

CASE STUDIES REPORT //

**Territorial impacts of COVID-19
and policy answers in European
regions and cities**

Mayotte island (France)

Case Study report // July 2022

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Coordination

Michaela Gensheimer, Andreea China, Stefania Rigillo, ESPON EGTC (Luxembourg)
Sebastien Bourdin, Mohamed Hachaichi, EM Normandie Business School (France)

Author

Victoire Cottereau (Université de Mayotte)

Advisory group

Luisa Pedrazzini, ESPON Monitoring Committee member (Italy), Terézia Somhegyi, ESPON Monitoring Committee member (Hungary), Francesco Molica, Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions – CPMR, Igor Caldeira, Committee of the Regions – COR, Nicolas Reynes, European Confederation of Local Intermediate Authorities – CEPLI, Quentin Delhay, CEPLI, Association des Provinces Wallonnes – APW (Belgium), Andreas Listing, CEPLI, Region Hannover (Germany).

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Inspire Policy Making with Territorial Evidence

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Case Study Report // September 2022

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This document is a final report.

The information contained herein is subject to change and does not commit the ESPON EGTC and the countries participating in the ESPON 2020 Cooperation Programme.

The final version of the report will be published as soon as approved.

Table of Contents

Abbreviations	7
Introduction	8
Research Methods.....	9
1 Characteristics of the study area	10
1.1 Economic characteristics of the study area.....	11
1.2 Social characteristics of the study area.....	16
1.3 Governance characteristics of the study area.....	24
2 Impacts of COVID-19	26
2.1 Main economic impacts	26
2.2 Main social and demographic impacts	28
3 COVID-19 policy response	30
3.1 Political context.....	30
3.2 Overview of proactive policies.....	30
4 Policy impacts	36
4.1 Results of the proactive policies.....	36
4.2 Impacts on governance structures	36
4.3 Consequences for cooperation between stakeholders	36
4.4 Policy funding.....	37
5 Future policy directions	38
5.1 Future policy directions	38
5.2 Regional recommendations	38
5.2.1 Policy Recommendations	38
5.2.2 Governance Recommendation	39
5.2.3 Territorial Recommendations	39
5.2.4 Financial Recommendations	39
6 References	41

List of figures, charts and tables

List of maps

Map 1 French maritime area in Mayotte	8
Map 2 Location of Mayotte.....	10
Map 3 Distribution and proportion of families receiving food aid in Mayotte during the COVID-19 pandemic.....	33

List of charts

Figure 1 Gross domestic product of the French regions in 2018.....	11
Figure 2 Gross domestic product per capita of the French regions in 2018.....	12
Figure 3 Gross domestic product per job in the French regions in 2018.....	12
Figure 4 Gross domestic product per capita of the countries in the Indian Ocean zone in 2014	13
Figure 5 Share of the economic sectors in the French regions in 2019	15
Figure 6 Share of institutional sectors in the total value added of Mayotte in 2014	15
Figure 7 Age pyramid of Mayotte in 2017	16
Figure 8 Changes in housing and housing conditions in Mayotte between 1997 and 2017.....	17
Figure 9 Comfort of main residences by type of housing in 2017	17
Figure 10 Educational attainment in the French regions in 2018	18
Figure 11 Unemployment rate in the French regions in 2020	19
Figure 12 Activity status of 15-64 year olds in Mayotte and France (excluding Mayotte).....	20
Figure 13 Poverty rate in the French regions in 2018	21
Figure 14 Population trends in the French regions between 2012 and 2017	21
Figure 15 Evolution of the population of Mayotte from 1958 to 2017	22
Figure 16 Fertility rate in the French regions in 2020.....	22
Figure 17 Evolution of the natural and migratory balances in the French regions between 2013 and 2018	23
Figure 18 Main components of family consumption	26
Figure 19 Indicator of business trends in Mayotte.....	27
Figure 20 Consumer price index (year-on-year)	27
Figure 21 Category A jobseekers at the end of the month.....	28
Figure 22 Evolution of outstanding loans granted to economic agents (in millions of euros).....	28
Figure 23 Roles and responsibilities of different institutions in the distribution of food vouchers in Mayotte.....	32

List of photographs

Photograph 1 The future Mayotte technopole	14
Photograph 2 A street hydrant	34

List of tables

Table 1: Interview participants	9
Table 2 Just transition policies.....	30
Table 3 Green transition policies.....	31
Table 4 Smart transition policies.....	31


Abbreviations

AFD	French Development Agency
ARS	Regional Health Agency
BAC	Baccalaureate
CADEMA	Agglomeration community of Mamoudzou and Dombéni
CCAS	Communal center of social action
CCI	Chamber of Commerce and Industry
CHM	Mayotte Hospital Center
CUFR	University of Mayotte
DEETS	Regional Directorate of Economy, Employment, Labor and Solidarity
DIHAL	Interministerial Delegation for Housing and Access to Housing
DJSCS	Directorate of Youth, Sports and Social Cohesion
EU	European Union
FEAD	European Fund for Aid to the Most Deprived
GDP	Gross domestic product
IEDOM	Institute for Economic Studies of the Overseas Departments
ICA	Business climate indicator
ILO	International Labour Office
INSEE	French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies
MEDEF	French employers' organization
NGO	non-governmental organisation
PJJ	judicial protection of youth
SAME	Mayotte Public Water Company
UDCCAS	Directorate of communal social action centers

Introduction

Map 1 French maritime area in Mayotte

Mayotte Map



This case study report examines the policy response to COVID-19 seen in Mayotte, an overseas department of France. More specifically, it explores the 'proactive' policies that were introduced in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and assesses whether the crisis presented a 'window of opportunity' for regional and local authorities to promote specific policy agendas concerning spatial planning and territorial targeting. The report is organised into the following six main sections:

1. **Characteristics of the study area:** Describes the main socio-economic and governance characteristics of Mayotte.
2. **Impacts of COVID-19:** Highlights the socio-economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic seen in Mayotte.
3. **COVID-19 policy response:** Provides an overview of Mayotte's policy response in relation to three key thematic areas, namely 'just transition' (social policies), 'green transition' (climate policies) and 'smart transition' (innovation policies).

4. **Policy impacts:** Assesses the main socio-economic, governance and financial impacts of the introduced policy measures.
5. **Future policy directions:** Examines the medium- and long-term policy directions of Mayotte and analyses whether the identified policies can be transferred to other European Union (EU) regions.
6. **Policy recommendations:** Provides policymakers and practitioners with political, governance, territorial and financial recommendations.

Research Methods

A two-stage approach was used in this case study.

As a first step, an extensive literature search was conducted to:

- document the main characteristics of Mayotte;
- assess the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the local society and economy according to various national and local statistical sources; and
- document Mayotte's policy responses as reflected in policy documents and online media sources.

