis. | Refugees with a valid status have the same access to healthcare as nationals. | The county council/region decides which type of healthcare asylum seekers can receive. | N/A Healthcare for refugees is organised on the country level. | 3 |
| Social assistance and income support | Social assistance services Income support, eligibility for welfare benefits | Asylum seekers receive an allowance from the Migrationsverket. The amount of the allowance | Refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiarity protection have the same right to social benefits as nationals. A | N/A Social assistance and income support are | N/A Social assistance and income | 3 |

| | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|--|---|--|---|-----|
| | | differs between asylum seekers living in accommodation provided by the Migrationsverket (allowance only covers pocket money) or their own accommodation (allowance covers food and pocket money). | specific remuneration system is provided to 18-64 year-old refugees within the first two years (Introduction benefit foreseen by Lag (2010:197)). If upon the end of the period, refugees are unable to support themselves they have the right to the same social welfare as nationals. | organised on the country-level. | support are organised on the country level. | |
| Education and training | School enrolment and attendance Adult education Vocational education and training | Underage asylum seekers have full access to school on a voluntary basis. Children between the age of 16 and 19 must attend preparatory courses improving their language skills and knowledge of core subjects. Asylum seekers over the age of 18 upon their arrival do not have access to education. | Beneficiaries of international protection have a right to education at all levels. There might be, however, some specific requirements regarding language skills. | N/A Education and training are organised on the country level. | N/A Education and training are organised on the country level. | 2.5 |
| Labour market access/ integration | Skills assessment/validation Active labour market policy (counselling, mentoring, job search assistance, entrepreneurship promotion, and social networks) Grants and preparatory courses Employment subsidies, apprenticeships, traineeships, on-the-job training, temporary/voluntary work Unemployment benefits | Asylum seekers are not obliged to have a work permit if they can provide identity documents. There are limitations regarding the working sectors requiring certified skills (e.g. medicine). | Assistance is provided within the Introduction Plan and falls under the responsibility of the Public Employment Service. | N/A Labour market access/ integration is organised on the country level. | N/A Labour market access/ integration for refugees is organised on the country level by the Public Employment Service. | 3 |
| Social and political integration | Early orientation programmes (language, practical orientation, civic education etc.) Integration programmes such as sport, culture, diversity promotion Political participation (local level) Residence and religion rights | N/A There are no initiatives in place for asylum seekers in the area of social and political integration. | Upon obtaining a residence permit, a refugee is entitled to participate in the Introduction Plan, which provides language training, courses on Swedish society, vocational education and training experience. | N/A There are no initiatives in place for asylum seekers in the area of social and political integration. | N/A Social and political integration are organised on the country level by the Public Employment Service. | 2.5 |

| | | | | | | |
|-------|----------------------------|--|--|--|--|---|
| Other | Appeal to asylum decisions | There are two levels of appeal. A first appeal is submitted before the Migration Court, and an onward appeal before the Migration Court of Appeal. First instance decisions must be appealed within three weeks, whether under the regular or the accelerated procedure. Decisions of the Migration Court of Appeal are final and non-appealable. When the Migration Court of Appeal hands down its decision, the expulsion order is enforceable, and the rejected applicant is expected to leave Sweden voluntarily within four weeks (two weeks for manifestly unfounded claims). In exceptional circumstances where there is a threat to society, the time limit can be even shorter. | The same rules apply to extending residence permits for refugees. | N/A The appeal to asylum decisions is organised on the country level. | N/A The appeal to asylum decisions is organised on the country level. | 3 |
| Other | Citizenship | N/A Citizenship is only applicable to refugees. | To become a citizen, refugees must be able to prove their identity, be over 18 years old, have a permanent residence permit/ residence card, fulfil the period of residence and have a good command of the language. | N/A Citizenship is only applicable to refugees. | N/A Citizenship is organised on the country level by the Public Employment Service. | 3 |

Table 6: Actors classification: A picture of the actors involved in the asylum seekers and refugees' system at country level

| Levels | Bureaucrats* | Politicians* | Experts* | Special interest* | Diffused interest* |
|---------------|---|---|---|---|--|
| International | European Commission Frontex IOM UNHCR | MEPs | Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography Migration Policy Centre EUROSTAT | European Council on Refugees and Exiles | European NGO Platform Asylum and Migration Organisation for Refuge, Asylum & Migration Refugees International Save the Children |
| National | Ministry of Justice Migrationsverket Migration Court Migration Court of Appeal | MPs | Centre on Global Migration (University of Gothenburg) Statistics Sweden | Swedish Network of Refugee Support Groups | Swedish Refugee Advice Centre Centre for Refugee Solidarity |
| Regional | County council | Members of county councils | Migration Studies Department (Stockholm University) | Swedish Network of Refugee Support Groups | Refugees Welcome Stockholm |
| Local | Municipality council | Mayor (Anders Lago) Members of municipality councils | Immigrant-institutet | <i>Organisationer av och för invandrare en tjänst från Immigrant-institutet</i> | <i>Samordnare för Flykting- och Integration</i> |