As a second step, semi-structured interviews were conducted with representatives from the most important local administrations, structures and institutions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the private sector. The aim of these interviews was to better document the impacts of the pandemic, the associated policy responses, the impacts of those policy responses and the future of both local and regional policies. Further details concerning the interview participants are presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Interview participants


N°	Organisation of the interviewed	Position of the interviewed	Date
1	Regional Health Agency (ARS)	Director of Public Health	01/2022
2	ARS	Environmental Health Prevention Officer	02/2022
3	Dembéni Mamoudzou Agglomeration Community (CADEMA)	Director of Environment and Sustainable Development	11/2021
4	CADEMA	Administration and Finance Officer Study Officer for the Fight Against Substandard Housing	12/2021
5	Red Cross	Coordinator of a Mobile Social Team Head of Department Reception and Guidance Social Watch	12/2021
6	University Centre of Mayotte	Director	12/2021
7	Directorate for the Economy, Employment, Labour and Solidarity (DEETS)	Inspector of Health and Social Action/Head of the Solidarity and Integration Unit	01/2022
8	Private Sector MEDEF/CCI	Company Director	01/2022
9	Médecins du Monde (MDM)	General Coordinator	01/2022
10	Pôle Emploi	Director General Director of the Kaweni Branch	01/2022
11	Prefecture	Sub-Prefect	12/2021
12	Prefecture	Delegate of the Prefect	12/2021
13	Prefecture	Policy Officer Social Cohesion/Fight Against Poverty	12/2021
14	Union départementale des centres communaux d'action sociale (UDCCAS)	President Director of the CCAS of Dzaoudzi Labattoir	01/2022

1 Characteristics of the study area

The island of Mayotte is a territory of 374 km² that is located in the southern hemisphere between Madagascar and East Africa. According to the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE), the territory had a population of approximately 260,000 in 2017. The smallest French overseas department, it has a tropical maritime climate characterised by a rainy season and a dry season.

The history of Mayotte renders the 101st French department a unique territory. The island has been a French department for only ten years. Not only does it stand out due to its administrative organisation and legal status, but also due to the composition of its population. The island differs from metropolitan France because of its strong demographic growth. According to the INSEE, the fertility rate in Mayotte was 4.16 children per woman in 2020 and more than half of the island's population was under 18 years old, making it the youngest French department. The island is located in a multilingual region and its population is predominantly Muslim, with a significant proportion of inhabitants coming from neighbouring islands (according to the INSEE, 48% of Mayotte's population was of Comorian nationality in 2017). Indeed, the weight of a common past and the geographical proximity to the island of Anjouan (70 km) are responsible for the high level of immigration from the Comoros, which is currently a source of considerable debate and conflict in both Mayotte and mainland France.

Map 2 Location of Mayotte



Source: www.researchgate.net/figure/Localisation-de-lile-de-Mayotte-dans-le-canal-du-Mozambique-sudouest-de-Ocean_fig1_331701136

1.1 Economic characteristics of the study area


Main economic activities

The main economic activities in Mayotte are trade, construction, services and tourism. Many new businesses have been created on the island in recent years in the building (structural work and finishing work), restaurant and sales sectors. However, the industrial and agricultural sectors remain poorly developed. A large proportion of Mayotte's population works in the informal economy (trade, construction, agriculture, childcare, etc.). Moreover, many others are employed in public administration, the medical sector and schools (due to the youth of the population).

Gross domestic product

According to the INSEE, the gross domestic product (GDP) of Mayotte was 2.4 billion euros in 2018. As a consequence, it is the French department that generates the least amount of wealth, including in proportion to the number of inhabitants.


Figure 1 Gross domestic product of the French regions in 2018



Source: www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/4632225#tableau-figure3_radio1


In addition, according to INSEE, the GDP per capita in Mayotte was only 9251 euros in 2018, whereas the French average was 35,252 euros. This provides further evidence that Mayotte is the French department with the lowest GDP. In fact, the island's GDP per capita is almost four times lower than the national level. The apparent labour productivity (GDP per job) is also significantly lower than that seen in other French departments, including overseas departments: €51,686 per job when compared with €83,204 at the national level. The very informal economic fabric of Mayotte's society partly explains this low productivity.

Figure 2 Gross domestic product per capita of the French regions in 2018



Source: www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/4632225#figure3_radio2

Figure 3 Gross domestic product per job in the French regions in 2018




Source: www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/4632225#tableau-figure3_radio3

However, on a regional scale (South West Indian Ocean), Mayotte's GDP per capita is among the highest (excluding Reunion Island). More specifically, it lies between two of the most advanced economies in the

region, below that of the Seychelles and just above that of Mauritius. Interestingly, despite the dynamism of its economy in recent years, South Africa's GDP per capita has not yet caught up with that of Mayotte. Finally, the gap between Mayotte and the other countries in the region is still considerable. Mayotte's GDP per capita is 13 times higher than that of the Comoros, 11 times higher than that of Tanzania, 17 times higher than that of Mozambique and 25 times higher than that of Madagascar.

Figure 4 Gross domestic product per capita of the countries in the Indian Ocean zone in 2014



Sources : INSEE, World Bank Indicators

Source: INSEE, World Bank Indicators

Innovation

The high technology sectors are not yet present in Mayotte. However, structuring projects for innovation have been established on the island.

In 2020, we created the first 'Pépîte Mayotte', a centre for innovation in terms of entrepreneurship and skills transfer. In May 2020, there was a multiparty agreement between the Departmental Council, the CUFR, the rectorate and the CCI, and then within the framework of the 'Pépîte' we launched the first University Diploma student entrepreneur, which allows students to obtain the national status of student entrepreneur, with the objective being to train young people to create or take over a company in the area of innovation, and then we also have the professional degree (management and management of organisations) created in 2015, which is also somewhat focused on the idea of creating companies and, therefore, innovation. (Aurélien Siri - Director of the CUFR)

In addition, a technology park is currently under construction in the commune of Dembéni near the CUFR. Its objective will be to support companies and provide them with equipment and laboratories in order to strengthen their technological potential. It will also direct companies towards promising sectors by promoting innovation and research.

Photograph 1 The future Mayotte technopole




Source: <https://www.mayotte.cci.fr/nos-implantations/la-technopole/>

Main economic challenges

Many economic sectors still require development in Mayotte, particularly in the fields of industry, agri-food, agriculture, tourism and high technology. According to INSEE, 55% of jobs on the island were concentrated in the non-market tertiary sector in 2019.


Moreover, INSEE data show that the market sector is not very developed in Mayotte, particularly industry and the market tertiary sector, which are responsible for far fewer jobs than at the national level. However, the non-market tertiary sector accounts for more jobs than elsewhere in France: 55% of jobs when compared with 30% at the national level. The share of jobs in the construction sector is also higher than seen at the national level (9% when compared with 6%).

Figure 5 Share of the economic sectors in the French regions in 2019



Source: www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/4632225#tableau-figure3_radio3

Figure 6 Share of institutional sectors in the total value added of Mayotte in 2014



Source: INSEE

Today, according to the prefecture, approximately 60% of Mayotte's GDP is directly linked to administrative activity. The main challenges involve the development of private economic initiatives, the business culture and the reduction of the informal economy.

We also have a large informal economy; it's hard to put a figure on it, but you can see it when you walk around, you can see it, it goes from the tyre dealer to the kebab shops, to the street vendor, the one who sells vegetables on the side of the road, etc. I think the economy is maybe 50% of informal. We don't have any statistics though. (Farid Ellouz - Business Manager)

According to a representative from MEDEF, 80% of businesses in Mayotte have fewer than 20 employees. Of those businesses, the majority are small businesses with only one employee. Still, the economic opportunities in Mayotte are important because there is very little competition in most sectors. However, according to the prefecture, the number of private sector employees in 2019 exceeded the number of people employed in the public sector for the first time, while 2020 was the year in which the most business start-ups were recorded.

1.2 Social characteristics of the study area


Main social challenges

The first major social challenge involves the fight against poverty in Mayotte. According to INSEE, 77% of the island's inhabitants live below the national poverty line, which is five times higher than the rate in metropolitan France. By way of comparison, the poverty rate is 53% in French Guiana, the poorest overseas department after Mayotte, while it is much lower in mainland France (14%).

A young population

The second major challenge concerns the youth of the population. According to the prefecture, 50% of Mayotte's inhabitants are under 18 years old. Moreover, three out of every ten people living in Mayotte are under ten years old, while 60% of inhabitants are under 24 years old. INSEE data show that the average age in Mayotte in 2017 was 23 when compared with 41 in mainland France. Currently, Mayotte's school system and economy are both experiencing difficulty meeting the expectations of this very young population, which is constantly growing. Indeed, in recent years, there has been a significant increase in insecurity, inter-village conflicts and the settling of accounts between rival gangs. As a result, Mayotte is finding it difficult to attract back those who left the island to study in metropolitan France.

Figure 7 Age pyramid of Mayotte in 2017




Source: INSEE, Mayotte population census 2017

Living conditions

The third major challenge concerns the fight against precarious housing, the improvement of living conditions and the enhancement of health. According to the INSEE, in 2017, nearly four out of every ten dwellings were fragile constructions (mostly made of sheet metal).


Figure 8 Changes in housing and housing conditions in Mayotte between 1997 and 2017



Source : INSEE, Population censuses from 1997 to 2017

Some 29% of dwellings (i.e. nearly one in three homes) in Mayotte do not have access to running water, which has significant adverse health consequences. Electricity is also unavailable in 10% of dwellings.

Figure 9 Comfort of main residences by type of housing in 2017



*House made of sheet metal, wood, vegetal or earth

Source : INSEE, Census of the population, 2017.

Mayotte has experienced a construction boom in recent years, leading to anarchic urbanism, a lack of control over land, an insufficient water supply and lack of sanitation, and an expansion of shantytowns. Unhealthy housing is visible in all of the island's localities. Two-thirds of the housing supply is overcrowded. These

conditions are conducive to the emergence of a number of health risks and the development of pathologies such as respiratory, infectious or waterborne diseases. In addition, the department of Mayotte is recognised as the largest medical desert in France. In 2019, according to the ARS, there were only 91 doctors per 100,000 inhabitants in Mayotte when compared with 308 in mainland France. In 2018, life expectancy at birth on the island was 75 years, eight years less than in mainland France. Infant mortality is also high when compared with the French average. In 2018, out of every 1000 children born alive, ten did not reach the age of one, which is three times higher than in mainland France.


It's a territory with enormous health inequalities. Roughly speaking, 80% of the population lives below the poverty line and human rights are not acquired by more than half the population. And in terms of health, well, we have 30% of the population who do not have access to drinking water, um, leading to epidemic and infectious diseases that are present in developing countries: typhoid, hepatitis, leptospirosis. (Julie Durant - Environmental Health Prevention Officer at the ARS)

Level of education and skills

The population of Mayotte is very young and characterised by a very low level of qualifications and training. In 2017, only 32% of people aged 15 or over had left the school system with a qualifying diploma, while that figure was 72% in mainland France. Mayotte is also the France department with the lowest number of graduates.

We have jobseekers who are very young. Very often, we have jobseekers who have—I don't know if it's specific to the territory—a very low level of training and qualifications. The implementation of training in basic skills is a must. (Christian Saint-Etienne - Director of the Mayotte Employment Centre)

Figure 10 Educational attainment in the French regions in 2018



Source: www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/4632225#tableau-figure2_radio2

Data from Pôle emploi (employment agency) indicate that, in 2020, 23% of jobseekers in Mayotte had no formal education. Furthermore, of those 23%, 80% were women. Some 40% of jobseekers in Mayotte had an education level below the *brevet des collèges* level, while 27% of jobseekers had a baccalaureate (BAC) or higher level education.

In Mayotte, the main challenge facing Pôle emploi today involves training, qualifying and increasing inhabitants' skills so that employers can more easily recruit. Many jobs remain unfilled due to the lack of qualified candidates. The employment centre provides a great deal of basic knowledge training in an effort to combat illiteracy as well as training leading to qualifications. According to a representative of the prefecture, 59% of Mayotte's population suffered from illiteracy in 2021, a percentage that is unmatched in other departments.


In addition, the main difficulties encountered by Pôle emploi in Mayotte are as follows:

- A significant digital divide exists in Mayotte. Pôle emploi has developed many remote services, which must be accessible and usable for those intended to use them.
- Mobility is far from straightforward. Traffic is completely saturated in Mayotte and it sometimes takes several hours to travel just a few kilometres. A person who lives in the south of the island must now travel to Mamoudzou to attend the job centre, which means that he or she has to allow a whole day for doing so. Moreover, almost 90% of employment on the island is located in the greater Mamoudzou area.

One of the main objectives of Pôle emploi is to strengthen access to employment through establishing partnerships (local authorities, CCAS, etc.) that allow for the delivery of local services. However, even when implementing this strategy, it is not possible to deliver all services.

Mayotte is the French overseas department most affected by unemployment. According to the INSEE, 22,500 people are unemployed in Mayotte, with the unemployment rate having reached 30% in 2019. Young people, women and foreign-born people remain the most affected by unemployment.


Figure 11 Unemployment rate in the French regions in 2020



Source: https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/4632225#tableau-figure5_radio2

In 2017, less than a third of people of working age in Mayotte were in employment when compared with two-thirds in France (excluding Mayotte). In addition, one-third of people of working age were recorded as economically inactive (excluding pensioners and pupils or students) when compared with just 9% at the national level.

Figure 12 Activity status of 15-64 year olds in Mayotte and France (excluding Mayotte)




Source: https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/4632225#figure6_radio1

Poverty rate

According to the INSEE, 77% of the inhabitants of Mayotte live below the national poverty line, which is five times more than in metropolitan France. All of the interviewees emphasised the extreme poverty in which the majority of the island's population lives.