Annex III Network analysis

Table 7: Actors classification: The actors involved in the specific intervention under analysis

| Levels | Bureaucrats* ²⁸ | Politicians* | Experts* | Special interest* | Diffused interest* |
|---------------|----------------------------|---|----------|---|---|
| International | - | - | | | |
| National | Ministry of Employment | - | | | |
| Regional | - | - | | | |
| Local | Municipality of Södertälje | Mayor (Boel Godner) Ingela Nylund Watz (MP) Nils Carlsson Lundbäck (MP) | | Telge Group Migrationsverket (Swedish Migration Agency) Arbetsförmedlingen (Swedish Public Employment Service), Försäkringskassan (Swedish Social Insurance Agency) Skatteverket (Swedish Tax Agency) | Peab Mekonomen Sodexo Scania ICA Maxi |

²⁸ * Bureaucratic actors are those actors that base the legitimacy of their intervention in the policy process on the claim that formal rules and procedures confer them a specific responsibility in the process; Political actors are those actors that base the legitimacy of their intervention on the fact of representing citizens as they enjoy citizens' consensus; experts are those actors that base the legitimacy of their intervention in the policy process on the claim of having the knowledge needed in order to solve the problem; special interest actors (grey nodes) are those actors that base the legitimacy of their intervention on the fact that they are directly affected by the policy decision, meaning that they will try to maximise the benefit/cost ratio from their specific point of view; general interest actors (pink nodes) are those actors that base the legitimacy of their intervention in the policy process on the fact that the interests they represent are general (e.g. NGOs, etc.) and on the fact that they represent groups that cannot defend their interests by themselves.

Table 8: Mapping the actors and the roles

| Actor no. | Actors | Role in the network | | | | | | | | |
|-----------|--|-----------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------|------------------------------|---|--------------------|--------------------------------|---|
| | | Setting the legal framework | Political responsible | Technical responsible | Financing | Programming the intervention | Coordinator in the implementation phase | Policy implementer | Monitoring and data collection | Actors mobilising relevant resources (legal, political, knowledge, human resources) |
| Actor 1 | Ministry of Employment | X | | | | | | | | |
| Actor 2 | Municipality of Södertälje | | X | | | X | | X | | |
| Actor 3 | Mayor (Boel Godner) | | X | | | | | | | X |
| Actor 4 | Ingela Nylund Watz (MP) | | | | | | | | | X |
| Actor 5 | Nils Carlsson Lundbäck (MP) | | | | | | | | | X |
| Actor 6 | Telge group | | | X | | X | | | | |
| Actor 7 | Migrationsverket (Swedish Migration Agency) | | | | | X | | | | |
| Actor 8 | Abetsförmedlingen (Swedish Public Employment Service), | | | | | X | X | | | |
| Actor 9 | Försäkringskassan (Swedish Social Insurance Agency) | | | | | X | | | | |
| Actor 10 | Skatteverket (Swedish Tax Agency) | | | | | X | | | | |
| Actor 11 | Peab | | | | X | | | | | |
| Actor 12 | Mekonomen | | | | X | | | | | |
| Actor 13 | Sodexo | | | | X | | | | | |
| Actor 14 | Scania | | | | X | | | | | |


| | | Role in the network | | | | | | | | |
|-----------|----------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------|------------------------------|---|--------------------|--------------------------------|---|
| Actor no. | Actors | Setting the legal framework | Political responsible | Technical responsible | Financing | Programming the intervention | Coordinator in the implementation phase | Policy implementer | Monitoring and data collection | Actors mobilising relevant resources (legal, political, knowledge, human resources) |
| Actor 15 | ICA Maxi | | | | X | | | | | |

Table 9: Relationship matrix - programming phase (please specify actors previously listed)

| | Actor 1 | Actor 2 | Actor 3 | Actor 4 | Actor 5 | Actor 6 | Actor 7 | Actor 8 | Actor 9 | Actor 10 | Actor 11 | Actor 12 | Actor 13 | Actor 14 | Actor 15 |
|----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Actor 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Actor 2 | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Actor 3 | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Actor 4 | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Actor 5 | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Actor 6 | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Actor 7 | | X | | | | X | | | | | | | | | |
| Actor 8 | X | X | | | | X | X | | | | | | | | |
| Actor 9 | | X | | | | X | X | X | | | | | | | |
| Actor 10 | | X | | | | X | X | X | X | | | | | | |
| Actor 11 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Actor 12 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Actor 13 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Actor 14 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Actor 15 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Table 10: Relationship matrix - implementation phase (Please specify actors previously listed)

| | Actor 1 | Actor 2 | Actor 3 | Actor 4 | Actor 5 | Actor 6 | Actor 7 | Actor 8 | Actor 9 | Actor 10 | Actor 11 | Actor 12 | Actor 13 | Actor 14 | Actor 15 |
|----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Actor 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Actor 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Actor 3 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Actor 4 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Actor 5 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Actor 6 | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Actor 7 | | | | | | X | | | | | | | | | |
| Actor 8 | | X | | | | X | | | | | | | | | |
| Actor 9 | | | | | | X | | X | | | | | | | |
| Actor 10 | | | | | | X | | X | | | | | | | |
| Actor 11 | | X | | | | X | | | | | | | | | |
| Actor 12 | | X | | | | X | | X | | | X | | | | |
| Actor 13 | | X | | | | X | | X | | | X | X | | | |
| Actor 14 | | X | | | | X | | X | | | X | X | X | | |
| Actor 15 | | X | | | | X | | X | | | X | X | X | X | |



ESPON 2020 – More information

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