A very, very poor population, housing conditions that are often degraded, difficulties in accessing basic needs, water, and healthcare, difficulties in schooling, not all children of age are yet in school, because there is significant demographic pressure due to there being almost 10,000 births per year. This is considerable. Several schools are in rotation, meaning the children go there in the evening or afternoon, sometimes with harsh living conditions alongside. There are many indicators in terms of poverty, social fragility, unemployment and the illiteracy rate, which is also very high in the area and which is a major focus of work. There are many difficulties, but in addition to that, it is a territory with a lot of solidarity, a very important associative dynamic in the political neighbourhoods, with inhabitants who mobilise, who manage to quickly federate in the event of a major problem. (Stéphanie Simonet - Delegate of the Prefect)

Figure 13 Poverty rate in the French regions in 2018

Sources: https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/4632225#tableau-figure2_radio2

Demographics

According to the INSEE, 256,500 people lived in Mayotte in 2017, while the island's population had risen to approximately 300,000 in 2021. Thus, demographic growth is very strong in Mayotte, with the threshold of 10,000 births per year having been passed in 2021. In fact, the population of Mayotte has doubled in the space of 20 years. Since 2012, the population growth has been particularly dynamic (+3.8% per year on average).

Figure 14 Population trends in the French regions between 2012 and 2017


Source: https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/4632225#graphique-figure1_radio1

Among the various interviewees, the question of the exact number of inhabitants of Mayotte represented a source of disagreement due to the large number of people living in an irregular situation.

If we were to officially count the population, there would be at least double the number of people in an irregular situation when compared with the figures announced. (Audrey Ducos - Head of the Reception, Orientation and Social Watch Service at the Red Cross)


Are we basing it on the population in good standing or on the total population of the island? It goes from 300,000 to 500,000, depending. (Bacar Ali Boto - Head of Administration and Finance at CADEMA)

Figure 15 Evolution of the population of Mayotte from 1958 to 2017



Source: INSEE - Mayotte population census

Figure 16 Fertility rate in the French regions in 2020




Source: https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/4632225#tableau-figure1_radio3

According to the INSEE, the fertility rate among the inhabitants of Mayotte was 4.16 children per woman in 2020. Today, more than half of the population is under 18 years old, with three in ten Mahorais being under 10 years old, which makes Mayotte the youngest department in France. Despite the construction and opening of new schools in Mayotte, not all children are enrolled due to the lack of space. Moreover, nursery and primary schools are only obliged to enrol children for half-days in order to meet the demand.

The characteristics of the population of Mayotte are the result of a combination of migration- and birth-related factors that are very specific to the department. Slightly more than half of all adults aged 18 to 79 who reside in Mayotte were not born there. In 2017, 48% of the population was of foreign nationality, mainly Comorian.

The apparent migratory balance was slightly positive between 2013 and 2018. Behind this relatively low migratory balance, the outgoing and incoming migratory flows to and from other French departments and abroad clearly intensified. They vary greatly according to place of birth and age. The balance of people born in Mayotte is very negative, as many young people aged between 15 and 24 leave the island to pursue their studies or look for work in mainland France. Conversely, there is a large surplus of foreign-born inhabitants, mainly from the Comoros. These inhabitants are mainly women aged between 15 and 34, as well as their children. In general, the migratory balance is generally in surplus for women and almost zero for men.

Figure 17 Evolution of the natural and migratory balances in the French regions between 2013 and 2018



Source: https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/4632225#figure1_radio2

As many of the interviewees emphasised, one of the major characteristics of Mayotte is the very high proportion of foreign nationals. This requires local adaptations of the policies in place.

We know that 52% of the population here is foreign, and 80% of that 52% live in the so-called marginal areas, because they are marginalised areas with their own way of functioning and with a way of functioning that sometimes has enormous impacts on the environment in general and on the health

of the whole population. (Hamada Sidi Sidi Moukou - Director of Environment and Sustainable Development at CADEMA)

I would say that the key characteristic of the population is the fact that a large part of it is legally resident foreigners; so these are the socio-economic data that are known and repeated, but in any case, we don't make a nation in the same way in a territory like Mayotte, which is also discovering how to formulate its citizenship with half of the population not being citizens because they are not French. So that's a specificity of the territory, and then for the part of the population that is French, we come back to what I was saying earlier, that the fact of being a citizen is something that can be learned, but not in one day, and that creates misunderstandings, misunderstandings that are sometimes difficult to manage. (Antoine Schwartz - Social Cohesion/Anti-Poverty Officer at the Prefecture)

1.3 Governance characteristics of the study area

Characteristics of the governance system

Mayotte is both a French department and a region. Thus, the island has a Departmental Council, although the prefecture has some specificities in terms of its functioning that are not seen in metropolitan France. Its organisation is close to that of the regions. The main feature is the large number of sub-prefects. First, there is a cabinet director, a deputy secretary general traditionally in charge of urban policy and social cohesion, and teams that mainly deal with illegal housing. There is also a sub-prefect in charge of the fight against illegal immigration, as well as a sub-prefect in charge of recovery, as in all of the regions. In reality, Mayotte is a deconcentrated, local state, which is very well developed. From this perspective, Mayotte is an atypical department.

The island of Mayotte became a French department in 2011, which makes it the youngest of the French departments. While some of the interviewees explained that it was necessary to provide the elected representatives with time to learn the rules of a French department, others denounced the persistence of political clientelism.

It is a department that is ten years old, and whereas the vast majority of our metropolitan departments are 200 years old and, therefore, have habits, engineering and capacities, Mayotte obviously does not have all these capacities, facilities and reflex acts. (Jérôme Millet - Sub-Prefect)

It's a characteristic of the territory: a very strong political clientelism. If you didn't vote for me, I'm not going to make sure that the drinking water gets to your house; it's like the posts in the town halls where it's always for the cousin... (Rouzouna Ahmed Abdallah - Coordinator of a Mobile Social Team at the Red Cross)

Mayotte is a small island, meaning that all of the structures and organisations are familiar with each other (prefecture, ARS, CHM, Departmental Council, associations, etc.). On a day-to-day basis, the prefecture collaborates with the ARS and associations (Red Cross, Mlezi Maoré, etc.), mainly on issues concerning precarious housing and inequalities. There is also strong collaboration between the various organisations and structures linked to health or working on health issues (ARS, CHM, Santé publique France, CUFR, associations, CADEMA, etc.). Several interviewees criticised the prefecture for not consulting other stakeholders enough.

A local specificity: Cadijal justice

The cadijal system has existed in Comoros and Mayotte since the arrival of the Shirazians between the 14th and 16th centuries. Since then, the cadi has played the role of judge, mediator and regulator of social and family life. Although the cadi bases his decisions on the Islamic Shafi'ite doctrine, he also applies customary rules from East Africa.

Originally, cadis fulfilled three types of activities:

- Judicial activity, which has been reduced as the application of ordinary law has progressed. This activity is paid for by the General Council.
- Notarial activity, including power of attorney, donations, divisions, deeds of sale, certificates of inheritance and settlement of estates. This activity is remunerated in a specific way by means of a specific scale, depending on the nature of the act.

- Social and administrative activity, such as mediation, moral and religious authority. For instance, it is up to the Grand Cadi to set the date for the beginning of Ramadan.

The cadis and secretary-registrars are civil servants of the departmental community of Mayotte, whose status was defined in 1986. The cadis are recruited through a competitive examination and invested by the prefect, in accordance with the opinion of the public prosecutor at the High Court of Appeal and a commission chaired by the president of the High Court of Appeal and composed of four religious personalities appointed by the prefect and the Grand Cadi. However, as no competition has been organised for a number of years, the youngest cadis have a contractual status.

According to figures provided by the Grand Cadi, 2238 notarial acts were issued by the cadis in 2006. The cadis are said to issue about 1000 court decisions each year.

Article 8 of the 2000 agreement on the future of Mayotte provided that the role of the cadis would be refocused on social mediation issues. The status defined in 2001 and the changes made to the personal status in 2003, therefore, lead to a progressive decline in cadi justice. To date, the cadis in Mayotte have lost a number of legal appeals and their role is now mainly that of a mediator.


2 Impacts of COVID-19

2.1 Main economic impacts

Short term: During the lockdown necessitated by the COVID-19 pandemic, businesses temporarily closed. In the 2nd quarter of 2020, the unemployment rate in Mayotte, as defined by the International Labour Office (ILO), stood at 28% of the active population. This indicated a fall of two points when compared with the 2nd quarter of 2019, mainly due to the difficulties involved in carrying out active job-seeking activities during the lockdown. Subsequently, the vast majority of companies were able to resume their activities due to national measures such as the reduction of contributions at the URSSAF level, partial unemployment and zero-interest loans through the French Development Agency (AFD). At a local level, the Departmental Council also provided assistance to small businesses, although several interviewees reported that such assistance was very difficult to obtain and so benefited few businesses.

Medium term: According to the annual report by the L'Institut d'émission des départements d'outre-mer (IEDOM), after a year marked by the COVID-19 crisis, Mayotte's economy was on the road to recovery in 2021, benefiting from, among other things, the revival of global economic activities and the optimism of economic players regarding growth forecasts. Thus, despite the still worrying health and security context, the business climate indicator (ICA) developed favourably during the 1st quarter of 2021 and remained at a good level throughout the year. This positive economic trend is based on household consumption, which remains solid, and the materialisation of public and private investments.

Figure 18 Main components of family consumption




Sources: Douanes, Préfecture de Mayotte, calculs IEDOM

The ICA only showed a slight decrease during the 2nd quarter of 2021 (while remaining well positioned), likely due to the new lockdown having much less significant consequences than that of 2020 and a highly divergent impact depending on the sector of activity.

Companies in Mayotte have seen a significant increase in freight. Today, the main problem is supply. According to a business leader and MEDEF representative, there are now fewer ships coming to Mayotte. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, a container from Asia cost 4,000 dollars, whereas it now costs 15,000 dollars. However, in Mayotte, you have to add dock dues on to the value of the goods and the cost of transport. The price of products in Mayotte is, therefore, clearly increasing.


We have exploding product prices. And in addition to the supply, but that's on a global level, we have a lack of containers because when the world economy took off again, there was a strong demand from the United States and then it's supply and demand from the United States. If on their maritime route they order 1,000,000 containers and on our route in proportion it will be maybe one container, if you look at the percentage it's necessarily more interesting, you see all these boats and these containers on these routes and we are a bit like the last wheel on the carriage. Even at the time when maritime freight was doing well, a director of a big company here, who had worked a lot in Africa and all over the world, told me 'It's like spoon-feeding'. (Farid Ellouz, Company Director)

Figure 19 Indicator of business trends in Mayotte



Source : Business survey, IEDOM


Figure 20 Consumer price index (year-on-year)



Source : INSEE, monthly data

Despite the inflationary context since the end of 2020, foreign trade has recorded a significant increase in imports, as driven by all types of goods, both those intended for households and those intended for business use. The formalisation of the labour market in Mayotte is increasing, leading to an increase in the number of registrations with the Pôle emploi (employment agency).


Figure 21 Category A jobseekers at the end of the month



Sources : Pôle emploi, par l'IEDOM

Overall activity improved throughout 2021, particularly during the first half of the year. This development has mainly benefited the construction and trade sectors, while market services have continued to experience difficulties.

Figure 22 Evolution of outstanding loans granted to economic agents (in millions of euros)



Source : IEDOM. Surf

Finally, the dynamism of Mayotte's banking activity has been maintained: savings collection is increasing and the banking system's support for the financing of the economy continues to grow, albeit with less intensity than in previous years.

2.2 Main social and demographic impacts

Short term: The main short-term impact of COVID-19 in Mayotte has been the immediate cessation of the informal economy (selling fruit and vegetables on the roadside, undeclared work on building sites, childcare, etc.). Several NGO representatives in Mayotte emphasised the fact that the majority of the population work on a day-to-day basis out of necessity, being obliged to consider one day after another due to their highly precarious social and administrative situation. The end of the informal economy meant the end of the daily

inflow of money for food and drink. As a consequence, the population very quickly felt the need for food aid and help in accessing water, in addition to explanations regarding the pandemic. The pandemic, therefore, very quickly degraded the living conditions of Mayotte's poorest people, who found themselves crammed into precarious housing mainly made of sheet metal.

First of all, it's incomprehension, nobody is prepared, it's a big surprise. And what is confinement, what is COVID? I have to show a reason when I go out, why? It was difficult to ask people to stay in confinement when they live in bangas where it's 50°C during the day, they have no access to water, electricity, healthcare. It's been hard to cope here. People took it lightly, they said we have to go on living. (Audrey Ducos - Head of Service, Reception and Orientation, Social Watch at the Red Cross)

During this period of initial confinement, it was very hard, because many people making a living from this informal activity were left with nothing, not fitting into any scheme. (Stéphanie Simonet - Delegate of the Prefect)

Furthermore, Mayotte entered lockdown at the same time as the whole of the national territory during the first wave of the pandemic. However, at the time Mayotte was confined, only one case of COVID-19 had been detected on the island. The wave of contaminations arrived after a delay, requiring an extension of the lockdown period and local adaptations. Ultimately, despite periods marked by very high rates COVID-19, Mayotte has not recorded many deaths from the disease due to the youth of its population. As of 1st April 2022, Mayotte has had 36,891 confirmed cases and 187 deaths.

Medium term: The many plans and projects for combating poverty in Mayotte are continuing as they were before the pandemic. To date, as the data on the median standard of living and the poverty rate have not been updated, it is not possible to really define the social and demographic impacts of the pandemic over the medium term.

3 COVID-19 policy response

3.1 Political context

Specific regional and local policy objectives and strategies

The COVID-19 crisis did not change any existing or developing policies, although it did reinforce certain strategies that had begun to be introduced prior to the pandemic. The best example is the strengthening of community health, which is also known as outreach health, seen since the pandemic. When faced with a very poor population who often speak little or no French, the development of community health makes it possible to directly determine what is happening with the population and, consequently, to put strategies in place that are better adapted to the local population. The decision-making structures and organisations have all now strengthened their collaboration with local associations. Today, community health has become a key component of public health in Mayotte.

According to various ARS representatives, some national measures adopted to combat the pandemic were quickly found to be unsuitable for the territory of Mayotte. For example, a large part of the population was unable to fill in the required travel certificates in French. In addition, it should be remembered that many people without drinking water in their homes have to go to standpipes several times a day to fill water cans. Moreover, there is also often overcrowding in unsanitary homes. As a result, a strict lockdown was only implemented in Mayotte for a short period.

We had the details of the field, that is to say, very quickly we knew about the attestation business. People were selling attestations for a lack of movement, for a lack of printers; it went up to €2 per attestation, filled out, so the person prints it out, fills it out and then gives you the right to move around, um, the water traffic went up to €5 for a 20-litre can. We're at €1.40 per cubic metre. But, of course, it's madness. (Julie Durant - Environmental Health Prevention Officer at the ARS)

After a fortnight, checks were only performed on national roads in order to prevent unjustified travel between villages. Furthermore, the prevention policy was also adjusted, including the distribution of free masks, introduction of prevention spots in Shimaoré, implementation of mobile screening to go to the poorest and/or most remote neighbourhoods, free tests, etc. According to one ARS representative, the COVID-19 crisis made the French Ministry of Health realise that the overseas territories are different and that they could share the same national objectives by adapting the implementation locally.

3.2 Overview of proactive policies

Table 2 provides an overview of the main 'just transition' policies introduced to support the most vulnerable groups in society against the worst socio-economic challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. The fight against poverty, inequality and social exclusion has been the top priority for all structures and policymakers during the various waves of COVID-19. The main policies put in place during the pandemic (i.e. food stamps and access to water) are similar to the humanitarian aid policies that exist in Africa today. As such, one prefecture official commented that he had sought advice from an expert in food package distribution in Africa in an effort to avoid making mistakes.

Table 2 Just transition policies

Policy area of interest	Description of the policy	Short, medium or long term
Fight against poverty	Emergency food aid: Distribution of food vouchers to the poorest inhabitants.	This policy was put in place by DEETS and the prefecture during the various waves of COVID-19. Today, the distribution of food vouchers continues through associations and CCAS.
Fight against poverty	Installation of water ramps and new fire hydrants.	This policy was put in place by the ARS during the various waves of COVID-19. The pandemic allowed for the installation of new standpipes on the island. These have been

		installed on a permanent basis. The water ramps represented an urgent policy response to allow the population to have better access to water during the health crisis. Some of the ramps have now been dismantled, but the facilities remain operational. The water ramps could be quickly reinstalled in the event of a new health crisis.
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Table 3 Green transition policies

Policy area of interest	Description of the policy	Short, medium or long term
	No green transition policy was in place during the pandemic.	

Table 4 Smart transition policies

Policy area of interest	Description of the policy	Short, medium or long term
Combating illiteracy	Funding of mobile digital access points and opening of many Maison France services. The aim is for the whole population to have access to Internet connection points and places where they can complete their administrative procedures online.	These measures were greatly accelerated during the COVID-19 crisis. They are still ongoing, with the aim being to reduce the very strong digital divide in Mayotte.

Policies maintained throughout the different waves of COVID-19

Proactive policy concerning emergency food aid:

This was introduced during the first wave by various actors.

- DEETS (Regional Directorate for the Economy, Employment, Labour and Solidarity) and the prefecture, in collaboration with the Red Cross and many local associations, proceeded with the distribution of food vouchers. This distribution of food vouchers started two to three weeks after the beginning of the first lockdown.
- Some town halls, the CCAS and the Departmental Council also distributed food parcels and/or vouchers.
- Some associations also took the initiative to distribute food vouchers, without any link to the prefecture.

The context of implementation: According to the DEETS 2020 Monitoring and Evaluation Report, this policy was intended to serve as a response to food stress resulting from the deprivation of informal resources due to the lockdown. The provision of unconditional emergency food aid was intended to:


- avoid human tragedies due to undernutrition during the acute phase of the crisis;
- ensure that the most vulnerable people, as identified during the acute phase, were protected during the chronic phase of the crisis (from May to July 2020); and
- support the most vulnerable during the recovery phase (from August to December 2020), which saw a very gradual and partial resumption of informal activities, albeit under the constraint of curfews and barrier gestures.

The principle: The unconditional emergency food aid consisted of distributing to the most vulnerable families either books of ten service vouchers worth €3.5 each or food vouchers worth €10, €20 or €40. These two types of vouchers made it possible to buy food and hygiene products from the majority of shops in the area.

Roles and responsibilities: At the beginning of the crisis, Mayotte had only one approved food aid operator. As a result, the DEETS and the prefecture mobilised the associative fabric of the island’s social cohesion, youth and urban policy in order to create a territorial network of operators capable of reaching precarious families in even the most remote areas. The Rectorat de Mayotte completed this network by taking charge of distributions in schools through the voluntary work of teachers and associations linked to the national education system. All of these voluntary associations were authorised to take part in food aid operations via a prefectorial agreement signed by the Commissioner for the Fight Against Poverty. The whole system was coordinated by the Solidarity and Integration Unit of the DEETS (formerly the Social Cohesion Unit of the DJSCS), which received the delegation of national credits reimbursable by the FEAD, signed an agreement with the CRF for the purchase of food vouchers and then ensured that the distribution network was supplied with them. Moreover, it received the service vouchers and supplied the distribution network with them. Finally, the operation was authorised by prefectorial decree in April 2020.

The flow chart below illustrates the adopted process, in addition to the roles and responsibilities of the different institutions and operators involved in the scheme.

Figure 23 Roles and responsibilities of different institutions in the distribution of food vouchers in Mayotte




Source: DEETS Mayotte Emergency 2020 Monitoring and Evaluation Report

The modus operandi: The first distribution method, which was adopted from April to July 2020, was based on the identification of beneficiaries on the basis of declarations, while the distribution scale was correlated with the declared sizes of the families. As the objective was to intervene rapidly so as to mitigate any risk of human tragedy linked to a lack of food, it was materially impossible to deploy a social survey to objectify the need for food aid among all of the potential beneficiaries. Consequently, a post-distribution census was instituted in an effort to limit duplication and improve knowledge of vulnerable groups through constituting a reliable database.

The second distribution method was activated during the summer of 2020. With the lockdown lifted, emergency food aid was seen as a repeatable support for families in a stabilised crisis context. Due to being less caught up in the emergency, associations could deploy small-scale social surveys to assess need on the basis of common eligibility criteria and take into account a rough assessment of the available resources. As for the coordination, it could analyse the list of identified beneficiaries to eliminate duplicates, avoid fraud or finely tune the scales to families' situations.

Map 3 Distribution and proportion of families receiving food aid in Mayotte during the COVID-19 pandemic



Source: DEETS Mayotte Report/COVID Emergency Food Aid Monitoring and Evaluation Report 2020/August 2021.

Territorial organisation: By the end of 2020, the emergency food aid scheme had mobilised around 470 volunteers from 35 distribution operators, including 30 associations and four institutions (Préfecture, Rectorat, ARS, PJJ, DEETS).

Operational performance: Between April and December 2020, the emergency food aid scheme provided support to 36,252 families through 50,809 distributions. This amounted to three times more than those identified within the framework of the common law food aid system, which listed approximately 12,000 families. These families represent 175,624 individuals, including 51,598 adults and 124,026 children. The map below shows the geographical locations and proportions of families receiving food vouchers as at 2 July 2021.

Evaluation of the operation: The 2020 operation can be considered effective due to achieving its objectives, namely safeguarding populations during the acute phase, protecting the most fragile during the chronic phase and supporting them during the resilience phase. However, the urgency of the situation sometimes led to a lack of consultation between stakeholders who carried out similar actions. Several actors (associations, elected representatives, etc.) denounced the lack of dialogue with the prefecture, which placed itself in the position of a principal. A number of elected representatives and CCAS staff also regretted not having been consulted by the prefecture, with some being left with the impression of having been put aside.

I think that is one of the big regrets, when it [COVID-19] came, we were not considered, for the simple reason that at some point, people decided, without asking our opinion. (Said Salim - President of UDCCAS)

Some municipalities decided to distribute food parcels and vouchers on their own, with the results of such initiatives varying from one municipality to another. Some municipalities and CCAS were very effective in terms of distributing food vouchers very quickly, particularly to elderly and vulnerable people. Other communes made major logistical errors, including by distributing food parcels at the heart of villages. Several gatherings of this type failed to adequately respect the barrier gestures, led to situations of tension and gave rise to new infection clusters. In addition, as these distributions took place shortly before the municipal elections, several actors complained of abuses. In fact, for electoral purposes, many food vouchers were distributed to families who did not meet the criteria.

However, all of the organisations and structures learned a lot from their mistakes during the first wave, and the distribution of the food vouchers went much better during the second wave. Indeed, the second distribution of food vouchers was conducted through collaboration among the prefecture, DEETS, town halls, CADEMA, CCAS and associations. The distribution criteria were also improved and the distributions were much better organised.

Today, the CCAS and associations continue to distribute food vouchers to their constituents and beneficiaries.

Proactive policy concerning the installation of standpipes and water ramps: Photograph 2 A street hydrant



Source: www.lejournaldemayotte.yt

Background to the implementation: Standpipes were already installed in Mayotte prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. To operate them, people buy a card from the water company (SMAE), which they add credit to. However, various problems arose during the lockdown:

The lack of standpipes forced some people to travel long distances to fetch water, with some preferring to fetch non-potable water from rivers.

It proved impossible for some people to go to Kaweni to have their card recharged at the SMAE.

It was difficult for some of the population to respect the hygiene rules required to combat COVID-19 due to their lack of access to water.

The principle adopted: The aim was to allow the population to have access to drinking water close to their homes and to respect the barrier gestures.

Roles and responsibilities: The ARS oversaw the installation of the standpipes and water ramps. Partnerships were then established with associations that took charge of the water distribution.

The modus operandi: This policy was introduced during the first wave of the pandemic by the ARS. The prefecture was initially against the installation of water ramps and new standpipes. The ARS staff explained that they had to send numerous notes to the prefecture and defend their point of view during emergency meetings to convince the prefect to agree to the implementation. After two months of lockdown, the prefecture authorised the installation of new hydrants and water ramps. The ARS had 160 water ramps and new hydrants installed, leading to a total of 100 hydrants across the island. The ARS then invested in electronic cards on which it put several cubic metres and distributed them to associations (Red Cross, etc.) to enable free water distribution. Both staff and volunteers from the associations stood by the standpipes and distributed water throughout the day. This also allowed for the collection of information on the situations in different neighbourhoods and the feelings of the population. In terms of the installation of the water ramps, the ARS agents contacted the town halls directly to identify their needs and, on the basis of those needs, then proceeded to install the water ramps.

Operational performance: The installation of the new standpipes and water ramps enabled many families to access safe water close to their homes. During a time when many people had no cash inflow due to the cessation of the informal economy, this free access to water prevented human tragedy through the consumption of unsafe water. Sometimes, the installation of the facilities was delayed, for example, when there was a shortage of taps on the island and it was necessary to wait for a delivery. In the end, all of the planned installations were put in place. The implementation of this policy during the COVID-19 pandemic was a real driver of the installation of new standpipes, which now allow better access to drinking water for the poorest populations on the island.

Evaluation of the system: The water access policy can be considered effective because it achieved its objectives. When the state of emergency was lifted, many water ramps were dismantled and offered to the municipalities. In the event of another pandemic or health emergency, the municipalities will already have the equipment and will only have to reinstall it. However, some negative points should be noted. The first point mentioned by actors from the ARS and the associations was the late implementation of the policy due to the reluctance of the prefecture during the first two months of the pandemic. The second point concerned the prefecture's refusal to perform identity checks near the standpipes. There are two opposing points of view here, that of the ARS and the associations, which viewed the need for identity checks as an obstacle to accessing drinking water, and that of the prefecture, which refused to create areas where illegal immigrants would not be at risk of being arrested.

4 Policy impacts

4.1 Results of the proactive policies

The proactive policies put in place during the pandemic have made it possible to limit the impoverishment of Mayotte's population. Moreover, they have had a strong impact from a health perspective, albeit not from an environmental perspective.

Assessing the impacts of the policies implemented during the pandemic is complicated by the fact that the vast majority of those affected by the proactive policies work in the informal economy. It appears that the proactive policies have succeeded in achieving their objectives. However, the interviewees agreed that it is difficult to know whether all of the people concerned have benefited from the various forms of aid. In addition, some interviewees were keen to point out that the food aid policy was solely a response to the emergency situation, as it did not provide a lasting solution to the problems of poverty, inequality and precariousness.

I think there are people who are still excluded because this help is a one-off, whereas it's everyday life. As long as the economy doesn't pick up, even if it's an underground economy, it's still a way for them to meet their needs. At the time, it obviously helped, but in the long term, it's more long-term help that they need. (Said Salim - President of the UDCCAS)

The proactive policy that has had the greatest impact is arguably the installation of the new standpipes, which have made a real difference to access to drinking water in Mayotte.

4.2 Impacts on governance structures

Organisation of crisis meetings: In Mayotte, daily crisis meetings were held every evening by telephone during the first lockdown. These meetings were attended by only three territorial governance structures: the prefecture, the army and the ARS. The other structures and organisations were not invited to the meetings. For example, no video-conference meetings were ever held with all of the island's mayors. This situation was related by elected officials and many people from the CCAS, CADEMA and associations, who all felt that they were being sidelined and stressed the lack of information from the prefecture. Several interviewees described the prefecture as acting like a real principal who did not listen to the other organisations and structures during the first lockdown. For example, a director of a CCAS explained that the only contact he had with the prefecture during the 1st lockdown was a telephone call asking him to distribute the provided snacks to the population as quickly as possible, as otherwise they would be thrown away. He explained that this call had not been accompanied by an explanation of COVID-19 or advice on reopening the CCAS.

Implementation of telework: In Mayotte, prior to the pandemic, the governance structures worked almost exclusively in person. Yet, COVID-19 served as a driver of the implementation of telework. Many structures (CADEMA, Pôle emploi, etc.) have invested in laptops and had to rethink their modes of operation and organisation. Mayotte's training and research centre (the CUFR) has also adopted urgent measures to enable students to connect to the Internet, initially by purchasing 4G keys and then by following courses via videoconferencing after being loaned computers.

4.3 Consequences for cooperation between stakeholders

In particular, the identified policies have enabled the prefecture to get to know and establish new collaborations with various local associations. In the short and medium term, the COVID-19 pandemic has led to a strengthening of existing collaborations between stakeholders, for example, the collaboration between the prefecture and the ARS or between the CADEMA and the ARS. For instance, the first wave of COVID-19 was accompanied by a major dengue fever epidemic in Mayotte. To limit the spread of this vector-borne disease, the ARS has established a collaboration with the CADEMA's environmental department, which is now responsible for removing carcasses in the agglomeration. This completes the actions performed by the ARS vector control service. Furthermore, the ARS Mayotte, which is a very young structure (created on 1 January 2020; it was previously a branch of the ARS Réunion), was partly built during the crisis. The staff interviewed as part of this project agreed that the pandemic has influenced policies implemented by the structure.

Finally, according to several actors, the COVID-19 crisis has highlighted the need to implement national policies in an adapted and specific manner in the French overseas territories.

It took this crisis to change our relationship with the Ministry. In particular, it finally understood that we are overseas territories, that we are really different, that we need to lead the different COVID responses, that we can share the same objectives, but that the implementation must be left in the hands of the territories very clearly. (Julien Thiria - Director of Public Health at the ARS)

4.4 Policy funding

The emergency food aid was financed by the DIHAL to the tune of €2.8M, by the EDF to the tune of €2.6M and by the prefecture via the anti-poverty plan to the tune of €100K.

The distribution of the food vouchers and parcels by the town halls and the Departmental Council was funded from their own budgets.

The installation of the standpipes and water ramps was largely financed by the ARS, with only a few town halls agreeing to participate. The ARS paid all of the bills for water distributed free of charge to vulnerable populations and compensated the associations in this regard throughout the state of emergency (1st and 2nd lockdowns).

5 Future policy directions

5.1 Future policy directions

Just transition Policies

Food autonomy

Overseas, due to their remoteness, are impacted by the high cost of living, accentuated by the war in Ukraine and the Covid-19 pandemic. There is therefore a need for food self-sufficiency. The importation of food products is one of the common points of the overseas territories. Mayotte is no exception. Worse still, it exports almost nothing. Aquaculture, which had shown promise for the future, has declined. Fish farming is no longer done, thus putting an end to their export. Mauritian agriculture is mainly food-producing. In the list of local vegetables, the green banana comes first in quantity. Cassava, eggplants, various breeds and lettuce are grown and consumed in the department. The Mahoran tomato has a bad reputation because of the pesticides used. They are competing with tomatoes that arrive by plane at 10 euros per kilo. By becoming an outermost region, Mayotte can benefit from European funds to develop the existing sectors, but farmers are faced with administrative problems, particularly concerning land. More than half of the farms have neither water nor electricity.

Mayotte is still far from being able to rely on itself. In this context, food autonomy is an ultra priority for the years to come.

5.2 Regional recommendations

The COVID-19 pandemic has not had an influence on policy in the region as such. However, it has served as a driver of the implementation of 'just transition' and 'smart transition' policies. The pandemic has also led to better access to drinking water as well as a reduction in the digital divide.

5.2.1 Policy Recommendations

Do not try to import good practices but innovate. The territory of Mayotte is so singular that the majority of interviewees explained that they had difficulty identifying territories where the identified policies could be replicated. Some mentioned French Guiana, where a significant proportion of the population also lives below the national poverty line. Finally, one representative of the ARS explained that certain local adaptations, particularly in terms of prevention or vaccination, would be worth replicating in certain disadvantaged neighbourhoods in mainland France (e.g. mobile and free screening). Given the specificities of this island, it is therefore preferable that it does not necessarily seek to replicate good practices from elsewhere, but rather that it seeks to innovate and find its path.

Do not stop measures that aim at greater social justice. The distribution of the food vouchers under the umbrella of the prefecture and orchestrated by the DEETS (Regional Directorate for the Economy, Employment, Labour and Solidarity) stopped when the state of emergency was lifted. The free distribution of drinking water by the ARS also stopped at the same time. However, given the social context, the low economic development and the significant increase in the cost of living in Mayotte, policies intended to reduce poverty and inequality are being actively pursued in the territory.

Facilitate the integration of young people and job seekers. This involves better support for young people in difficulty by providing them with specific and reinforced follow-up; by supporting parenthood, in particular by relying on family educational actions; by continuing specific measures to support job creation and help people in difficulty return to work.

5.2.2 Governance Recommendation

Bringing together the stakeholders of territorial development. Several interviewees referenced improved governance and collaboration in the future through better consultation and communication among stakeholders. Lack of communication or distorted communication has been shown in the past to have deleterious effects on local public policy design. The crisis has shown that complete coordination and transmission of information has significantly improved territorial governance between the different levels. The question of governance of the process is decisive. Giving visibility to the measures enables public action to be put into perspective, expectations to be prioritized, and public actors to be made responsible in the exercise of their competences.

To better train local agents and elected officials and to adapt their skills to the needs by setting up a large-scale training program for public agents; by creating, within *the Mahoranian coordinating committee for professional training*, a commission responsible for steering, monitoring and evaluating this training plan; by providing local authorities with tools that will enable them to control their human resources situation.

5.2.3 Territorial Recommendations

Targeting training more closely to the needs of the region and to occupations to promote employment for all. This involves developing work-study training by transposing the provisions of the metropolitan labour code on apprenticeship and the professionalization contract; encouraging the involvement of the provisions of the metropolitan labor code with regard to apprenticeship and the professionalization contract; by encouraging greater involvement of companies in work-study training. It is also important to promote regional cooperation in higher education and skills and vocational training by increasing support for mobility, particularly through the territorial continuity fund. It is also important to identify the technical training sectors that will give structure to the territory: building and construction; health and social services; tourism; agriculture, agri-food and aquaculture; sustainable development.

Provide Mayotte with the infrastructure necessary for balanced development of the territory and its regional integration by improving the mobility of its inhabitants:

- Support the implementation of an urban and interurban transport policy and develop the road infrastructure by creating interurban lines; by improving traffic conditions on national and departmental roads,
- Supporting the growth of the port with the ambition of guaranteeing, as a priority, the supply of Mayotte under acceptable conditions of safety, cost and regularity. The realization of this ambition will be based on the provision of State and European funds; by reorganizing traffic from and to the port through maritime links in order to strengthen the role of the port of Longoni as a regional service platform for the Comoros and northern Madagascar.

5.2.4 Financial Recommendations

Train elected officials and government technical staff responsible for managing EU programs. In addition to the efforts required of local authorities to meet "European standards", companies or structures wishing to receive European funds must make the same effort. It is under this condition that it will be easier to mobilize these funds.

Promote private economic initiatives, for example through the implementation of financial or project assistance by the Departmental Council, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry or Pôle emploi (the employment agency).

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ESPON 2020

ESPON EGTC

11, Avenue John F. Kennedy

L-1855 Luxembourg - Kirchberg

Grand Duchy of Luxembourg

P: 00352 20 600 280

F: 00352 20 600 280 01

E: info@espon.eu

www.espon.eu

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